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China’s civil nuclear power programme is a sensitive topic which has seldom been 
researched by social or political scientists inside or outside of China. In the past, 
public participation activities in relation to nuclear power issues in China were rare. 
However, in 2005, when the central government decided to promote civil nuclear 
development and build 40 more nuclear reactors within the next 20 years, the public 
started to become aware of the potential environmental risks that might be caused by 
nuclear power sites. Based on six months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted 
between 2007-2008, this thesis represents the first in-depth study of local people’s 
ways of participation concerning a potential inland nuclear power project in China. It 
provides rich empirical materials to illustrate local people’s differing perceptions of 
nuclear power and its risks.   
         
The thesis reviews developments in the sociological theorisation of ‘risk’ and, by 
bringing this body of literature into dialogue with the empirical case study, explores 
its possibilities and limitations as a means of understanding the social construction of 
risk in contemporary China. In exploring the social, cultural and political context of 
risk construction, it illustrates how political power and social status influence local 
people’s participation in nuclear power issues. It also demonstrates that citizens’ 
growing environmental risk awareness helps to create space within which they can 
make their voices heard and, simultaneously, that generating open spaces for people 
to express their opinions helps to shape their awareness of environmental risk. The 
central conclusion of the analysis is that, in the context of Chinese society political 
power, by which I mean policy makers’ ideology and all levels of governments, 
plays a particularly crucial role in the definition, management and governance of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
As Chinese people who were born in the 1980s, we were seen as the generation that 
was growing up alongside the country while it was in the process of reform and 
opening up. Our generation witnessed the country’s rapid economic development in 
the areas of science, technology and industry, and its development as well in areas 
concerning environmental degradation. Most of us who lived in the cities had the 
experience of moving out of flats in five- or six-floor buildings without elevator 
access, to flats in buildings with elevator access to forty floors or more. From the 
mid-1990s to the beginning of the 21st century, people thought this moving process 
symbolised an upgrade to modern living. More recently, however, those able to 
afford housing located at the edge of big cities, have been considered as enjoying a 
better natural living environment and better lifestyles in general. Chinese people who 
have benefited from the country’s economic development (especially in big cities) 
now pay more and more attention to their well-being besides money-earning. They 
are becoming aware of the environmental risks that come with scientific, 
technological and industrial development. Since the 80s, the country has become the 
leading factory for world manufacturers.  In order to support huge manufacturing 
demands, the country faces a continuing challenge to its energy supply; it also faces 
an ongoing challenge to pay attention to industrial air, water and soil pollution. An 
over-dependence on coal power has caused the country to become the world's 
number one emitter of carbon dioxide (Zbicz 2009). The conflict between economic 
and industrial development, and the related negative effects on nature and the 
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environment, is becoming one of the most serious conflicts in Chinese society. Along 
with this conflict, it seems that ‘risk’ has become an unavoidable concept worth 
being discussed in the Chinese context. It is important to consider how countryside 
areas and less developed regions can catch up with the country’s modern 
development – and how risks can be minimised in the process. Sustainable 
development and the building of an environmentally friendly society are national 
policies in China.  
 
Risk is a concept that has been widely discussed by Western sociologists and 
anthropologists since the 1970s. The ‘risk’ I discuss in my thesis is not the same as 
the risk with which people are familiar in economic and financial areas. It is the risk 
related to nature, and especially the risk caused by science and technology 
development and the influence of that development on nature. This kind of risk will 
typically be discussed in relation to modern technology, such as nuclear power 
projects, GM food, environmental crises such as global warming, and also health 
disasters, such as BSE. However, as a student from a totally different cultural, social 
and political context, it is sometimes difficult to understand how different disciplines 
and subjects (especially in Western developed countries) interpret definitions and 
perceptions of risk.  
 
This research intends to see how risk – as a concept and discourse derived and 
embedded within Western rationales – makes sense in the local context in Chinese 
society. In my thesis, China’s civil nuclear power development has been used as a 
case study for interpreting the concept of risk in Chinese society. This research uses 
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the ethnography-style case study as a methodology for analysing the controversy 
over the potential inland nuclear power project inside Guangdong province. 
 
1.1 Context of China’s civil nuclear power development 
      
Nuclear power has been widely used as a case study through which to discuss risk 
issues. As a kind of powerful technology that has been used in military and civil 
energy recourse, nuclear power has a special technological and scientific background, 
and is also a highly politically-orientated technology. When the UK and the US first 
discovered the use of nuclear power as energy, it was thought that human beings had 
stolen the secret from nature itself (Welsh 2000). In France, the development of a 
nuclear industry after World War II was seen as a way for the country to recover its 
national identity as a technological nation (Hecht 1998). Although nuclear power has 
been used as the ‘big science’ for securing the leadership position of Western 
Industrial Countries, debates and concerns about technological risks have been 
ongoing. Moreover, accidents which happened in Windscale, UK in 1957, only one 
year after the world’s first nuclear power station was operated, and later accidents 
such as Three Mile Island and Chernobyl (which happened in the 70s and 80s), have 
caused nuclear power development to face more serious challenges and difficulties. 
Nuclear power has become a controversial energy resource. On the one hand, its 
value is attractive. On the other hand, the public are concerned about the risks. 
Recently, because of the rise in oil prices and an increased instability with the oil 
supply, the UK government started new discussions about nuclear energy. China is a 
developing country that faces huge difficulties in energy supply and demand, and 
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also greenhouse gas release pressure. The country is promoting nuclear power as a 
long-term energy resource. According to the development plan, 40 more nuclear 
reactors will be built by 2020 (NDRC 2007). China’s civil nuclear power 
development model is different from the UK and US model. Firstly, this is because 
the nuclear power development policy is decided by the central government. 
Provincial governments cooperate with nuclear power companies to compete for 
nuclear power projects to be located in their areas. Secondly, the country mostly 
depends on technologies and equipments imported from foreign countries. 
International nuclear power companies bid for China’s nuclear power projects. And 
thirdly, the electricity market is not completely market-orientated. Although the price 
of nuclear power electricity is still more expensive than coal-fired and hydropower 
electricity, the National Power Grid (NPG) buys and sells all electricity from nuclear 
power.  According to these reasons, when policy-makers make decisions about 
nuclear power policy, they do not simply consider technological and economic 
elements. They also consider energy safety, national security and military issues. It is 
true that policy-makers in Western countries also consider these issues.  Just like 
Welsh has claimed, “At the national level nuclear capability became a defining 
feature of the political, ideological and economic anatomy of both capitalist and 
socialist states” (Welsh 2000). However, in China strategic considerations (national 
security, energy safety, military industry) are much more than economic and 
technological considerations in nuclear power issues. Recently, thanks to an 
institutional reform of the electricity industry and some resistance activity to civil 
nuclear power projects, civil nuclear power development is now on the way of 
transferring from government to governance. It is this complicated industry and the 
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special moment of its transformation which offer rich empirical sources for my 
research.   
 
1.2 Academic Objectives 
 
This research originates from three theoretical perspectives. Firstly, I was fascinated 
by the relationship between risk, science and modernity in Beck’s risk society theory 
(1992a, 1992b; see chapter 2). Beck’s theory had a strong effect on me from the very 
beginning, which made me feel that I had come across a totally different social 
organisation system in modern Western society. I started to formulate the question: if 
China keeps following the model of modernity used by Western developed countries, 
will Chinese society face the same risks and uncertainties? Is there any way that 
Chinese society – which developed in an entirely different historical, cultural and 
political background – can learn from modern development and minimise its risks? 
This is how I first started to try to see the applicability of Beck’s risk society theory 
to China. Through the research process, I became aware of the limitations of using 
Beck’s theory as a theoretical background for interpreting empirical cases. I came 
across Wynne’s critiques about Beck’s theory. Wynne (1996, 2001; see chapter 2) 
offers a much deeper consideration of the relationship between real existing risk and 
people’s risk perception. Wynne offers rich empirical research to interpret and 
analyse how lay people’s knowledge of risk was denied and ignored by scientists and 
experts, and to demonstrate how ignorant lay people were about their own 
knowledge of risk. There are also other criticisms (Elliott 2002; Irwin 2001; Jasanoff 
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1999; Yearley 2005) about Beck’s theory. Wynne’s insightful argument about lay 
knowledge constructs my first academic objective.  
 
Secondly, I intend to analyse the power – and space – that is needed in order for the 
public to define risks and make their voices heard in environmental issues. Jasanoff 
(1998), in science studies, discusses three regulatory, policy decision-making models 
that link policy-making with public perceptions of risk. In Chinese studies, Wang 
(2008) discusses six models of the public issue agenda and policy decision-making. 
Wang’s model represents the linkage of public policy and policy decision-making in 
the Chinese context. I found that both models (Jasanoff’s and Wang’s) represent the 
important position of power in policy decision-making. The discussion of power in 
environmental sociology suggests that risk constructions are controlled by industrial 
and scientific authorities. In order to gain a certain power to define risk and to 
influence policy decision-making, individuals have to cooperate as groups or join 
together in other environmental protection organisations (Freudenburg & Pastor). 
However, a country’s public policy style is continually influenced by the public’s 
participation activities, and vice versa. The second point I intend to research in my 
thesis is the relationship between power and public space, and the people’s 
participation in governance of environmental risk.  
 
The third academic purpose of this study is to provide ethnographic data from the 
field. Nuclear power has been one of the most popular empirical cases for risk 
studies in Western countries (Beck 1992b; Irwin 2001; Pidgeon, Lorenzoni & 
Poortinga 2008; Welsh 2000; Wynne 1982; Zonabend 1993). In China, however, 
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nuclear power is a sensitive topic that has rarely been discussed. The third main 
contribution of this research, therefore, is to use China’s civil nuclear power as an 
empirical extension of Western theory in the Chinese context.   
  
1.3 The unit of research 
 
The research uses the controversy of the potential inland nuclear power project in the 
upper reaches of the Han River as the single case for in-depth study and analysis. 
The case concerns a controversy over a potential inland nuclear power project that 
might be located in the upper reaches of the Han River. The Han River is one of the 
main rivers in the east area of Guangdong province. It is the main drinking water 
resource for over 10,000,000 people in the lower reaches. It was reported that the 
three locations (two in the Dapu townland and one in the Fengshun townland; see 
map 5.3 in chapter 5) had passed the preliminary test for building the inland nuclear 
power site. The news provoked debates about the potential nuclear power project, 
and people in the lower reaches began to worry that their drinking water resource 
might be polluted. People’s Deputies (PDs) from two of the main cities in the lower 
reaches, Chaozhou and Shantou, asked for an inquiry meeting at the Provincial 
People’s Congress. In the inquiry meeting, officials from Guangdong provincial 
government and government agencies – along with experts from China Guangdong 
Nuclear Power Group (CGNPG), had a face-to-face meeting with PDs and answered 
questions and concerns directly. After the inquiry meeting, PDs also produced 
official paperwork for inquiry and the Guangdong Development and Reform 
Commission (GDRC) gave feedback to PDs on two different occasions through 
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official reply letters. My case study starts with this controversy. The fieldwork 
research was conducted in Dapu townland, Chaozhou city and Shantou city in order 
to understand the local context of the three locations, people’s daily lives, the local 
political system (mainly focusing on the Local People’s Congress), and the local 
understanding of nuclear power and nuclear risk. In the two phases of fieldwork 
(three months each), over 60 formal and informal interviews were conducted with 
local residents in the townland, farmers in the villages, local government officials, 
local civil servants, PDs who attended the inquiry meeting, journalists who reported 
the news, and other officials and experts in Guangzhou city and Beijing.     
    
1.4 Thesis structure  
 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides a literature review of 
relevant theories and scholarship concerning risk, science and society. Chapter 3 
offers the historical background of China’s civil nuclear power development and 
briefly introduces general information about China’s civil nuclear power stations and 
reactors; the decision-making of nuclear power stations; the economic and 
technological status of the country’s civil nuclear industries; and also the government 
and governance of civil nuclear power in China. Chapter 4 is the methodology 
chapter that discusses the process of the fieldwork research, problem resolving in the 
field, and the various methods for case and data collection. Chapters 5 to 8 are the 
four main field-finding chapters. Chapter 5 mainly introduces the local context of the 
Han River basin and the townland where I conducted the ethnographic research; the 
local geographical situation (with maps and pictures); the local living conditions; and 
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the local culture and environmental awareness. Chapter 6 focuses on local 
understandings of nuclear power and its risks, constructions of trust and ignorance 
regarding nuclear power and its risks, and risk-benefit trade-offs. Chapter 7 mainly 
discusses power issues and bottom-up politics in the local context. The main point of 
analysis is the Local People’s Congress. Chapter 8 is about the media and online 
communities. Chapter 9 is the final discussion and conclusion chapter.
Chapter 2 Literature Review  
 
2.1 Introduction  
Risk has been an important topic in the multiple disciplines of social research in 
Western countries for over thirty years. Authors have discussed risk in the disciplines 
of Science and Technology Studies (STS), the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
(SSK) and Environmental Sociology. Leading theorists researching risk include: 
Beck and Giddens (risk society and reflexive modernisation), Douglas and Wildasky 
(risk and culture), Foucault (‘governmentality’ theorists) (Lupton 1999:24). In his 
risk society theory, Beck considers risks in knowledge and perception of risks as the 
same (Beck 1992b). In his later work Beck displays ambivalence as to whether risk is 
real or socially constructed. Besides these leading theorists and their theories about 
risk, in the area of science studies risk is also a traditional theme (Yearley 2005). In 
the SSK discipline, authors like Wynne and Irwin discuss the influence of interests, 
power and institutions in shaping lay and expert knowledge of risk (Jasanoff 1998). 
The purpose of reviewing Beck and Giddens’ risk theory and critiques through the 
STS/SSK discipline is to clarify one key theoretical concept of the thesis: whether to 
treat risk in a realist manner or a subjective constructing process according to 
different people’s perception. In this chapter I firstly conduct a critical review of risk 
society theory and reflexive modernisation through the SSK discipline. In this 
section, I intend to review how authors in the SSK discipline point out the 
problematic nature of Beck and Giddens’ theory about risk when they treat risk as a 
realistic matter from the very beginning.  Secondly, I review literature about the 
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division between lay and expert knowledge of risk. Thirdly, I focus on Jasanoff’s 
three models which link risk perception and policy decision-making. Fourthly, I 
review literature about risk in the environmental sociology discipline, which focuses 
on the risk constructing and defining process. Fifthly, I try to link those arguments in 
the previous section with the concept of risk perception and participation in risk 
governance.  The final two parts are about literature in China Studies about China’s 
risk and changing social class and models of public agenda and policy decision-
making.  
 
2.2 Critical Review of Risk Society and Reflexive 
Modernisation   
In this section I review Beck and Giddens’ theory of risk, modernity and reflexive 
modernisation. I have put this in the first section of the chapter because of my special 
interest in the risk society theory and the definition of risk which is quite different 
from what I am familiar with in the Chinese context, for example risk in the financial 
market, and risk from smoking. Some social scholars claim that ‘risk’ finds its 
origins in the Latin word risco and was first used as a navigational term by sailors 
entering uncharted waters (Giddens 1999; Lupton 1999; Strydom 2002). Risks have 
existed in various aspects of social lives for a long time; for example, investment will 
bring economic risks; smoking will bring health risks; driving cars will bring safety 
risks. Risk means the possibility for bad things to happen. However it does not mean 
that the bad things do happen, and no one knows when they will happen; for example, 
smoking carries the risk of cancer, but it does not mean people who smoke will 
- 11 - 
 
definitely get cancer. However in Beck’s theory, “a risk, for him, is another word for 
a hazard or danger” (Lupton 1999:59). In the very beginning of my PhD study I had 
the notion that modern Western society is just like what Beck has described in his 
book ‘Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity’. I assumed this was especially the 
case for the risk of nuclear power which he uses to represent the kind of risk he 
analyses in his thesis. In the risk society as Beck has described it, the development of 
science and technology no longer primarily distributes benefits as they used to do in 
the industrial society, but distributes risk (Beck 1992b). Giddens defines this kind of 
risk as ‘manufactured risks’ (Giddens 1999), and claims that this manufactured risk 
is “created by the very impact of our developing knowledge upon the world” 
(Giddens 1999:26); given its novelty, people have very little experience of dealing 
with it, and it is not insurable or calculable. Both Beck and Giddens claim that 
environmental risks such as global warming and the hole in the ozone layer should 
be counted as so-called ‘manufactured risks’, being what we have done to nature. 
Certainly, manufactured risk does not refer only to nature and the environment. It is 
also represented in other aspects of people’s lives as well. However, risks relating to 
the environment and nature are the main issues I discuss in my thesis.    
    
Beck and Giddens believe that it is the development of science and technology in the 
modernisation process of Western countries that creates this kind of risk which 
makes people’s lives full of uncertainty. They also believe that the uncertainty that 
the public have about their lives in modern society creates a new social regulation 
system, and the discourse of risk is the key topic in this system. Giddens claims that 
“risk was supposed to be a way of regulating the future, of normalising it and 
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bringing it under our dominion” (Giddens 1999:26). In this section I will summarise 
three main criticisms of arguments that Beck makes about risk and modernity which 
are relevant to my thesis. 
 
Firstly, Beck overemphasised the negative thoughts that the public generally have 
about modernity and especially developments in science and technology.  
 
 
“‘Risk society’ means an epoch in which the dark sides of progress increasingly 
come to dominate social debates. What no one saw and no one wanted – self-
endangerment and the devastation of nature – is becoming the motive force of 
history.” (Beck 1995:2)  
 
Beck claims that in the risk society science and technology change from key social 
values to troublemakers. Developments in science and technology and the public’s 
concerns about the risks caused by these developments become the main conflict of 
the society. This will lead to a new social system.  
 
“We do not yet live in a risk society, but we also no longer live only within 
distribution conflicts of scarcity societies. To the extent that this transition occurs, 
there will be a real transformation of society which will lead us out of the previous 
models of thought and action.” (Beck 1992b:20)  
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Simply put, Beck believes that the dark side of science and technology development 
will take over the world in the coming future. People worry about everything 
including their daily drinking water, food, the air they breathe, and also unpredictable 
harms such as nuclear pollution and so on. Irwin claims that although environmental 
risks like nuclear radiation and global warming are horrifying, they are not yet 
central to people’s lives compared to other ordinary everyday risks like poverty and 
unemployment (Irwin 2001). Moreover, Beck ignores the ‘high level of public 
support for new technologies’ (Irwin 2001:65). Although science and technology 
developments did bring with them controversies and problems such as nuclear power 
and GM food, this does not change the fact that technological innovation is essential 
to make people’s lives more convenient and advanced. Welsh argues that techniques 
will not destroy tradition; moreover, it is a crucial way for tradition to be reinvented 
within modernity (Welsh 2000). Dicknes (1992) claims that Beck does not consider 
what the public really thinks; he simply puts down his own critical thoughts on 
society (Wilkinson 2001). My field findings on local people’s understanding of 
nuclear risk (see chapter 5 and 6) indicate that in the local context, people do not 
actually worry so much about risks from nuclear power projects. Compared to risks 
and difficulties they face every day, nuclear technology sometimes is actually seen as 
an opportunity rather than a risk. 
 
Secondly, Beck believes that risk will end class inequality in society. Risks like 
nuclear pollution and global warming are equally distributed to people whether they 
are wealthy or in higher social classes. In industrial and modern society, wealth and 
higher social classes mean the ability to avoid some social risks, such as 
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unemployment, poverty and hunger. Rich people will be able to buy organic food 
which is considered much safer than normal supermarket products. However, in the 
risk society, risk is coming globally and is unavoidable; the wealthy and the poor are 
equally affected by risks such as global warming.  
 
Yearley believes that Beck’s claims about equality of risk in environmental issues 
are incorrect. Environmental justice movements provide good examples in showing 
that the environmental risks which Beck talks about in risk society are not equally 
distributed to everyone (Yearley 2005). A lot of harmful chemical factories and 
polluting industries are situated close to residential areas inhabited by poor people. 
“Environmental ‘bads’ are still often distributed quite unequally along ethical, gender 
and class lines” (Yearley 2005:141). My field findings also point to the inequalities 
in the location selection of potential nuclear power sites. The poor economic 
conditions and low population are reasons why Dapu townland has been picked up as 
the potential location site of a nuclear power project rather than economically 
developed and rich cities in Guangdong (details of Dapu townland will be discussed 
in chapter 5).  
 
Thirdly, Beck takes for granted lay people’s knowledge of risk and science, and also 
their ability to be reflexive on expert systems and institutions. Beck believes that 
people’s concerns and perceptions of non-accessible and non-insurable risks give 
them power to challenge experts and authorities. “Beck’s analysis of the ‘risk 
society’ suggests that centralised institutions such as national governments are 
fundamentally incapable of responding to contemporary environmental and risk 
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concerns” (Irwin 2001:52). Apart from his claims about institutions, Beck also 
points out the lost function of expertise, since experts and authorities would not be 
able to give convincing solutions to this kind of risk. This provides individual power 
in the public sphere to choose one’s way of life, which never previously happened in 
any kind of social system. Because of the existence of manufactured risk, people gain 
the power to become involved in defining and managing risk. This is the so-called 
‘individualisation’ in Beck’s theory. People’s lives in more and more areas escape 
the control of traditional politics, cultures and experiences. “People must choose 
paths for a more rewarding life – all of which requires planning and rationalisation, 
deliberation and engagement” (Elliott 2002:298). Elliott (2002) claims that Beck’s 
idea of individualisation does not consider the influence of class and economic 
context on people’s choices and decision-making. Today, even in Western capitalist 
society, the division between rich and poor is getting bigger, and class difference is 
distinctive, just as in socialist countries like China1. People do not have equal access 
to the resources and ability to define risks even though these risks may be equally 
distributed to them.  
“It has also become evident – and this is crucial – that one must be able to deploy 
certain educational resources, symbolic goods, cultural and media capabilities, as 
well as cognitive and affective aptitudes, in order to count as a ‘player’ in the 
privatisation of risk-detection and risk-management. People who cannot deploy such 
resources and capabilities, often the result of various material and class inequalities, 
are likely to find themselves further disadvantaged and marginalised in a new world 
order reflexive modernisation” (Elliott 2002:305). 
                                                 
1Details of China’s income inequality, class and social status will be discussed in 2.6.  
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 In Beck’s risk society theory, he treats risk as a realistic matter that comes along 
with society’s development of science and technology. In STS/SSK literature authors 
generally discuss people’s perception of risk. Authors like Wynne and Irwin use 
empirical cases to research lay people’s knowledge about science and risk.  
Wynne criticises, firstly, Beck’s understanding of lay people’s knowledge of risk. It 
is not that the public do not trust in institutions to handle real risk, and then react to 
those institutions and expert systems. In reality, the public’s knowledge of risk is 
influenced and shaped by cultural and political background, and at the same time 
depends on institutions and expert systems. Secondly, the public would not be able to 
react to those institutions and expert systems because they are dependent on them for 
the control of risk (Wynne 1996). The social and cultural framing of risk which is 
represented in the case of the proposed inland nuclear project is what I want to 
discuss in this thesis. It matches Wynne’s idea and critiques of Beck’s and Giddens’ 
arguments about lay and expert knowledge of risk which will be discussed further in 
the next section.  
  
2.3 Lay and Expert Knowledge of Risk  
Beck and Giddens believe that risks in modern society are real, universal and 
unmanageable. There is another group of authors (Wynne, Lash, Irwin, Jasanoff, 
Yearley, Hannigan) who discuss risk through constructivist epistemology. These 
authors, from a background of science studies, the public understanding of science 
and environmental policy analysis, focus more on lay knowledge and public 
expertise rather than the institution of science (Yearley 2000). Moreover, Beck and 
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Giddens have been criticised for “their uncritical reproduction of ‘realist’ concepts of 
scientific knowledge” (Wynne 1996:45). Wynne and Lash suggest that: “they have 
understated the importance of the cultural nature of science, and especially of 
implication of fundamental indeterminacies in knowledge which a cultural 
perspective should be able to capture” (Wynne 1996:5).  Wynne thinks that Beck and 
Giddens take for granted lay and expert knowledge about risk. They do not consider 
the power embedded in institutions and expert systems and their influence on lay 
understanding of risk and science. Wynne also discusses the ambivalence of lay 
people’s trust and their dependency, which I will address later in this section and also 
with my field findings in chapter 6.  
 
2.3.1 Defining lay knowledge of risk  
 
Before analysing the division between lay and expert knowledge of risk, it is first 
important to review how authors define lay knowledge of risk. Wynne believes that 
lay people’s knowledge of risk is based on their cultural backgrounds and everyday 
experiences, and is also influenced by lay people’s ignorance2.Wynne argues that lay 
people and scientists might have different but equally important expertise with regard 
to local risks (Yearley 2000). However, the knowledge and expertise of lay people 
have been ignored, and they are also ignorant about the knowledge they have. 
Scientific definitions of risk have been seen as “objective, natural and universal 
representations” (Wynne 2005:70), while lay knowledge has been seen as having “no 
                                                 
2“Ignorance: ‘We don’t know what we don’t know.’ In other words, we don’t even know the main 
parameters for sure.” Wynne, Brian (1992b) 'Uncertainty and Environmental Learning ', Global 
Environmental Change 2: 111-27.  
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real content or authority beyond the parochial, subjective and emotional world of its 
carriers” (Wynne 1996:63). Wynne’s famous sheep farmer case supports his 
criticism. The case concerns a sudden ban on hill sheep sales in the UK six weeks 
after the Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986, because radioactive clouds passed over 
the UK. Scientists and experts only expected the ban to last for three weeks; however, 
their advice was based on incorrect assumptions about the soil3. “Because they had 
assumed that the knowledge drawn from particular conditions was universal 
knowledge the scientists did not understand that in these conditions the sheep were 
exposed to continual recontamination and hence probably much longer-term 
restriction” (Wynne 1996:66). Some hill farms in Cumbria and North Wales could 
not sell their sheep for six years (more than a hundred sheep farm bans were still in 
place in Cumbria and Snowdonia in 2010). In this case lay people (sheep farmers) 
actually have certain knowledge of the soil and climate, as they deal with the natural 
situation all the time. On the one hand, the scientists and experts only conducted the 
research in labs without knowing the real soil and climate conditions. However, they 
misunderstood local people’s scientific knowledge. It is not because the public do not 
have enough knowledge; it is because their knowledge has been ignored. On the 
other hand, farmers did not know how much they knew. They did not at first think of 
their everyday life experience as ‘knowledge’. Wynne (2001, 2005) believes that 
experts misunderstand the public concern of uncertainty. It is not because the public 
worry about uncertainty and want to have zero risk. It is because lay people do not 
know what they know or do not know, so they worry. Wynne points out that lay 
                                                 
3“The scientists made a spectacular mistake in predicting the behaviour of radiocaesium in the 
environment of interest. It was gradually learned that the reason for the mistake was that the original 
prediction had been based on the observed behaviour of caesium in alkaline clay soils, whereas those 
of the areas in question were acid peaty soils.” Ibid. 
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people’s ignorance of their knowledge of risk, and experts’ and authorities’ 
ignorance of lay knowledge, have been misunderstood as lay people not having 
enough scientific knowledge so they trust expertise. Besides Wynne, Michael (1996) 
is another author who analyses public ignorance in SSK. Michael’s research 
indicates that people are actually constructing their attitude to science when they 
claim ignorance to science. Michael’s research about public ignorance to scientific 
knowledge explains some of my research findings during fieldwork research (for 
details see 6.3).  
 
 2.3.2 Trust  
 
 
Giddens (1990, 1991, 1994) and Wynne (1996) offer two interpretations of public 
expressions of trust in those institutions that manage risky local technology. 
Giddens’ interpretation considers trust from a reflexive modernisation approach. In 
this approach he defines two kinds of trust. The first kind (in ‘simple modernity’) is 
present in an expression of unexamined trust in expertise (Giddens 1994). The 
second kind happens when people obtain scientific knowledge that has been provided 
by an expert system, and then respond to (are ‘reflexive’ to) the system and actively 
choose what to trust (Giddens 1994). The difference between these two kinds of trust 
is that one is being reflexive to scientific knowledge and the other is not (Szerszynski 
1999). Wynne criticises Giddens’ interpretation of trust, arguing that:  
“He (Giddens) thus makes two mistaken and mutually reinforcing 
assumptions – that the earlier, ostensibly publicly uncontested status of 
expertise equalled public trust; and that the reflexive processes of late 
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modernity in which expertise is widely and openly contested are a result of 
the choices that have to be deliberately made by people exposed as they are 
(on this view) to a new dimension of insecurity, namely the problematisation 
of (supposedly) previously unproblematic expert authority.” (Wynne 1996:48) 
Wynne’s research about the hill sheep-farmers of the Lake District indicates that 
local people’s trust is found through the process of social identity negotiation and 
also certain levels of dependency among some groups (Wynne 1992a).  Here the 
trust that Wynne discusses is not just tied to the issue of claims of knowledge, but to 
a broader set of issues of institutional integrity, social dynamics of trust relations, and 
the way that trust is achieved in different social and cultural contexts. In the hill 
sheep-farmer case, it is local farmers’ identity, their dependency on institutions and 
also their lack of agency which gave them no choice under the circumstances but to 
accept the credibility of scientists’ advice. My field findings which will be discussed 
in chapter 6 are incredibly similar to Wynne’s case.       
2.3.3 Critiques of Objective Risk Assessment  
In comparison to lay knowledge, scientific knowledge has been defined as the 
objective way of understanding risk. Risk assessment as an objective way to measure 
and calculate risk has been used in policy decision-making processes (Yearley 2005). 
Policy-makers use risk assessment to calculate how much cost is worth spending on 
how much risk. However, Yearley (2005) claims that it is difficult to assess risk and 
cost in a practical way. Firstly, it is difficult to compare risk in different fields: for 
example risk from transport, industry and agriculture cannot be calculated in the 
same way. Secondly, the data needed for risk assessment can not be equally provided 
in different risk issues; for example, there is much more data on car accidents 
- 21 - 
 
compared to nuclear accidents. Thirdly, it is hard to quantify risk: for example, “it is 
just not possible to come to an objective solution to the question of how many severe 
injuries are equal to an average death” (Yearley 2005:132).  
 
In risk assessment, normally risk is calculated using the standard size of man to 
represent the average person (Yearley 2005). Yearley uses the case of air-bags to 
point out the problem of the average person in risk assessment. In the US the average 
person for a crash test is a standard-size American male weighing around 78kg. The 
design of air-bags of motor vehicles uses this as a reference point. However, it has 
been reported that drivers who are shorter or lighter are injured by the inflation of the 
bag. Obviously, using the average person to represent all passengers in risk 
calculation posed serious problems for people’s safety. 
 
 It is not possible to have an objective or scientific view of risks, since objective risk 
assessments have a lot of practical problems, and the scientific view of risk is not 
universal and correct in all conditions. In the sociology of scientific knowledge 
approach, risk has been considered as socially constructed. In this approach risk is 
shaped by culture, history and politics in different social contexts (Jasanoff 1999).  
 
2.4 Risk Perception and Policy Decision-Making  
 
In SSK authors like Wynne and Irwin concentrate on how lay people’s knowledge of 
risks has been ignored and misunderstood. However, neither of them has conducted 
much analysis on how lay people’s perception of risks is shaped. Psychometric 
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research on risk perception highlights the distinction between lay people’s perception 
of risk and scientific measured ‘actual’ risk, and also risk perception has been 
considered as shaped by “ignorance, prior beliefs, and subjective personal 
experiences of non-experts” (Jasanoff 1998:91). Although I am not going to discuss 
the psychometric research on risk perception in my thesis, in this section I review 
Jasanoff’s three models about the relationship between the public’s risk perception 
and public policy (table 2.1). 
 
“Theories of risk perception are inherently political because they carry within them 
implicit understandings about how to organise and implement policies for managing 
risk” (Jasanoff 1998:93). 
 
In Jasanoff’s article “Political Science of Risk Perception” (1998), she uses a new 
approach beyond the psychometric paradigm, but combines social construction and 
social theory to put the analysis of risk perception forward in the direction of 
political science (Jasanoff 1998).   
 
First is the realist model. The main feature of this model is that risk “can be 
objectively mapped, measured, and controlled” (Jasanoff 1998:94). In this model 
experts hold the authority of knowledge, and they take over lay knowledge. Risk 
perception is centralised and controlled by bureaucracies (Jasanoff 1998). The 
public’s fear has been considered as irrational, while expert knowledge has been seen 
as rational. Expert knowledge has simply been taken as the evidence for policy 
decision-making due to its higher status in the hierarchy.  
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The second is the constructive model which considers risk as socially constructed 
through the process of negotiation and discussion in public participation activities. In 
this model knowledge is shaped by interactions and stockholders’ interests and 
experiences. Social and cultural factors also influence the shaping of knowledge. 
Both expert and lay opinions about risk have been considered in the policy decision-
making process. Experts’ perception of risk should be studied more carefully.  
 
The third model is the discursive model. It shares the idea of risk construction with 
the second model, while emphasising “the role of professional languages and 
analytic practices in shaping public perception of risk” (Jasanoff 1998:94). Risk 
analysis is a specialised and formal term to allocate power to society (Jasanoff 1998). 
According to the case that Jasanoff discusses about the use of quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA) in the US regulatory process, this model represents a kind of 
scientific social movement through which ordinary people understand risk based on 
QRA.  However, this model is different from the simple and instinctive acceptance of 
the authority of science and expertise in the realist model. It goes into deeper 
consideration of how QRA-influenced causation, agency and uncertainty determine 
risk.  
 
In comparison to the realist model, the policy decision-making of the constructive 
model and discursive model is inclusive rather than hierarchical (Jasanoff 1998). 
Welsh’s (2000) research about the scientific social movement of nuclear power in the 
UK matches the discursive model. Although Welsh and Jasanoff do not reference 
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each other, I found a link between the model and the nuclear power scientific social  
movement in the UK. Welsh points out that there were in fact debates and concerns 
about nuclear power even from the very first use by the UK government of nuclear 
weapons. However, there are indications that the public’s opposition to nuclear 
power only began in the 1970s after nuclear power stations had already been built. 
Welsh claims that the policy decision-making of nuclear projects is not government-
dominated as people imagine. There are interactions and negotiations between 
policy-makers, scientists and experts, and the general public. Welsh also claims that 
in the initial stage of the UK’s nuclear development, politicians have to trust an elite 
group of theoretical physicists to give them advice (Welsh 2000). In the nuclear case, 
people’s perception of risk is shaped by scientific discourse along with the social 
scientific movement of nuclear power, and finally decision-making is decided by 
power and expertise.  
 
From the development process of China’s civil nuclear power (details in chapter 3) 
and the dynamics of public participation (the Daya Bay and Silver Beach cases in 
chapter 3, and the Han River case in chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8), I suggest that in China, 
although nuclear power has not yet emerged as a social scientific movement, the 
decision-making on civil nuclear power is changing from the realist model to the 









Model     Epistemology   Location of authority              Policy prescription  
                                                                                      Style       Mechanism 
 
Realist         realist        expert communities       managerial expert advice                     
Constructivist constructivist   social/interest groups     pluralist     public participation 
Discursive    constructivist    professional discourses   critical       social movement  
 
 
Table 2.1 Models of risk perception for public policy.  Source: ‘The Political Science 
of Risk Perception’  
 
2.5 Risk in Environmental Sociology  
 
In the environmental sociology discipline, risk is also a very important topic. 
Discussions about risk in this context also concentrate on whether risk is real or 
socially constructed. As I have reviewed in the previous section, a group of authors 
(Irwin, Wynne, Lash) take the route of public understanding of science to make 
critical arguments about Beck’s risk society theory and point out the division 
between lay knowledge and expert knowledge about risk. The authors reviewed by 
Hannigan (Dietz, Renn, Hilgartner & Bosk, Freudenburg & Pastor, Clarke & Short) 
take the social construction angle and focus on how risk has been socially defined 
and constructed. Hannigan emphasises the important role of science in pointing out 
and defining risk in the first step for the public to notice the risk. However, scientific 
findings and research data also make people confused in risk definition. Hannigan 
uses the case of how scientific findings on eating salmon caused a dilemma for the 
public as an example to show how individuals are involved in the process of risk 
assessment and risk perception (Hannigan 2005). Salmon has been presented as a 
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good food to reduce the risk of heart disease. The factory-farmed salmon industry 
has offered ordinary people a cheaper and easier way to access this healthy diet. 
However, scientific research points out that farmed salmon contains a higher level of 
toxins which bring with them a higher risk of cancer. Another scientific finding 
showed that the toxic pollution of farmed salmon is too low to worry about. There 
are also other scientific findings suggesting that the toxic pollution is only contained 
in the skin of farmed salmon, and that there will be no risk if people remove the skin 
before eating. There is even a research report claiming that people should eat more 
farmed salmon. All these dissident scientific findings about farmed salmon made 
people afraid to eat it, so they chose wild salmon, or not to eat salmon anymore. 
However, later on consumers found out that some shops and restaurants sold farmed 
salmon as ‘wild’ salmon. After all these claims about salmon, this fish has changed 
from a good diet to reduce the risk of heart disease to a risky product in itself.  
 
The relationship of power and risk perception is another main theme which is 
discussed by authors in environmental sociology. Dietz raises issues about whether 
power differences among social actors decide their perception of risks (Hannigan 
2005). Also, he looks at how people’s risk perception is rooted in their social context, 
meaning influence from friends, family and also the mass media (Hannigan 2005). 
These two issues raised by Dietz will all be discussed together with my field findings 
in chapters 6, 7 and 8. Freudenburg & Pastor and Clarke & Short point out the 
important position of power in the risk construction process, which is a crucial point 
in my field findings chapter (chapter 7). They point out the importance of 
relationships in negotiating whether something is risky or not. Because of their 
- 27 - 
 
power and social positions, institutions, experts and political authorities have more 
channels to assess and dominate risk construction compared to ordinary individual 
citizens. After reviewing Freudenburg & Pastor and Clarke & Short’s argument 
about power and risk construction, Hannigan reviews Kaminstein’s (1988) case 
about the ‘toxic talk’ in New Jersey, USA to support their points.  
 
“Kaminstein (1988) argues that embodied in the public presentation of scientific 
information at meetings concerning the health and safety aspect of toxic waste 
dumps is rhetoric of containment which restricts discussion, avoids tough questions 
and pursues its own agenda.” (Hannigan 2005:118-119)   
 
The Lipari landfill in Pitman, New Jersey is one of the worst dump sites in the US. 
After three years of observing meetings held with local people about how to clear up 
the landfill in their residential area, Kaminstein points out that local people have not 
played the important role that they were thought to. Scientific experts and institutions 
use “toxic talk to stifle discussion and smother public concern” (Hannigan 2005:119). 
In meetings, documents provided for residents were full of technical information 
which was hard for them to understand. At one meeting, EPA4 distributed documents 
totalling 44 pages. Moreover, residents never received the information that they 
wanted; they were forced to listen to what consultant scientists wanted to present.  
The meeting room setting, the presentation style of EPA officials and scientists, and 
the professional and technological language that scientists and officials used to 
answer residents’ questions all show how government officials and scientific experts 
                                                 
4 The Environment Protection Administration in the US.  
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directed the hearing and set the risk agenda. Local residents found it hard to get 
involved in the meetings and actually develop conversations with scientists, experts 
and officials, since they used technical, ambiguous and intellectual language in 
presentations. This ‘toxic talk’ and the hearing meeting are quite similar to what I 
saw in the Han River case. Details about the case and analysis will be given in 
chapter 7. 
 
2.5 Perception and participation of risk governance 
 
Risk governance is a wide topic which can cover almost all issues about risk in both 
the scientific-technology area and the social-cultural area concerning multiple 
interdisciplinary risk research. The purpose of introducing risk governance is to offer 
a framework to see “an interplay between governmental institutions, economic forces 
and civil society actors, such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs)” (Renn 
2008:8). Besides this multi-actor participation, risk governance also includes 
institutions’ arrangements (Renn 2008), for example, the institutional transformation 
of China’s civil nuclear industry which I will discuss in chapter 3. In his book “Risk 
Governance”, Renn proposes four consecutive phases of the risk governance 
framework: “pre-assessment; appraisal; characterization/evaluation; and 
management” (Renn 2008:47).  Renn also claims that: “the four phases correspond to 
two major challenges of risk governance: generating and collecting knowledge about 
the risk, and making decisions about how to mitigate, control or otherwise manage 
it” (Renn 2008:47). Narrowing down Renn’s claims about risk governance to the 
social-cultural risk, I discuss in my thesis risk perception and participation of risk 
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governance. These are two points of risk governance on which my theoretical 
framework is focused. one is my review of Beck’s theory and critiques; the other is 
Wynne, Irwin and Yearley’s argument about lay knowledge and expertise, which 
actually attempts to pinpoint the division between risk assessment and lay people’s 
perception of risk. Risk perception is an important indicator in risk governance 
because of its political relationship to risk management as Jasanoff has claimed. 
Jasanoff’s models about risk perception and policy decision-making are actually 
good cases of risk governance in Western society. They offer three different models 
which represent lay people and experts’ participation in decision-making on risk 
issues. However, Renn also points out that risk governance can not be isolated from 
the social and political context of different countries and regions (Renn 2008). China, 
as a country which is traditionally administered by strong central government and is 
now changing to a more open public policy agenda, offers good cases for governance 
(for details see Wang’s six models in 2.7 which show the changing style of decision-
making on public issues in China).     
 
In order to integrate risk governance with China’s environmental issues, I found that 
Mol & Carter’s article offers insightful points.  Mol & Carter (2006) claim that 
discussing the transition of China’s environmental governance is to see the new 
relationship between the state, market and civil society (Mol & Carter 2006). 
Intending to answer the question about how China deals with environmental threats 
and risks faced by the country now and in the near future, Mol groups his analyses 
into four categories: “political transitions, and the role of economic actors and market 
dynamics (this section), emerging institutions beyond state and market, and process 
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of international integration” (Mol & Carter 2006:155). In my case, participation does 
not make an appearance in all of the four categories. I can only see PDs, the media 
and people’s comments online. Details will be discussed in chapters 7 and 8.    
 
2.6 Risk and the Changing Chinese Society  
 
Theories and concepts about risk in the social research field point to the relationship 
between risks and social, political and cultural background. Risks have been defined 
by Beck as the key issue at a certain stage of social development – post-modern 
society. In my thesis I attempt to extend to Chinese society Beck’s theory of risks 
associated with concepts of risks in the SSK and environmental sociology disciplines. 
To see the applicability of a theory and concepts in a certain society is not like 
testing for a disease; there is no answer of an effect or otherwise. The key issue of 
the thesis is to answer the question: in the modernity development process, how do 
Chinese people define and understand risks? However, in order to find the answer to 
this question, first of all we have to know certain social, political and cultural 
contexts in the changing Chinese society. In order to fulfil this purpose, in this part I 
intend to review literature on risk and changing social class in Chinese society.  
        
In this section I review some Chinese scholars’ articles about risk society and 
Chinese society, and also some literature about class and Chinese society in the 
Chinese studies area. The relationship between risk and class is a new topic for 
Chinese authors in social research. Li Youmei (2008), for example, discusses 
whether risk distribution will become a new route for China’s social structure 
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reorganisation after the distribution of wealth. Lin Ting and Xu Doudou (2008) 
discuss the influence of social risk on China’s changes in class. Li’s article analyses 
China’s social conflicts along with economic development in the recent thirty years 
after the reform and opening up. Li introduces risk as a new angle from which to 
view the influence of social conflict on Chinese society. Li claims that: 
“In the 21st century, risk has existed as a form of power to reorganise social 
restructuring (mainly represented in the form of ‘interest groups’) in Chinese society. 
Risk is framing another kind of path of social disintegration and reorganisation. Its 
influence on Chinese society is increasing, and it is moving the social structure in a 
more complicated direction along with the distribution of wealth and other powers.” 
(Li 李友梅 2008 :2; my translation)     
   
Here Li introduces the concept of ‘interest groups’ which explains some phenomena 
in my case study. I also find that this links with Fei Xiaotong’s claims about Chinese 
people’s selfishness and interest-oriented attitudes. Fei did his research on traditional 
China since the 1930s and has made a significant contribution in analysing the social 
order of Chinese society. Details about Fei’s theory and interest groups through 
which people fit into the nuclear power issue will be discussed in chapter 6. Li 
claims that “our country’s recent situation fits the risk society on a certain level, 
which makes the historical requirement of ‘risk society equal to late modernity’ not 
necessary in China” (Li 李友梅 2008:7; my translation). To support this claim Li 
makes two arguments. Firstly, the process of globalisation has made China confront 
risks (for example, the global economic crisis, terrorism, global disease) no 
differently to other countries in the world. Secondly, the blind admiration of 
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economic, scientific and technological development has broken the traditional 
Chinese ideal development model of ‘harmony between man and nature’. In these 
thirty years after reform and opening up, the pollution to the environment and harm 
to nature caused by economic development have led Chinese society to face a serious 
ecological crisis. According to these results, present-day Chinese society is becoming 
a risk society although it is only in the initial stage of modernity. Although risk 
distribution influences the social structure at some level, class and wealth distribution 
do not seem to be approaching equality. Moreover, the gap between rich and poor is 
getting bigger in both developing and developed countries. China actually faces both 
risk and wealth distribution and this leads to a complicated social structure. I agree 
with Li’s claim that China has some characteristics of a risk society when 
considering the environmental and ecological crisis. However, her arguments are 
vague and lack any critical analysis of Beck’s theory. The article merely describes 
the theory and generally analyses some of the country’s recent problems. Generally 
speaking Chinese scholars’ research on risk and society are still at the surface level. 
There is still no theoretical framework or discipline of the research. Normally they 
simply describe some points and concepts in the risk society theory and match them 
with some aspect of Chinese society. There is no critical analysis or discussion about 
the theory and its application in Chinese society. This is precisely the gap I am 
attempting to fill with my thesis.  
 
Chinese society did have a complicated social structure. Economic development has 
brought in new riches and significant changes in social class. On the political side, 
decentralisation means more space for participation around certain issues within the 
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country’s borders, for example environmental issues (see 2.7). In this section I 
discuss the changing social class in Chinese society, followed by models of policy 
decision-making in the next section.  
 
It is commonly accepted as a fact that before the reform and opening up in 1978, 
people in China considered class conflict to be the main social conflict (Perry & 
Selden 2003). From the establishment of the new People’s Republic of China in 1949 
until Mao’s death in 1978, the whole country was affected by class movements and 
struggles (Cao 2004). The political direction at that time was an attempt to beat 
capitalism and build the socialist new China, meaning a society without Bo Xue Jie Ji 
(exploiting class 阶级剥削 ) and wealth. Egalitarianism was seen as the highest 
achievement for the country. Following Mao’s death in 1978, China’s post-Mao 
reform officially began after the ‘Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress’ in 
December of that year. After that, Deng became the new leader of the Party and 
country. People gradually thought less about class conflict and more about economic 
development. 1978 was a historical point at which the political orientation of 
People’s Republic of China began to work on economic and social development, just 
as in Deng’s famous words: ‘development is the strong theory (Fa Zhan Cai Shi Ying 
Dao Li 发展才是硬道理)’.  
      
“China’s market reforms over the last two decades or more brought about a 
significant degree of societal stratification and rise of class politics. The 
diversification of class interests forces the party-state leadership to take sides in the 
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emerging class warfare and to show a manifest class orientation in government 
policy-making”’ (Chen 2003:141). 
 
Below, I summarise the three main major changes of social class in post-Mao China.  
 
1. The new upper and middle classes  
 
Social researchers in the area of China studies, such as Goodman (2008), Chen (2002, 
2003), Liu (2006) and Tomba (2004), claim that recently there are ‘new rich’ or so 
called ‘middle classes’ in China which include economic and political elites, petty 
bourgeoisie and professionals (Chen 2003). According to an online article from News 
of the Communist Party of China, it was reported by 2007 that China’s Gini 
Coefficient is nearly 0.48, which means that China has become one of the most 
unequal countries in the world. The richest 20% of households earn 50.24% of the 
total social income (Bai 书白 祥  2008). According to the news reported in the 
Yangcheng Evening News on 4 March 2010, the most up-to-date survey by the 
Ministry of Finance indicates that in China the richest 10% of families occupy 45% 
of the total income of urban inhabitants, and the poorest 10% of families occupy only 
1.4% of it. The high consumption (third highest in the world) of luxury handbags, 
shoes, jewellery, and perfume has also been highlighted (Goodman 2008). In 
Western countries social class relates to inequality and hierarchy, and “it is usually 
categorised on the basis of occupation, income and wealth” (Chen 2002:408). 
However these new upper or middle classes in China, although they do exist, are not 
as easy to define as in Western countries. One of the most distinguishing features is 
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that these classes in China “are not readily separable from the Party-state as a social, 
political or even economic force” (Goodman 2008:6). Unlike most Western people 
who are subjectively assigned different class categories, “for historical and practical 
reasons, most Chinese urban citizens tend to identify themselves as the working 
class” (Chen 2002:410), or they avoid being identified as middle or upper class.  
 
2. The special position of government officials and party cadres 
 
Government officials and party cadres, as well as lower-level officials and 
administrators, so-called ‘petty cadres’ (Xiao Gan Bu 小干部) (Goodman 2008), 
occupy a special position in the context of the country’s development. The power 
they have actually makes them the real upper classes of society. Private 
entrepreneurs, government officials and party cadres are considered to have higher 
social status in particular. 
 
3. The changing position of the proletariat and working class  
 
“In Mao’s China, the proletariat was said to be the most progressive force of history 
and the embodiment of the most advanced forces of production. Together with the 
peasants, they were the ‘masters of the country’ and constituted ‘the regime’s only, 
or surely most legitimate, political actors’ (Solinger 2004:54-55). Today the key 
players in China’s socialist market economy are those who generate material wealth 
by producing, providing and consuming goods and services” (Guo 2008:40). 
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Since the State Owned Entrepreneurs (SOE) reform in the mid-90s, a multitude of 
urban working class and proletarians lost their jobs in SOE. These people either 
became unemployed, have a very small business or are in unstable employment 
serving private entrepreneurs or individuals; few of them had the opportunity to be 
re-employed in other SOE or to access decent positions in proper companies 
(Solinger 2002, 2004). The proletariat and working class is defined as the foundation 
and master of the country because of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and also 
the country’s development plan in the Mao period. The development of Zhong Gong 
Ye (heavy industry, 业重工 ) including iron and steel, coal-mining, shipping and 
railways, etc in the Mao period gave the proletariat and working class a very high 
position in society (Goodman 2008; Guo 2008). While modern entrepreneurs and 
enterprise development since the early 1990s changed the country’s industrial 
structure, the proletariat and working class lost the benefits of both economic and 
social status. When the working class lost their advanced social position and faced a 
changing social status, they simultaneously lost their voice and power to participate 
in social issues. If we go back and look at history, farmers and workers used to make 
their voices heard much earlier in the newborn China. In my fieldwork research, I 
also observed the silence of farmers on environmental and nuclear issues.  
 
After the reform and opening up in 1978, the new rich emerged in Chinese society. 
However, looking at the historical background of the concept of ‘middle class’5, in 
                                                 
5 “One middle class was the early capitalist of the early industrial revolution in Northwest Europe 
during the first half of the nineteenth century, the bourgeoisie between the aristocracy and the 
townspeople. Another has been the state and capitalist enterprise sponsored managers and 
professionals of the managerial revolution during the first half of the twentieth century, between the 
capitalists and the workers. More recently, the term has been applied to the vast majority of 
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the Chinese context it is quite complicated to define who fits this definition. ‘Middle 
class’ is not simply defined by income, property ownership or positions and titles in 
the workplace. According to Nee’s (1989, 2005) research, in China political capital is 
a stronger force than the market to bring benefit to individuals (Goodman 2008). 
High incomes after China’s economic reform and building up of the market economy 
do make people rich; however this does not give people equal political power. 
Government officials, political leaders and party cadres who hold the power to 
decide the use of political capital in reality occupy a high social status. Meanwhile, 
the entrepreneurs, managers, businessmen and other professionals might have a high 
income but not the equivalent political power and social status held by their middle 
class counterparts in Western countries.      
  
2.7 Models of China’s Public Policy Agenda 
 
Risk issues are essential topics in the public agenda in Western developed countries. 
In Chinese society, before discussing how risk discourse influences policy decision-
making, it is worth discussing how the public agenda influences the policy agenda. In 
the public policy area Wang Shaoguang’s article (2008) “Changing Models of 
China’s Policy Agenda Setting” is worth reviewing. Wang argues that through the 
transformation of policy agenda-setting models we can see the changes of China’s 
political system. In order to explain the relationship between public agenda and 
policy agenda Wang proposes six models (see table 2.2) of policy agenda-setting: 
‘closed-door’, ‘mobilisation’, ‘inside access’, ‘reach-out’, ‘outside access’, and 
                                                                                                                                          
consumers in late capitalist industrialised societies, between the rich and the poor”. Goodman, David 
S. G. (ed) (2008) The New Rich In China: Future Rulers, Present Lives Routledge).  
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‘popular pressure’ (Wang 2008:59). The order of these six models is from low to 
high public participation according to the initiator (decision-makers, advisers, and 
citizens).   
Models of the Policy Agenda Setting in China  
                                                                
 
                                                                                            Initiator of Agenda             
 
                                                             Decision-Makers             Advisers       Citizens 
 
Degree of Public Participation    Low            I.                    III.                  V. 
                                                      Closed Door      Inside Access  Outside Access 
                                  High            II.                   IV.                  VI. 




Table 2.2 Source: “Changing Models of China’s Policy Agenda Setting” (Wang 
2008:60) 
 
In the closed-door model the public do not participate in the decision-making 
process. “Decision makers believe it is easier for them to set the policy agenda and 
implement policies that result from it if they can prevent the issue from expanding to 
the mass public” (Wang 2008:60). The policy decision-making agenda of the civil 
nuclear power development plan in the 1970s and 80s fits the closed-door model. 
Those key policy-makers in central government set up the plan for building Daya 
Bay Nuclear Power Station without any public consultation. However, in 1986, the 
participation of the people of Hong Kong forced the central government to set up a 
communication and reporting system with the public (see chapter 3).  
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As with the closed-door model, policy-makers are still the initiators of the policy 
agenda in the mobilisation model. However, in the mobilisation model policy-
makers try to interest the public in the policy agenda, in order to win their support for 
it. This kind of model happened most in Mao’s China before the reform and opening 
up. In Mao’s China most of the major and strategic agendas fit this model, for 
example, land reform, the great leap forward, and so on (Wang 2008).  
 
The key players of the insider access model and the reach-out model are the policy 
advisers. The policy agenda is proposed by policy advisers instead of policy-makers. 
The difference between these two models is that in the insider access model, policy 
advisers are official ‘trusted brains’ 6  ( 团智囊 ) (Wang 2008): they do not care 
whether their suggestions are supported by the public or not; they only care whether 
policy-makers buy their advice. The single-child policy discussed by Greenhalgh 
(2008) as a distinguished case from the 70s shows how scientists, as ‘trusted brains’, 
played the most important part in the decision-making process. Greenhalgh argued 
that the scientist Song Jian, an expert in the missile industry, played a central role in 
this policy. In 1976, right after the Cultural Revolution, China was lacking in 
scientific expertise in all areas apart from the military industry, and this lack was 
especially prominent in the social research field, since for decades the leaders 
thought that Marxism alone was enough to guide social research. This special 
historical context made Song Jian and his colleagues, with their skills in computing 
and statistics, important people to work on population modelling. Since the 1970s, 
Mao and later Zhou made important speeches about birth and population control. 
                                                 
6 Scientists and experts who, like government consultants, offer professional knowledge to 
government officials.  
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Song Jian and his group projected a population growth rate over the coming decades 
that could result in catastrophic consequences for the country’s modernisation. His 
model, along with Chinese leaders’ ideology of population control for modernisation, 
shaped the single-child policy (Greenhalgh 2005, 2008). Greenhalgh makes the 
essential argument that Song was able, with his research data and model, to persuade 
the key leaders to endorse the single-child policy and also make it a basic national 
policy. This case shows how expert knowledge shaped and cooperated with political 
leaders’ ideology leading to policy decision-making in China in the late 1970s.  
 
However, in the reach-out model, policy advisers tend to get support from the 
public in order to help their suggestions reach policy-makers. After the reform and 
opening up, the insider access model was applied more frequently. Along with this 
policy agenda, research institutions and universities started to conduct more 
specialised research in order to fulfil the requirements of government policy 
decision-making. Unlike the insider access model, the reach-out model is not 
common in China. Mostly, policy advisers will not use the public to pressurise 
policy-makers in order to draw attention to their recommendations, apart from in 
some special cases, such as medical reform since the 1990s, which is market-oriented 
(Wang 2008).  
 
Citizens are the initiators in both the outside access model and popular-pressure 
model. The former means that “citizens or a group of citizens submit suggestions on 
public affairs in the form of a letter to central decision makers, excluding complaints 
or appeals about the interest of an individual or a small group” (Wang 2008:69). In 
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both civil nuclear power project cases I will discuss (the Silver Beach nuclear power 
project in chapter 3 and the Han River inland nuclear power project in chapters 5, 6 
and 7), citizens and deputies use the outside access model to write letters to policy-
makers in order to express their concerns about the projects. Although the outside 
access model has rarely been seen in China before now, recently it has been used to 
influence policy decision-making in some of these big projects by citizens who are 
not experts or policy advisers but have certain social positions and social relations 
and networks. The popular-pressure model is the upgraded version of the outside 
access model, which means that the degree of participation is higher. Wang points 
out that the popular-pressure model only applies “when a certain ‘focusing event’ 
suddenly occurs and quickly attracts public attention” (Wang 2008:72) at the same 
time: normally bad things such as disasters, accidents and harm to the general public. 
These kinds of events are more likely to involve some kind of environmental hazard 
or serious disease; for example, the grassroots campaign to stop dam building in the 
Nu River (Yang 2004) used both the outside access and popular-pressure models. 
The campaign had four features: firstly, the important position of environmental 
protection groups in mobilising opposition to the project and raising the public’s 
environmental awareness; secondly, collective actions were taken including public 
forums, study exhibits, petition letters, collection of signatures and so on; thirdly, 
funding was collected from international connections; and fourthly, media 
professionals played a leading role (Yang 2004:5). In the Nu River case, premier 
Wen Jiabao claimed that the project was suspended due to “a high level of social 
concern”. In China public participation in environmental issues reflects the use of 
both the outside access model and popular-pressure model. Although authors like 
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Peter Ho (2001, 2007), Guobin Yang (2004, 2005) and Shui-Yan Tang & Xueyong 
Zhan (2008) write about China’s environmental issues through the lens of civil 
society and new social movements and NGOs for environmental protection, their 
main research topics are environmental protection social organisations. 
Environmental issues have been a hot topic on the public agenda since the mid-
twentieth century. Between 1994 and 2007 China’s environmental NGOs and 
activism groups grew from 8 to 96 nationwide (Wu 2008). Famous environmental 
events such as the Three Gorges project and cleaning of Lake Tai all demonstrate the 
popular-pressure model. 
 
2.8 Summary  
 
In Western social science research, risk – and particularly the relationship between 
risk, science and politics – has been a popular topic since the publication of Beck’s 
risk society theory, and relates to various aspects of social life. Wynne and Irwin 
discuss risk within the theoretical framework of the sociology of science; Jasanoff 
uses a new form of approach associated with social construction theory to connect 
risk with political research; and Hannigan discusses risk through the environmental 
and social construction discipline. The public’s risk perception and their method of 
participation are essential in risk governance. There are two main questions to ask 
about risk. Firstly, how does risk influence human society? Secondly, how does the 
public understand and define risk? It seems that Beck’s theory attempts to answer 
both questions; however, it ends up confused about whether risk really exists or is 
socially constructed. Authors in science studies and environmental sociology 
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contribute to the discussion of people’s understanding and construction of risk. Also 
within this construction process is the inter-relationship and influence between risk 
and science and politics. China as a developing country is in the initial stage of 
modernity development. Because of its rapid development speed and unequal 
development style, on a certain level China has some characteristics of the so-called 
‘risk society’ (Li 李友梅 2008). However, historical reasons and China’s different 
political system distinguish the country too much from Western ones. In discussions 
of China’s risk, science and modernity are interesting and valuable topics which give 
insight to understanding of risk in the developing socialist country.  
    
Chapter 3: Methodology  
 
This chapter discusses the methodology of this research. To conduct an 
ethnographic-style case study of China’s civil nuclear power issues, I spent six 
months doing phases of fieldwork research in China. As a Chinese student studying 
in the UK and doing fieldwork research back in her hometown, I benefited from my 
Chinese identity and family and social networks. Thanks to reliable insiders who 
introduced me to the field, I spent a considerably small amount of time on gaining 
access and collecting data. Throughout the process of fieldwork I was aware of the 
importance of relationships (关系 Guanxi) in conducting research in the Chinese 
context. In this chapter I discuss seven aspects, beginning with gaining access to 
documents in the preliminary stage of my research and becoming aware of the 
importance of relationships, followed by choosing a practical case with which to 
commence the case study. The third and fourth parts are about obtaining access and 
my changing identity during the research period. The fifth part is about the detailed 
data collection methods that I used in the field. The sixth focuses on data analysis. 
Finally I discuss problem solving, mainly concerning data collection and analysis.  
 
3.1 Obtaining documents  
At the beginning of my PhD research I had only limited knowledge and 
understanding of the country’s civil nuclear power development, including some 
general information on nuclear power stations and operating reactors. I mainly 
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collected this information from the Internet during the research for my master’s 
dissertation. Moreover, I was aware of the limitations of documents and literature 
about China’s civil nuclear power development. Finally I identified a series of books 
called Nuclear Power Development Strategy Research, which was published in 1999 
by several official or academic research institutions7. I expected this series would be 
helpful since it is referenced by Wu Bang Guo (the vice-Prime Minister of the 
country at that time). Since I was in the UK by then, I asked family members to try to 
find the books in the bookstore; however, I was told that they had never been sold 
publicly. Finally I was able to obtain the books from family friends in the electricity 
industry. The same situation occurred when I looked for some more key literature: Li 
Peng Nuclear Diary. This series of books was received through the same channel, 
from family friends within the industry. Apart from these two series, I collected some 
important Hong Kong newspaper articles about Daya Bay and Ling Ao nuclear 
power stations in the 1990s from a friend’s former colleagues who had worked for 
the newspaper in the past. I started to become aware of how important it is to know 
people who are insiders of the industry and insiders of the field if I want to conduct 
research. This awareness, together with practical considerations, influenced my 
choice of case after the pilot study in February 2007.  
  
3.2 Choice of case  
 
In this section, I will first briefly introduce the single case that I used as the unit of 
research, and then explain the reason why I selected it. The case is about the debates 
                                                 
7Details will be introduced in 4.4.  
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over an inland nuclear power project in Meizhou City in Guangdong province. The 
provincial government planned to join the bidding for an inland nuclear power 
project. The Han River basin was used for exploratory testing and research. Local 
people living in the lower reaches of the Han River basin worried about the risks of 
water pollution. The People’s Deputies (PDs) asked for an inquiry meeting in the 
Provincial People’s Congress (PPC) on 4 February 2007 to discuss the potential 
impact on the drinking water resources of the Han River. Details of the location and 
local context of the case will be introduced in chapter 5.  
 
In February 2007 I went back to China after the board meeting. The board had 
suggested I take six weeks for the pilot study before commencing the formal 
fieldwork research. The pilot study had two purposes: firstly, to identify a practical 
and accessible case in order to conduct fieldwork research, and secondly, to help me 
identify a much clearer set of research questions, and a more viable programme of 
research. On 5 February 2007 a news report was published in Southern China Daily: 
“A nuclear power station might be built in the upper reaches of the Han River. 
People’s Deputies asked for an inquiry meeting—10,000,000 people’s drinking water 
might be polluted?” I felt that this was a very interesting issue that I could research. 
However at that time I was not sure whether I could get access to Daya Bay Nuclear 
Power Station or whether I could find a way to research it. My research has been 
influenced by subjective coincidences. Besides the objective reasons I will address 
later in this section, a coincidence took place which helped me to make my decision. 
On 7 February 2007, I was invited to my cousin’s wedding which was held in her 
husband’s hometown in Dapu townland. After I arrived in the townland I noticed that 
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it was exactly at the potential location of the inland nuclear power station. My 
cousin-in-law’s family live in Taohua village, located just on the opposite side of the 
Han River to the village of Shanzhou, which is one of the potential sites for the 
nuclear power station. The two villages are situated less than 50 metres apart. There 
were further reasons to pick the Han River case.  
 
 Location of the case 
 
The Han River case is situated in Guangdong Province. How can Guangdong’s civil 
nuclear power development represent the whole country’s situation? 
 
Firstly, Guangdong has been identified as a window on the whole country’s reform 
and opening up, which began in 1978. The city of Shenzhen in Guangdong province 
was the first Special Economic Zone in China. The government allowed the city to 
have different economic polices to other cities. Shenzhen was free to solicit foreign 
investments, set up joint-venture companies, enjoy special tax preferences, and so on. 
Shortly after Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou were approved as Special Economic 
Zones as well. Because of the special economic policy, Guangdong province 
achieved huge development in the last 30 years. Compared to other provinces 
Guangdong conforms more to the idea of a modern society. And the southeast area is 
the wealthiest area in the province.  
 
Secondly, 60% of the whole country’s nuclear electricity output is produced by 
Guangdong province. At present nuclear power provides 1.6% of the whole 
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country’s electricity output. By 2020 this number will have increased to 4% and 
Guangdong province will account for 60% of the total output of China’s nuclear 
electricity. Due to this high level of nuclear electricity output, Guangdong province 
is a key location for a civil nuclear power study. 
 
Thirdly, the country’s first big commercial nuclear power station was set up in 
Guangdong, and it was reported that the province is now competing to construct the 
first inland nuclear power station. 
 
 Timing of the case 
 
The debates about the inland nuclear power project on the upper reaches of the Han 
River started in September 2006, and continued to 2008. The timing of the case made 
it very suitable for research. As a recent case, it would be much easier to contact 
interviewees, find documents and conduct participant observation. It is also good 
timing to conduct research when the subject is a recent hot topic. 
 
 Information on the case 
 
The new nuclear project on the upper reaches of the Han River prompted the media 
to report debate and negative news about civil nuclear power development for the 
first time in mainland China. It was also the first time that the PPC organised an 
inquiry meeting to discuss people’s doubts and worries about civil nuclear power 
with local people’s deputies. This case represents the development of people’s 
- 49 - 
 
understanding of nuclear power and the willingness of local people to voice their 




As I mentioned in the previous section, family relationships and social networking 
played very important parts in this fieldwork research. The three important 
gatekeepers (Whyte 1993) in my research all have a relationship with my family 
network. The first one was DXu, my cousin-in-law’s father. He is an official in the 
local government of Dapu townland. I first met him at the wedding ceremony in 
February 2007. Later on my cousin-in-law let him know of my intention to conduct 
fieldwork research, and DXu offered to help directly. In May 2007 when I formally 
contacted him about the fieldwork research, he kindly offered to help me access the 
field. I could stay with his family and have free entry to his work department. He 
also offered to help with contacting all the interviewees I hoped to meet, and 
arranged for me to visit the villages which had passed the test to be the potential sites. 
However, he requested one condition, which was that I had to have a visiting 
studentship in a domestic university. I was going to register as a visiting student in 
China Science Academy (CSA) when I went to Beijing in July 2007 with reference 
letters from my supervisor and the director of my research institution. However, I 
would not be able to receive the studentship before I officially registered in CSA. 
DXu then asked whether I would be able to find some Shu Ren (熟人'people that I 
know') in Sun Yat-sen University, where I did my undergraduate degree, to do me a 
favour and write an official letter to confirm my identity. Unfortunately, at that time I 
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had not yet had contact with the sociology department in Sun Yat-sen University. 
Also my previous tutors in business school would not be able to help with my social 
research. Given these issues, I asked whether my invitation from People’s University 
for the international conference would be of help. DXu vouched for me in accessing 
the field as a researcher and his family member who was doing fieldwork research 
for a very important international conference in Beijing. From then on, I was aware 
of the importance of identity in fieldwork research. This will be discussed further in 
the next section. I suspect that in the local context gatekeepers have to have a good 
reason to introduce you to the field, which means you should make them feel 
important. In my case, a PhD student at a famous university was a suitably 
impressive identity for DXu to introduce me and arrange meetings and trips for me. 
Local people are not familiar with foreign universities and might not find them 
credible. However, Sun Yat-sen University, People’s University and CSA are all 
very well-known universities and research institutions. In fact, when DXu introduced 
me to interviewees they never asked me for any ID. My identity was only significant 
in convincing DXu that I was worth introducing. Both DXu and his wife DYan have 
been resident in the town for over thirty years. DXu used to work as the headmaster 
of a local middle school and DYan is a primary school teacher in the town centre. 
They have a very wide network of friends, colleagues and students around the town. 
During the three weeks I stayed in their home, I met with their social contacts, which 
made for a very good research environment. 
 
Following my first phase of fieldwork, I went to Beijing in July 2007, registered as a 
visiting student in CAS, and went to Shantou and Chaozhou to continue my 
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fieldwork research. The second gatekeeper was SWeng, a major in Shantou city 
military sub-district. The research format in Shantou and Chaozhou was quite 
different from that in Dapu. I had a clear idea of who I would like to interview, 
having seen their names in the newspaper. I intended to interview PDs who went to 
the inquiry meeting about the inland nuclear power project. In order to gain access to 
these people I went through the military source. SWeng was assigned to assist me by 
my mother’s friend, who is a general in Guangzhou provincial military, several 
levels higher than SWeng’s post. SWeng’s duty was to assist my research; he was 
keen to offer me whatever I wanted in order to please the general. I gave SWeng my 
reference letter from CSA and the list of PDs I wanted to interview when I arrived in 
Shantou city. He contacted interviewees for me through Shantou Municipal People’s 
Congress. As well as interviewees in Shantou city, SWeng was able to contact 
Chaozhou military sub-district to arrange meetings for me with PDs there. Thanks to 
his efficient work, I interviewed most of the PDs who had attended the inquiry 
meeting.  
 
The third gatekeeper was DWLi, the officer in the Dapu Armed Forces. Because of 
sudden flooding during the first phase of fieldwork research, I was not able to visit 
those villages in the townland. In the second phase of fieldwork, the main purpose 
was to conduct research in villages. My experience of the first phase of fieldwork 
taught me that using military contacts would be much more efficient than going 
through the local government officials in the field. However in this case gaining 
access took longer. I suspected that as it had been half a year since the first phase of 
my fieldwork research, the local government, government agencies and also the 
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military department might have heard some rumours about my research. Those 
officials became more careful with their words and also with granting me access to 
the field. It took several days for DWLi to consider whether to guide me to the 
villages. The problems were resolved by two dinners and several rounds of toasting. 
DWLi at last sent two officials to guide me to the villages.     
 
With the help from these three gatekeepers I did not face many problems in gaining 
access to the field. With references from them, people were normally not suspicious 
of my identity and purpose for visiting such a small and rural townland. However, 
without the help of these gatekeepers it would have been impossible for me even to 
find where the villages are. There is no public transport to get to them. They are 
surrounded by mountains. The only way I had tried was to negotiate with taxi drivers 
to rent their car for a day to the villages. In the end, I did not use this method due to 
security concerns.    
3.4 My identity  
 
My identity benefited the research a lot, as someone who was born and brought up in 
Guangzhou city (the capital city of Guangdong province) and finished her 
undergraduate education in the top university of the province. Moreover the military 
background of my family and its strong social network were advantageous to the 
fieldwork research. I was considered as an insider most of the time instead of a spy 
from the UK who wanted to search for information about the country’s civil nuclear 
power development. However, as mentioned in the previous section, I was requested 
to prove formal enrolment in a Chinese research institution in order to interview local 
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government officials and visit the proposed sites of the civil nuclear power station. 
Since the research institutions (RCSS, ISSIT) to which I belong have official 
connections with CSA, I was able to officially register as an international visiting 
PhD student in CSA with references from my supervisor and the director of RCSS. 
Thanks to good relationships with scholars from CSA who had previously conducted 
research in RCSS, I received my student identity documentation smoothly and 
quickly in Beijing. In the first phase of my fieldwork, this student identity helped me 
a lot. I simply told the People’s Deputies in Shantou and Chaozhou city that I was a 
student from CSA, and they were all willing to be interviewed. Local government 
officials might have assumed that, since I was a student from CSA, I had some 
relationship with the central government and that my research might influence 
decision-making on the nuclear power project - they have such ideas about 
researchers from Beijing (the capital city).  
 
In January 2008, before I started the second phrase of fieldwork, I contacted 
Professor Wang Ning, the head of the department of sociology in Sun Yat-sen 
University. I was invited to give a seminar in the department about the subject of 
environmental sociology in Western countries. After the seminar I asked Wang to 
write me a reference letter from his department, stating that I was working for a 
project with the university and needed to do research in Dapu townland. As the top 
university in Guangdong, Sun Yat-sen University is known to people in Dapu 
townland. With this official letter, I was identified as a researcher from Sun Yat-sen 
University instead of a student from Edinburgh University. In the field, I always had 
to think of the best identity which could help the research, and then try to use Guanxi 
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(connections) in order to access it. This was parallel to my situation in trying to enter 
the field as an insider.   
 
3.5 Methods of data collection 
 
The main methods I used to collect data were qualitative interviews along with 




Qualitative interviews were the most important data collection method used in the 
ethnographic research (Bryman 2004). There is a dearth of published documents 
about the situation of China’s civil nuclear power development, so I needed to collect 
a lot of background information through interviews. Interviews were conducted at 
high, middle and low levels during the research. Interviewees included government 
and agency officials at both national and local levels, scientists, experts and the 




Interviews were conducted on general information about the civil nuclear 
development background in Beijing, with scientists and experts in Guangzhou, 
journalists and also government officials and lay people in the local context.    
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I interviewed three categories of people. Firstly, the local people live around the 
proposed sites of the inland nuclear power station in the upper reaches of the Han 
River. People in this category live in Dapu townland, in Meizhou City. These people 
can be divided into five groups according to their occupations: local farmers, local 
small business owners, teachers, students and manual labourers. Their ages were 
between 16 and 60. The ratio of male to female interviewees was nearly 50:50. 
 
Secondly, I interviewed People’s Deputies, government officials, scientists and 
experts who were connected with the inland nuclear power station project issue in 
local, regional and central government, nuclear power companies and environmental 
protection agencies.  
 
Thirdly, I interviewed journalists and media officials who had been involved in civil 
nuclear power issues.  
 
In the first phase of fieldwork research, I interviewed thirty-six ordinary local people 
and local government officials formally and eighteen ordinary local people 
informally. I interviewed the local government officials with consideration given to 
their titles and duties; in my interviews with ordinary people I considered their age, 
gender and occupation. As I observed and talked to people during the fieldwork 
research, I identified three main characteristics.  
 
Firstly, there is a lack of adults in the town who have received higher education or 
are considerably skilled. There is no university in Dapu townland or even Meizhou 
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city. Young people leave for higher education, and people rarely come back to work 
in the townland after graduation. Those who are young and unable to enter university 
also find opportunities to work in big cities rather than stay in the townland. So those 
adults who stay in the townland are either less educated, less skilled, or take the 
country’s civil servants examination8 and are signed to work for local government 
after graduating from college or university.  
 
Secondly, the town is a typically male-dominated society. In local government, 95% 
of high positions are occupied by males, while females mostly hold positions as 
assistants. Women’s incomes are much lower than men’s. The man is the head of the 
family and the woman is obliged to serve her husband. Men are the breadwinners and 
women spend most of their time within the home.  
 
Thirdly, people in the town have close relationships. Friends and colleagues like to 
visit each other frequently. People who work in the same unit will also have flats in 
the same building or nearby. They regularly visit each other after dinner and drink 






                                                 
8In China, in order to work for the government as civil servants, people have to take the exam after 
graduation from college or university. Different positions have different requirements. Some positions 
are very competitive and are only open to university graduates.     
9Mahjong is a kind of traditional Chinese gambling game played by four people.   
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Interviewees Number 
Senior officials in government agencies 
connected with civil nuclear power in 
Beijing  
2 
Scientists and experts connected with 
energy  
3 
Journalists  3 
People’s Deputies and government 
officials in Shantou City 
5 
People’s Deputies and government 
officials in Chaozhou City 
5 
Local government officials in Dapu town 10 
Ordinary local people in Dapu town 
centre 
20 
Village leaders in Dapu 3 




The interviews I conducted in my fieldwork research were not standardised 
interviews. They were more like conversations, but involving key information 
(Fielding 2001). These conversations (interviews) about nuclear power issues were 
either with individual people or with groups of people, and were sometimes 
conducted by telephone. The strategy for conducting interviews in a local context 
was flexible. For example, I found it very hard to carry out one-to-one interviews 
with local government officials in Dapu. In local government, most of the time staff 
members share offices. Local government officials have very close relationships with 
one another. There was always somebody else sitting nearby when I wanted to talk to 
one person, and they did not have the sense that we should talk privately. They felt 
comfortable with their colleagues remaining there. Most of the interviews with local 
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government officials became group discussions by the end. The same situation 
happened in schools and other places where people shared offices. As nuclear power 
is a sensitive topic, people did not like being tape recorded, which meant I had to 
take many notes. However, since I wanted to know the facts and also to understand 
people’s opinions on the issue, I was content to note down points that I found useful 
and interesting. This kind of group interview did have its benefits. I found people 
were more willing to talk and discuss when friends and colleagues got together 
(Morgan 1997). They would come out with some new ideas when talking in groups. 
So I found that this kind of interview style helped me to collect useful research data.  
 
Due to poor weather conditions during the first phase of my field research period, I 
was not able to go to the villages where the proposed sites were located. Local 
farmers and government officials were busy with the flooding and rebuilding of 
damaged facilities after that. With both this and my safety in mind, they thought that 
it was inappropriate for me go to the villages. My gatekeeper DXu suggested I 
conduct telephone interviews instead. The leading official in the Gaobei town gave 
me a list of numbers. I made calls randomly to people I selected with help from DXu 
and DYan. As some people do not speak very good Mandarin, I let them introduce 
me first on the phone, then commenced the interviews if those farmers felt 
comfortable to talk to me. Luckily most of the people in the villages now had 
telephone access. Ten telephone interviews were conducted with farmers in the 
villages. Telephone interviews are an efficient alternative way to find out local 
farmers’ views on the potential nuclear power project (Fielding and Thomas 2001). 
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However in the second phase of my fieldwork research I was able to go to the 




Interviews were conducted with officials and insiders in Beijing and locally to collect 
information about the country’s nuclear power policies, the functions of different 
government agents connected with nuclear power and risk management, and also 
some historical context to the nuclear power industry. This information is very hard 
to confirm through documents or other resources. In order to guarantee the reliability 
of the information, I normally asked similar questions of numerous people from 
different backgrounds. If two or three people from different backgrounds gave the 
same answer to a specific question, it should be seen as reliable.  
 
Interviews were conducted with ordinary local people to gauge their knowledge and 
opinions about nuclear power, its risks, and the inland nuclear power project. In 
order to help people open up to me, my research questions were quite simple. I 
would start by asking their opinions on the nuclear power project, then follow with 
some “why” questions. These are helpful in making people explain their feelings. 
The interviews had no standard schedule or question guidelines. The object of each 
interview was to find out what kinds of things were happening. Freestyle 
conversations about the nuclear power project were more helpful in understanding 
people’s feelings about it.  
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Participant observation  
 
With DXu’s help I was able to observe how people work in the local government. 
DXu and DYan’s friends and colleagues are all middle or upper class people based in 
the town centre. Their social class is decided by their jobs. They work for the local 
government, schools or state-owned companies, as opposed to working as 
shopkeepers, farmers or manual labourers. As well as interviewing DXu and DYan’s 
contacts, I also went out in the street to meet people by myself. In order to chat with 
local doctors, I went to the local hospital with DYan when she was sick. Since I 
stayed in the town centre for nearly a month, there were many opportunities to get in 
touch with local people in the lower classes. I talked to people in bookstores, hair 
salons, middle school, etc. I also talked to a dressmaker, shopkeepers and farmers in 
town. I tried my best to ask people about their opinions on the nuclear power project, 
and tried to understand their culture and lifestyle through observations. In the 
villages I observed people’s living conditions and tried to understand their culture 
(Bryman 2004). Most of the time participant observation was mixed with interviews 
(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007). I used it as a supplement to understanding 
people’s attitudes about the nuclear power project.    
 
Analysis of documents  
 
Documentary analysis was used in two different aspects of the research. One relates 
to the background of the whole country’s civil nuclear power development situation 
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and risk management situation; the other is related to the specific case. The 
background information covers diverse topics relating to the country’s civil nuclear 
power development. There is not in fact a great deal of literature related to the policy 
decision-making and nuclear power development. The main resources used were 
internal books published inside the electricity industry, newspaper articles and also 




1) A series of books called Nuclear Power Development Strategy Research. 
This series has two volumes made up of 8 separate research reports, published in 
1999. China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (CGNPG) commissioned this 
research. Eight different research institutions or research groups wrote the eight 
reports, and carried out their research studies separately. These groups are: 
 The Development Research Centre of the State Council, PR China (DRCSC).  
DRCSC is a research and consultancy institution that lies directly under the 
State Council. The main responsibility of the research centre is to conduct 
research on the country’s national economy and social development and to 
give political suggestions on the problems resulting from the country’s 
opening up and reform. 
 The State Planning Office Macroeconomic Research Group 
 Development Research Centre of the People’s Government of Guangdong 
Province. The research centre is directly under the Guangdong Council, and 
is a policy research and consultancy institution. 
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 Guangdong R&D Centre for Technological Economy — a research centre 
founded in 2001. It is a research and consultancy institution directly under the 
Department of Science and Technology of Guangdong Province. 
 Institute for Nuclear and New Energy Technology, Tsinghua University. 
The Institute was founded in 1960 as a top nuclear research and experimental 
base in China. In the last forty years, it has become a comprehensive research 
centre with multi-disciplinary research, design and engineering projects 
mainly in nuclear technology. To further broaden the academic disciplines of 
the institute, the full official name was changed to the Institute of Nuclear and 
New Energy Technology (INET), in September 2003. 
 School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University 
 DECADAES/DECPAC software research group 
 JCESS Journal. The journal publishes research on the socioeconomic system 
of China. 
The series is an internal document for government and power companies and 
departments and is impossible to find in public bookshops. It contains many details 
about the current situation of China’s nuclear power development. However, as it 
was published in 1999, some of the information is out of date. 
 
2) Li Peng Nuclear Power Diary 2004 (Xinhua) - A series of books which has two 
volumes, written by Li Peng, the former premier of the State Council, about the 
Chinese civil nuclear power development process. Li Peng is the key person in the 
planning and construction of Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station.  
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Official websites   
1) The official website of China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC). The CNNC 
website publishes information about regional nuclear power companies and the 
nuclear power stations which are operating right now, and also information about 
worldwide nuclear power stations or civil nuclear power programmes. The website is 
in both Chinese and English.  
 
2) The China Atomic Information Network (CAIN). The CAIN website is a Chinese 
website containing a wide range of information about atomic development in China 
and worldwide. The organisers of the website regularly invite managers from nuclear 
power companies to do online interviews on different topics relating to the 
development and management of China’s civil nuclear power. People with an 
interest in the specific topic can register on the website and ask questions online. 
 
Journal  
“China’s Energy” (1986-2007) China Energy Research Institute  
Newspapers  
The Southern China Daily  
Meizhou Daily  
The Yangcheng Evening News 
Internal documents from local government agencies in Dapu townland and 
Shantou City  
Survey data about the relocation situation of Dangxi and Shanzhou Village 
The Dapu statistic yearbook 2007 
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Internal journals from the Shantou Social Science Institute   
Letters 
I have two copies of official letters made available to me by Chen Han Chu, which 
are formal replies from the Development and Reform Commission of Guangdong 
Province. They wrote to reply to his inquiry about the nuclear power project on the 
upper reaches of the Han River. I was also able to collect some documents about the 
water protection regulation and planning of the Han River.  
 
3.6 Data analysis 
 
Taking fieldnotes was my usual way of recording observational and interview data in 
the field, although I did make use of tape recording on occasion. I noted down all the 
useful and interesting things that I saw and heard each day, and then reorganised and 
input them in my laptop at the end of the day. Other data I collected in the field 
included journals, newspapers, letters, and internal documents, as well as online 
information and virtual documents (pictures that I took in the field). In this section I 
will discuss analysis of these materials and documents collected from fieldwork 
research.  
 
I do not use any software for coding data; all coding is done by hand. “In 
ethnographic coding, there is no requirement that items of data be assigned to one 
and only one category, or that there be explicit rules for assigning 
them”(Hammersley and Atkinson 2007 p153). In order not to miss any useful 
information in the documents and materials, I always go over them multiple times 
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during the writing process. Data was first separated into different folders for storage 
according to fieldwork locations (Beijing, Hong Kong, Guangzhou, Dapu, Chaozhou 
and Shantou cities). For each location it was then organised into different categories 
for storage: for example in Dapu there were data from interviews with government 
officials and civil servants, data from interviews with local people, online discussions 
about the inland nuclear power project, notes and memos for data organising, etc. A 
Microsoft Excel table was used to compile the list of interviewees from Dapu 
townland, within which I listed each interviewee’s name, gender, education, place of 
birth, occupation and contact details. The data that I collected in Dapu townland was 
widely concerned with local people’s daily lives and local culture. The data collected 
from Beijing and Hong Kong was mostly used for background information and 
contextual information related to the development of China’s nuclear power industry. 
Its function was to provide information rather than in-depth analysis. I did not use 
any systematic coding methods for data analysis before I began writing up the thesis. 
The data analysis in fact took place all the way through the writing and redrafting of 
the thesis. Data was analysed and exploited through the process of connecting the 
theoretical concepts with real situations that I saw and heard in the field.   
 
3.7 Problem resolving  
Reliability of interview data 
 
When I reflect on my interview process, gatekeepers and family relationships on the 
one hand helped with a lot of the research, and on the other hand also brought in 
problems. Since I was always introduced by insiders who were in a relatively high 
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position to that of interviewees, the reliability of their words is worth considering. 
How much did they want to tell me what they really thought? Did they want to 
please me or the gatekeepers? People do not always say what they really think in 
everyday life; they will subjectively frame their words no matter who I am. When I 
interviewed people in the field, I did not feel that they were trying to please the 
gatekeepers; most of the people I interviewed did not have a direct relationship with 
the gatekeepers. They were reached via snowball methods through the gatekeepers’ 
networking, for example gatekeeper DXu in Dapu townland: although he is a 
government official, he is not in a high position in the government. Most of the 
interviewees introduced by him were his colleagues and friends. They did not need to 
please him; they wanted to help me with my research and answer my questions 
because I was related to DXu. However, I did feel that some interviewees, especially 
local government officials in Dapu townland and PDs in Shantou and Chaozhou 
cities, chose their words carefully. Their purpose was not to please me and say 
something I wanted to hear, but to demonstrate their approval of or resistance to the 
nuclear power project. They actually said what they wanted, and hoped I could pass 
the message on to individuals or agencies in charge of the project. Simply put, I was 
not somebody they wanted to please, I was somebody that they wanted to use. I will 
discuss local government officials’ active construction of their trust of nuclear 
technology in Chapter 6. I posit that local people’s words are mostly reliable because 
what they described about their situation matches with what I observed in the field. 
In Shantou and Chaozhou cities, PDs’ concerns had already been published by the 
newspaper. What they told me were the opinions that they had expressed in the 
inquiry meeting.        
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How to deal with the missing category of population? 
 
As mentioned above, young adults between the ages of 18-35 who are skilled 
workers or have received higher education are missing in the town. It was difficult to 
find out their opinions about the civil nuclear power project and its risks. Although 
these people do not physically live in the townland, they have tight and close 
relationships with their families in the townland: for example, some of them will buy 
or build flats in the town for their parents, and some want to go back to the town 
when they retire in the future. Simply put, Chinese people have very strong emotions 
connected to their hometowns (Fei 费孝通 2005 [1947]). Even if those people do not 
physically live in their hometown anymore, their opinions still matter. As they have 
received higher education and are considered to know more than local people, local 
people tend to listen to their opinions. I had to use a different strategy to resolve this 
problem. Online information had become a very good resource. Two online forums 
organised discussions and votes about the nuclear power project. Registered 
members who took part in voting amounted to nearly 300 people. People also left 
messages about their opinions on the project and discussed potential environmental 
concerns in the online forum. According to their online ID and people’s 
conversations, I found that most people using the online forum were originally from 
the townland but working outside in other cities now. Their age and occupations 
were hard to confirm since it is not necessary for them to provide any of this 
information in the forum. However, according to the style of their usernames and the 
icons they used to represent themselves I believed that their ages were roughly 
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between 20 and 35. I used the online forum as a supplementary resource to analyse 
people’s opinions and debates about the nuclear power project and its risks.  
 
Tape recording and field notes 
 
Nuclear power issues are a sensitive topic. People feel uncomfortable about being 
tape recorded. Sometimes I just went to talk to local people in shops or restaurants; it 
was very inconvenient to do tape recording. When people have already started to talk 
it is unethical to record their words without asking for their permission. In the case of 
local government officials, they will tell you straight out that they do not want to be 
tape recorded. So most of the time, I took notes of people’s words. Only three 
interviews were tape recorded. As I was trying to use interviews as a way to 
understand people’s feelings on a specific issue, the most important thing was the 
context of the conversation. Taking notes was enough for me to collect data I wanted; 
the question of whether or not to tape record was not very important. One local 
government official did not want to be tape recorded. When I started to record the 
interview, he began to sweat; the tape recorder clearly made him feel nervous. He 
also avoided some of my questions which related to the risks of nuclear power. Nigel 
Fielding also argued about whether we should do tape recording or write field notes 
in ethnographic interviews. I agreed with his claim that although recording speeds 
things up, it has the disadvantage of leading to a reflective approach; also, in 
comparison with tape recording, writing often yields better analytic themes (Fielding, 
2001:153). As I could not do tape recording, I tried to write down everything I 
thought important. I needed to rewrite the field notes as soon as possible when I went 
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home in order to record anything I had missed out. I noted my feelings about the 
interviews and also summarised what I did every day.  
 
Problems with translation  
 
As the whole fieldwork research was conducted in mainland China, all the primary 
data resources I collected were in Chinese. The translation job was huge. I also faced 
some difficulties here.  
 
1) Difficulties in translating location names. Dapu town is actually a very big town 
(the total area is 2470 km²), and  if its size is taken into account it is even bigger than 
a city in the UK. But it is a very small place in China and also at quite a low 
administration level. The administration of Gaobei Zhen (镇 ; ‘town’) is  managed by 
Dapu town. Gaobei Zhen can be viewed as having a similar size and administration 
level as a town in the UK. So if Gaobei is a town, Dapu should be understood as a 
bigger place with a higher administration level than a town, but lower than a city. 
When I looked in the dictionary, it was translated as the word ‘county’. In the UK a 
county is similar to a ‘shire’. But in the US ‘county’ seems to be the right word to 
identify the situation of Dapu. After considering these differences, I ultimately 
decided to use ‘townland’ to describe Dapu. 
 
2) Difficulties in translating government officials’ titles. The higher position that a 
government official holds, the wordier a job title he/she has. It is really a headache to 
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translate people’s titles, some of which do not make sense when translated into 
English. 
 
3) Problems in preserving the meaning of some words. Some words became 
meaningless when translated into English. Sometimes I needed to find another way 
to make things clear. It was a challenge to explain things clearly without losing their 
original meanings, for example the news report about the inquiry meeting. The 















Picture 4.1  
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My translation is:  
“A nuclear power station might be built in the upper reaches of the Han River. 
People’s Deputies asked for an inquiry meeting— 
        10,000,000 People’s Drinking Water Might be Polluted?  
      A nuclear power station to be built on the upper reaches of the Han River, 
10,000,000 people’s drinking water in the middle and lower reaches might be 
polluted? Yesterday, the Shantou and Chaozhou PDs standing group queried the 
Development and Reform Commission of Guangdong (DRCGD), Guangdong 
Environmental Protection Administration (GEPA), Guangdong Water (GW) about 
the ‘first inland nuclear power station to potentially be located in Meizhou’. The field 
atmosphere is huo bao (火爆 hot).” 
 
In comparison to the word huo bao (火爆) in Chinese, ‘hot’ in English does not 
cover and represent all of its meanings. When translating such words into English 
sometimes their function is diminished and the actual situation is harder to represent.  
 
Another example comes from an interviewee’s words:  
 
Wang: “I won’t do it. We Lao Bai Xing[1 10] (老百姓 1. ordinary people 2. the 
‘person in the street’) always listen to the government. We are not going to express 
disagreements. People like us have no power to say no.”  
 
                                                 
10 Lao Bai Xing is the term Chinese people always use to distinguish themselves  from soldiers and 
government officials. It sometimes also means innocent and powerless people.  
 
- 72 - 
 
- 73 - 
 
 
Here if we just directly translate ‘Lao Bai Xing’ into the first or the second meanings 
in English it loses its full meaning in representing lay people’s identity.  
4) Limitations of using a single case study to generalise findings. Yin (1994) points 
out the limitations of scientific generalisation. How can one single case represent 
Chinese people’s construction of nuclear risk in general? There is no way to know to 
what extent the Han River case is similar or different from other nuclear power cases 
in China. Theoretically, a single case study is not a method to collect data which 
represent a larger population. In my research, the case shows the real situation that 
happened in the specific local context. It offers rich material and empirical data for 
readers to understand the low levels of people’s perception of risk, and how their risk 
perception was influenced by their social, cultural and economic background. So if 
we weaken the ‘generalised’ function of the single case and strengthen the real 
situation beyond the actual case, limitations have no major influence on the research.         
 
Summary: The research data was supplemented by note-taking which means I 
subjectively wrote down things that I considered important and useful. I 
subsequently translated those Chinese texts into English, which may have lost some 
of the original text’s meanings. These are two problems which might slightly 
influence the reliability of the interview data and documents. However, no single 
piece of research can be - or needs to be - one hundred percent objective. I was also 
aware of the limitations of the research and try to avoid them as much as possible.  
  Chapter 4: Background to the civil nuclear industry 
in mainland China  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In this chapter I intend to address for the first time some sensitive topics related to 
China’s civil nuclear power, including its technological situation, its policy decision-
making since the 1960s, its industry governance, and – perhaps the most sensitive – 
its nuclear waste disposal. The process of China’s civil nuclear power development 
shows the transformation of the industry from a military, top-down planning system 
to a civil and preliminary market-oriented system. This transformation trend offers 
more opportunities for public participation and bottom-up politics. Even with this 
change, however, the industry still keeps its strong ‘Chinese-style’ development 
model.  
 
This chapter contains four main parts. The first section aims to give the reader a 
general understanding of the civil nuclear industry of China, via a brief introduction 
to the whereabouts of operating nuclear power reactors and nuclear power stations; it 
is also an introduction to the general condition of the country’s energy supply – and 
to the economic and technological conditions of the civil nuclear power industry.  
The second part is about the process of policy-making for the country’s first big 
commercial nuclear power station – Daya Bay – at the national level. In this part, I 
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discuss key policy-maker considerations regarding nuclear power in a specific 
historical period. In the third part, I discuss the governance of civil nuclear power in 
China at three levels: government and institutions; nuclear companies; and the public. 
From these three levels of information, readers will have some basic understanding 
of nuclear power governance in China. The final part of this introduction considers 
the most sensitive topic of all: nuclear waste disposal. In this part I introduce some of 
the preliminary discussions (concerning location, technology, and the economic 
conditions of waste disposal) taking place among Chinese scientists and experts. I 
also introduce a comparison case using the United Kingdom’s decision-making 
process regarding waste disposal.      
 
 
4.2. Number and location of nuclear power stations in 
mainland China  
Moves to develop nuclear power commenced in mainland China in the late 1970s. 
Since then, the industry has moved into a phase of steady development. Nuclear 
power technology has been imported from France, Canada and Russia, with local 
development based largely on French equipment. The first big commercial nuclear 
power station in mainland China was the Daya Bay nuclear power station that was 
built in Shenzhen, Guangdong (map 3.1). This station has been in operation since 
1994. To date, there have been six operating nuclear power stations (eleven nuclear 
reactors) in mainland China (see table 3.1): Daya Bay and Ling Ao (Guangdong, 
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south littoral), Qinshan phase I, II and III (Zhejiang, east littoral), and Tianwan phase 
I (Jiangsu, east littoral) (map 3.1).  
 
According to the Civil Nuclear Power Mid-Long Term Development Schedule 
(2005-2020) ( 电 长 发核 中 期 展 规 划 2005-2020), published by the State 
Development and Reform Commission (SDRC) in 2007, there are three other nuclear 
power stations (eight reactors) currently under construction (see table 3.2). They are 
Ling Ao Phase II (Guangdong, south littoral), Qinshan phase II extension (Zhejiang, 
east littoral), and Hongyanghe phase I (Liaoning, northeast coastal areas). Recently 
on the China National Nuclear Cooperation (CNNC) website I found a map labelling 
the most up to date information on the state’s nuclear power sites (see map 3.1), 
including not only those in operation, but those under construction and at the 
planning stage. According to this map, six nuclear power projects are currently under 
construction: Changjiang Nuclear Power Project (NPP) (Hainan), Fuqing NPP 
(Fujian), Sanmen NPP (Zhejiang), the Expansion projects of Qinshan NPP Phases I 
and II (Zhejiang), , and Taohuajiang NPP (Hunan).      
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Map 3.1. Source: http://www.cnnc.com.cn/Portals/0/images/fenbutu.jpg 
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Operating Mainland Nuclear Power Reactors 










Daya Bay 1 & 2 PWR
11  
France 
0 2x984MWe 1994 Shenzhen, 
Guangdong  






40% 2x650Mwe 2002, 2004 Haiyan 
Qinshan Phase 
III 
PHWR 12  
Canada 
0 2x700Mwe 2002, 2003 Haiyan 
Ling Ao Phase I PWR 
France 
20% 2x990Mwe 2002, 2003 Shenzhen 
Tianwan 1 & 2 VVER   2x1060Mwe 2007 Lianyungang, 
Jiangsu 
TOTAL 11     9068Mwe     
Table 3.1Sourced from Nuclear Power in China, China Nuclear Power Development 
Strategy, Civil Nuclear Power Mid-Long Term Development Schedule (2005-2020) 
(核电发展中长期规划 2005-2020) 
 
                                                 
11Pressurised Water Reactor 
12Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor 
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The Daya Bay nuclear power station in Guangdong province is the first big 
commercial nuclear power station. As a joint-venture project with France and the UK, 
it occupies a special position in the history of China’s civil nuclear power 
development. Seventy percent of the electricity produced by Daya Bay nuclear 
power station is sold – for a great deal of profit – to Hong Kong. The Qinshan 
nuclear power base in Zhejiang province contains five reactors. The Qinshan phase 
1 is the first nuclear power station to be designed locally (by Shanghai Nuclear 
Engineering, Research & Design Institute) and to use domestic technology. This 
reactor was first connected to the electrical grid in 1991 – three years earlier than 
reactors in Daya Bay. The other six reactors (Ling Ao, Qinshan Phase 2 and 3) were 
set to operate in these [two] nuclear power bases after Qinshan phase 1 and Daya 
Bay commenced operation. Ling Ao nuclear power station (2x1000 MW PWR 
reactors operated from 2002) is located just half a kilometre away from Daya Bay 
power station; its reactors are replicas of the Daya Bay facility. Hong Kong residents 
living a mere 50 kilometres away from Daya Bay are concerned about the close 
distance of the two power stations. They thought it risky to have four nuclear reactors 







Nuclear power reactors under construction 
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Reactor Type Net capacity 
Construction 
start date Start up* 
Ling Ao Phase II-1 PWR 990MWe 2005 2010 
Ling Ao Phase II-2 PWR 990 MWe 2005 2010 
Qinshan Phase II E-1 PWR 650 MWe 2006 2011 
Qinshan Phase II E-2  PWR 650 MWe 2006 2011 
Hongyanhe Phase I PWR 4*1110MWe   
Total (8)    7720MWe 
* Latest announced commercial operation.    
Table 3.2: sourced from Nuclear Power in China & CNNC website; Civil Nuclear 
Power Mid-Long Term Development Schedule (2005-2020) ( 电核 发展中长期规划
2005-2020) 
 
4.3 Energy supply and civil nuclear power  
Welsh claims that after World War II “Politically and scientifically there was the 
hope that ‘nuclear boilers’ would revolutionise the generation of electricity and end 
dependence upon coal and oil”(2000:36). Since the 1950s, Western developed 
countries such as the UK, the US and France   have, together with Russia, promoted 
the use of nuclear power as an energy resource. The development of civil nuclear 
power has carried some political and military significance for all these countries 
since the very beginning. China started to plan the use of nuclear power for its 
energy supply since the late 1970s. In this section I discuss three issues: reasons for 
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using nuclear power, energy alternatives, and the economic conditions of nuclear 
power. 
4.3.1 Why use nuclear power as an energy resource?  
Why does the country or central government want to use nuclear power as a kind of 
energy resource? Three reasons have been widely discussed: the security of the 
energy supply, environmental protection requirements, and growing energy demands 
(Zhou 1986; Jiang 1989; Rong, Lai et al. 1999; State Council Development Research 
Centre 1999; Shen 2005). Apart from these three main reasons there are authors who 
have also discussed that the development of nuclear power can ease the pressure on 
coal transport13 and benefit the country’s technology development (Ren 1990; Zhang 
1990).  
 
1. Security of energy supply  
China’s energy supply depends mainly on coal. Coal-fired electricity makes up 74% 
of the country’s electricity supply, while hydropower supplies 24% and nuclear 
power only 1.6% of the electricity supply (Shen 2005). Coal-fired electricity 
obviously occupies a much higher percentage of China’s energy supply than the 
average world level (Xu 2005). The country is certainly rich in coal resources. 
However, the State Council Development Research Centre points out that over-
                                                 
13China’s coal resources are distributed in an unbalanced way. The main coal-producing areas in 
China are in the West and North, while the main coal-consuming areas are in the East and South. The 
coal transporting systems are called ‘Bei Mei Nan Song'  (北煤南送North coal sending to South) and 
‘Xi Mei Dong Song'  (西煤东送, West coal sending to East). There are three main means of coal 
transportation: rail, road and water. Over 60% of coal transportation depends on the railway; coal 
transportation takes up nearly 40% of the country’s railway transportation capability. In 2007, the 
whole country’s coal railway transportation was 1.54 billion tons. The growing demand for coal has 
put increased pressure on the railway transportation system. (Source from: 
http://www.ccoalnews.com/101782/101868/102811/96300.html; my translation.)   
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dependence on one kind of energy resources is not secure for the whole country’s 
energy supply system (State Council Development Research Centre 1999).   
2. Environmental protection requirements 
Because of its over-dependence on coal-fired energy, the country feels a great deal of 
responsibility (and international pressure) to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions (Li 
李永江, 2004). Another serious pollutant is sulphur dioxide from coal-fired power 
stations, which has an extremely negative effect on forests, water and crops. In 1995, 
sulphur dioxide released from coal-fired stations cost 99.35 billion RMB lost in 
forests and crops (Pan 2001). Since most small to medium coal-fired power stations 
do not have desulphurisation systems, they often pose a threat to the environment. 
The transportation of coal from the north and the west to the south and the east also 
causes various environmental problems, such as an increase in dirt pollution along 
the railway. 
3. Energy demands 
A conservative estimate would suggest that China’s energy consumption will 
continue to increase until 2035, finally exceeding that of the US and becoming the 
highest in the world (Xu 2005). The development of nuclear power is a solution for 
energy demands in the meantime. China’s uranium storage is enough to supply the 
recent nuclear power development plan for over 100 years (State Council 
Development Research Centre 1999). 
4. Benefiting the country’s military and civil nuclear technology  
This is the main point that policy-makers in the central government considered when 
making decisions about civil nuclear power in the 1970s (Li 鹏李  2004). The 
development of civil nuclear power is a means to maintain personnel and technology 
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in such a fashion as to increasingly benefit the country’s military development. The 
central government raised the slogan of ‘Yi He Yang He’ ( 养已核 核 “use nuclear 
power to grow nuclear power”), meaning that civil nuclear development can be used 
to maintain and support military nuclear technology and development (State Council 
Development Research Centre 1999; Li 李鹏  2004).    
4.3.2 Energy alternatives 
Overall, China’s alternative energy situation is poor. The whole country’s energy 
supply situation can be summarised into three main categories. 
 
Firstly, I have discussed in footnote 7 the unbalanced distribution of coal resources 
and the pressures upon coal transportation. The Yunnan Province in southwest China 
has a rich source of hydropower, as does the famous Three Gorges project in Hubei 
Province. The government is promoting the development of southwest hydropower 
in order to satisfy the high electricity demand of south coastal cities. Electricity has 
been transported by Extra High Tension (EHT)14 cables from the west to the east.   
 
Secondly, as I have discussed in 3.3.1, emission gases from these coal-fired stations 
have been released directly into the atmosphere – inevitably causing serious air 
pollution. The greenhouse gas emissions from coal-fired power stations and vehicles 
made China the biggest CO2 producing country after the US. In order to relieve the 
imminent environmental crisis, the central government has prioritised energy-saving 
and emission-reduction as important government activities.  
 
                                                 
14EHT is the special cable used for long distance electricity transport.   
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Thirdly, the development of renewable energy sources is very slow. Renewable 
energy sources make up less than 1% of the whole country’s electric output. Take 
wind energy as an example: nowadays the country is encouraging private companies, 
state companies, and foreign companies to compete in wind energy projects. Wind 
power development, however, faces three difficulties. Firstly, state investment in 
wind energy projects is very low. Secondly, wind power electricity (on average 
around 0.8 RMB/KH) is two times more expensive than standard coal-fired 
electricity (average around 0.3 RMB/KH). Thirdly, the cost of wind power electricity 
will not be reduced even if its generating capacity grows. The cost of wind power 
electricity comes down to two things: equipment costs and land costs. China imports 
its equipment from Switzerland and Finland. And unless the country can make its 
own domestic equipment, the price of these imports will not go down. The cost of 
land, on the other hand, can only be more (and not less) expensive in the future. 
Based on this information it would seem that wind and solar energy do not have the 
ability to play a reliable role in contributing to the state’s long-term energy supply 
(State Council Development Research Centre 1999). China’s energy system is 
currently using coal and oil as a base energy source, so nuclear power and 
hydropower need only function as supplementary energy resources; renewable 
energy sources are the next phase in energy research. But with the serious trouble 
caused by coal and oil, and with the slow development of renewable energy 
resources, hydropower and nuclear power have become truly vital to the country’s 
energy supply. Since hydropower is mostly concentrated in southwest China, the 
country is now strongly promoting the ‘West-East Power Transmission ( 东西点 送)’ 
Project in order to transmit electricity from western areas to East China.  
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4.3.3 The economic conditions of nuclear power  
According to research reports and journal articles, electricity produced by nuclear 
power stations is more expensive than that produced by coal-fired and hydropower 
stations (Jiang 1989; Su 1997; State Council Development Research Centre 1999). 
The report published by the State Council Development Research Centre in 1999 
included a comparison of nuclear power, coal and liquefied national gas (LNG). A 
nuclear power station is a huge investment. When comparing nuclear electricity with 
other energy (sources), the most important indicator of the relationship between 
investments and changing interests is the discount rate. The result of the report 
eleven years ago is as follows15: 
 
1. If the discount rate is 0, then nuclear electricity is more economical than coal 
electricity. 
2. If the discount rate is 5%, then nuclear electricity is similar to coal electricity. 
3. If the investment of a nuclear power station can be reduced by 25%, then nuclear 
electricity is much more economical than coal electricity. 
4. Our country’s current discount rate is 8%-12%. So coal electricity is much more 
economical than nuclear electricity. 
 
Economic comparison of nuclear electricity and LNG electricity: 
1. If the discount rate is 0-5%, nuclear electricity is much more economical than 
LNG electricity. 
                                                 
15The data for comparison is collected from Ling Ao Nuclear Power Station Phase I, Shaojiao C Coal-
Fired Power Station and Huizhou LND Power Station. These three power stations are all located 
inside Guangdong Province, and capabilities are all 1980WMe.   
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2. If the discount rate is 8%-10%, nuclear power stations should decrease costs to 
about 10%-20% and then nuclear electricity will be similar to LNG electricity. 
3. If the discount rate is 12%, then LNG electricity is always much more 
economical than nuclear electricity. 
 
Economic comparison of coal electricity and LNG electricity: 
If the price of coal is 420yuan/tonnes and the price of LNG is $4.50/tonnes, then the 
de-coked coal electricity is similar to LNG electricity. 
 
 
According to these results, it was actually the discount rate that decided the cost of 
nuclear power. If the country’s discount is reduced in the future, then nuclear 
electricity might possibly be cheaper than coal and LNG electricity. However, all 
these comparisons have been made by considering the cost of building and running 
nuclear power stations, but ignoring the cost of waste disposal and plant 
decommissioning. The initial investment of a nuclear power plant is much higher 
than a coal-fired station. If building a new nuclear power station, the nuclear power 
company has to borrow large sums of money from its investors. The research centre 
considers this point when making comparisons. The higher discount rate will raise 
the initial investment – which accounts for these results. But if waste disposal and 
plant decommissioning fees are also considered, then the result will be totally 
different. According to the experience of Western developed countries, a lower 
discount rate will make waste disposal and plant decommissioning costs much higher. 
In the case of the Qinshan Phase I nuclear power station, the waste disposal fee 
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would start to be withdrawn from the sixth year of operation and the 
decommissioning fee would start to be withdrawn from the eleventh year; poor 
decision-making in the 80s resulted in a lack of funding from the very beginning(Su
苏宁 1997).  
 
Although the price of nuclear electricity is still higher than coal-fired and 
hydropower electricity (at least until recently), the electricity price of localised 
nuclear power stations will become competitive in the long run (Li 李永江 2004). If 
we consider the price of nuclear power overall, together with the waste disposal and 
decommissioning fees, it is much higher than coal-fired and hydro-powered 
electricity. If it is not compulsory for power grid companies to buy nuclear power, if 
the purchase follows the market price, then nuclear power will not be consumed in 
mainland China (State Council Development Research Centre 1999). It is obvious 
that compared with other energy resources nuclear power does not hold an economic 
advantage, according to data discussed in this section. The state plans to promote the 
development of civil nuclear power. According to materials that I can find, China’s 
consideration of civil nuclear power is similar to that of most Western countries. 
Policy-makers give more consideration to energy supply and technological 
development for strategic reasons (national safety, energy safety and international 
relationship). In the long run, traditional resources are facing dry-out. Nuclear power 
has the potential to become the most reliable new energy resource in the future. 
China will not avoid the technology of nuclear power.         
4.3.4 Technological status of civil nuclear power  
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Technology is an important indicator of a country’s nuclear power development. At 
present, China is importing technology and equipment from France, Canada, Russia 
and the US. China’s 11 operating nuclear power reactors fall into the category of 
second-generation technology16. For developed Western countries such as the UK 
and France, nuclear technology in the 1940s and 1950s was considered a symbol of a 
country’s modernity. This technology has been treated as a very important tool for 
remaining a world leader (Hecht 1998; Welsh 2000).  
For developed countries, nuclear technology is a tool for ruling the world, while for 
China, importing and learning Western technology is a way to escape from being 
ruled. Importing technology is reasonable and safe when a country’s domestic 
technology is immature; I suggest, however, that the risks of importing technology 
should not be ignored.  
In China, engineers and experts in the civil nuclear industry claim that the country’s 
current overdependence on imports will be disadvantageous to domestic nuclear 
power development for several reasons. Firstly, the importation of technologies and 
equipment raises the cost of nuclear power (State Council Development Research 
Centre 1999; Li 李永江  2004). Secondly, reactor technologies and equipment 
imported from four countries makes it hard for China to learn foreign technologies 
and make progress with its own technology. Thirdly, an overdependence on foreign 
technology and foreign experts leads to lower efficiency in the problem-solving 
process, and a corresponding increase in safety risks (Xu 2005). The country’s 
domestic engineers might not be able to resolve key operational problems, and might 
                                                 
16“Generation II reactors are typified by the present US fleet and most of the operations elsewhere. 
About 85% of the world's nuclear electricity is generated by reactors derived from designs originally 
developed for naval use. These and other second-generation nuclear power units have been found to 
be safe and reliable, but they are being superseded by better designs.” Source: http://www.world-
nuclear.org/info/inf08.html.  
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therefore have to rely on foreign experts. Foreign technology has been treated as a 
guarantee for safety, yet its potential risks have never been discussed publicly.  
In the early 1980s, the only option available for China’s Daya Bay Nuclear Power 
Project was to import the necessary technology and equipment from France (details 
will be discussed in the next section). Because it lacked sufficient expertise and 
financing, China needed foreign investment and technology to get started. Since the 
very beginning of its technology-related decision-making, the central government 
planned to use imported technology as a way to learn from foreign countries, hoping 
to later develop its own equipment in a domestic nuclear industry. However, 30 years 
have passed and domestic technology has still not been used for designing and 
making equipment for China’s nuclear power stations.  
Scholars claim that this delay is not because of China’s underdeveloped nuclear 
technology, but rather because the country’s nuclear power policy decision-making is 
at fault (Lu 2009). Policy-makers have changed their decisions about using domestic 
technology. In the 1980s they promoted the ‘import + self researching’ policy. In the 
1990s they advocated import only. According to the Civil Nuclear Power Mid-Long 
Term Development Schedule (2005-2020) published by the NRDC in 2007, 
technology importation was still the main way of building up China’s nuclear power 
stations: “Importing technology from Western developed countries has become a 
matter of diplomacy for the Chinese government” (interview with BL, secretary-
general of the China Nuclear Academy). BL (2009) claimed that buying technology 
from different countries balances the profits of each country.  
Consider the Yangjiang Nuclear Power Project as an example. This was the first time 
China opened its technology import competition to Westinghouse of the US (西屋公
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司 ). After competing with Framatome for several rounds, Westinghouse was 
declared the winner because of its lower price. Liu also noted that the US 
government did not want to export the technology for security reasons. The US was 
concerned that China would use civil nuclear technology to make submarines. 
Insiders in the nuclear industry now claim that importing technology from Western 
countries is not only a commercial activity. There are also political and strategic 
considerations in the international relationships regarding China’s nuclear power 
business, particularly with Western countries. Importing technology defines (at least 
to a certain extent) China’s relationship with technology-exporting countries; for 
example, in the 1980s and 1990s, China primarily used technology from France and 
the UK. The importing policy nowadays is much more open. However, this issue is 
not openly discussed with the Chinese public, and literature about this sensitive topic 
is scarce.  
 
4.4 Decision-making for the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Project  
The Daya Bay Nuclear Power Project was China’s first big commercial nuclear 
project and thus has special historical significance. In reviewing the decision-making 
for the project, readers will see the policy-makers’ concerns about big science and 
technology projects. This project illustrates policy-makers’ views of nuclear projects 
requiring Western technology.  
 
4.4.1 Before and during the 1970s  
China started to build commercial nuclear power stations much later than Western 
countries. When China officially started to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes 
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in 1955, this effort actually covered a nuclear weapons programme (Cappellano-
Sarver 2007). Real civil nuclear power projects for producing electricity were not on 
the government’s agenda until the 1970s (Li 李鹏 2004; Cappellano-Sarver 2007). 
Starting in 1964 the central government sent officials to visit and investigate civil 
nuclear power industries in Western countries. At that time China was still at war, 
and the central government put all its resources into developing the military uses of 
nuclear power. There were no plans for a specific civil nuclear power project until 
1972 (Li 李鹏 2004). 
 
In the 1970s the Chinese government started to have more diplomatic ties with 
Western countries and sent government officials and civil servants to visit other 
countries in order to discuss energy, economic and technological cooperation issues. 
At this same time, some key government policy-makers and government officials 
visited commercial nuclear power stations. Li Peng ( 鹏李 ) 17 was one of the key 
persons involved in China’s civil nuclear power development. Li has worked for the 
country’s development of the electricity industry for over 40 years. He was sent to 
Russia from 1948 to 1955 to study in Moscow Power Institute, majoring in hydro-
electric power systems. After graduation he began work as an engineer, later on 
becoming a manager and key policy-maker for the country’s electricity industry. Li 
is the person in charge of the Daya Bay project. In 1972, after attending the 
International High-Power Grid Conference, he spent one month in France visiting 
                                                 
17Li was the secretary of the Beijing Electricity Industry Authority  (BEIA) from 1966 to 1979, the 
minister of the Ministry of Power Industry from 1979 to 1983, the vice premier from 1983 to 1988 
and the premier from 1988 to 1998.  
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sites in the electricity industry: coal-fired power stations, nuclear power stations and 
electricity equipment factories. He later wrote: 
‘After a decade, France has made nuclear power the main energy source 
of electricity development. In its technological aspects, French reactors 
have been changed from gas-cooling reactors to pressure-water reactors 
(PWRs). The design of PWRs has already been standardised. Their 
development goal is that the capability of the circulation system will 
reach 3000MWe on circuit. Two 900MWe nuclear power plants are being 
constructed. Because of the advanced leaking resistance, emission and 
wastewater treatment facilities, pollution problems for this civil nuclear 
power have been solved appropriately’ (Li 鹏李  2004:6-7; my 
translation). 
Li made three important points. Firstly, he noted that France focused its electricity 
development on big power stations (capability over 600MWe). Secondly, he 
recognised that the French PWR was standardised and mature. Thirdly, he believed 
that the pollution problems of nuclear power had been resolved. Here Li used the 
word ‘pollution’ to describe ‘leaking, emissions and wastewater’. This shows his 
awareness of nuclear pollution.  
I suggest that as a government official Li’s knowledge of nuclear power and its 
potential risks was limited. Consider his background: he studied electric power as an 
engineer in Russia and worked for the electricity industry ever since he graduated 
and returned to China. Although he was a government official who had special 
knowledge of electric power, he was not a specialist in nuclear power. His 
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understanding of France’s nuclear technology came from what he saw during his trip 
to France.   
In 1979 Li visited Japan and inspected its electricity industry. He found that Japan 
was also promoting civil nuclear power. He observed, “Japan has a lack of 
traditional energy sources. Although the US has just had a serious nuclear accident, 
this will not change Japan’s energy development strategy” (Li李鹏  2004:11-12; my 
translation). As a developed country geographically situated next to China, Japan has 
always been the competitor and model for China’s development. As such, it is 
significant that Li mentioned Japan’s energy strategy and its plan to promote nuclear 
power. It’s clear that even though there were serious accidents, Japan was still 
determined to follow in the footsteps of developed Western countries: the nuclear 
power technology was still worth developing. In March 1979 Li was appointed as 
minister and also the secretary of the Party Committee 18  of the Ministry of 
Electricity Industry. In 1980, the top leader of China at that time, Deng, said that the 
country needed to build at least two nuclear power reactors in the south coastal area 
(Li 鹏李  2004).    
                                                
 
4.4.2 1980s onwards 
On 20 March 1981 the Party Committee of the Ministry of Electricity Industry 
decided it would cooperate with Guangdong Province to edit the Guangdong Joint-
venture Nuclear Power Station Feasibility Research Joint Report. The province and 
 
18China is a party-led country. In regional and higher levels of government and institutions, the Party 
Committee has the highest administrative rights.  Party Committee Secretaries are the highest leaders 
in the government and institutions. The Ministry of Electricity Industry is directly under the 
administration of the central government. Its level is higher than regional governments. So the mission 
of the Party Committee is making decisions. 
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the Ministry of Electricity Industry then used this report to apply for planning 
permission from the State Planning Office (under the State Council). From 1981 to 
1982, the State Council held five committee meetings to discuss the Daya Bay 
Nuclear Power Station project. The nuclear power project could not be agreed until 
the last meeting as there were conflicts between key policy-makers (Rong, Lai et al. 
1999). Economic problems were the main concern at that time. However policy-
makers’ concern over economic problems was not about whether nuclear power 
could provide cheaper electricity; it was about whether the country had enough 
money to build up a nuclear power station. The state did not have enough money to 
invest in the nuclear power project, and some committee members thought it was 
dangerous to take foreign investments and loans (Rong, Lai et al. 1999; Li 李鹏 
2004). Others thought it was a good opportunity to attract foreign investment in the 
primary stage of the state’s reform and opening-up policy.  
When key policy-makers discussed the project, their main concerns were the 
strategic 19  and economic issues involved in the nuclear power project; in the 
technology and safety demonstrations, they trusted in and depended upon Western 
technologies.   
 
The following quote reflects a point of view summarised during the State Council 
Committee meeting (Li 鹏李  2004:40; my translation): “There is risk in nuclear 
power projects, but there is not a big risk. The whole world is developing nuclear 
power, the technology is mature.” The committee here easily believed that there was 
                                                 
19 Strategic consideration, which has been always mentioned in decision-making on the Daya Bay 
project, means the comprehensive consideration of the military, international relationships, energy 
supply conditions and technological conditions. 
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not any great risk in nuclear power – even without domestic experts and specialists 
around to demonstrate nuclear safety and risk issues.   
 
The Preliminary Economic Feasibility Studies of the Nuclear Power Project on 
25 March 1981 
“The capability of the nuclear power station is 2*948WMe. Total investment 
estimates 4 billion USD. The capital fund is 400 million USD which is 10% of the 
total investment. Guangdong Province will pay 60% of it and Hong Kong will pay 
the other 40%. Guangdong Province will pay this money by RMB rather than USD. 
The loan is provided by Bank of China. Money will be paid back after the operation 
of the first reactor. The commercial loan needs to be paid back within 7 years, the 
equipment loan within 15 years and fuel loan with 3 years. The equipment utilisation 
is 75%. In the first year, the electricity generation cost is about 14 cents USD per 
KWH. The country will collect 30% income tax and 5% business tax from the power 
station. The power station will generate 150billion KWH electricity in the future 15 
years. The total tax income will come to 5.3 billion USD. China owns 60% of its 
electricity and resells 30% to Hong Kong, which means Hong Kong will use 2/3 of 
the total electricity output. Referring to this percentage China will get 50 billion 
KWH of electricity. With this calculation, there will be a deficit of 4.2 billion USD. 
This can be compensated by the taxation and profit of selling electricity; and the 
investment and income will be balanced within 15 years. It means that the 
government does not need to spend any money on the nuclear power station. After 20 
years (in 2008), the whole asset belongs to China. This was the way that we used 
foreign investment to build up the nuclear power station, and then paid back the 
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money by selling electricity to Hong Kong. There are three benefits we will get from 
this project. First, the government will earn 4.5 billion USD in tax. Second, we will 
have 500KWH electricity output. Third, we can learn civil nuclear technology from 
Western countries.” 
 
(Li 鹏李  2004:28-29; my translation) 
  
The Initial Decisions of the Nuclear Power Station in 1981 
 
1. The Ministry of Electricity Industry and Guangdong Province to draft the 
programme proposal. Planning Committee, Construction Committee and 
Import and Export Committee will verify its applicability.  
2. A civil nuclear power group organised by Gu Mu (the secretary of the 
Secretariat of the PRC Central Committee) and other leading people is 
strongly recommended.       
Negotiations concerning the nuclear power station began between France and the UK 
in 1982. Li and Ye Xuanping20 led the visiting group to inspect the nuclear power 
industry in the UK and France. After several rounds of meetings and demonstrations 
the Planning Committee in the central government finally decided that the Ministry 
of Water and Electricity (MWE) 21  to organise the nuclear power project at that 
time(Li 鹏李  2004). According to Li’s diary about the process of the Daya Bay 
Nuclear Power Project, nuclear power companies had not yet been founded at that 
                                                 
20Ye Xuanping was the Vice Governor of Guangdong Province and the Mayor of Guangzhou City 
from 1980 to 1985.  
21The Ministry of Electricity Industry was set up in July 1955. In February 1957, the MEI merged 
with The Ministry of Water Resource and was called The Ministry of Water and Electricity. In 
February 1979 the MEI was reset, and then merged with MWE again in March 1983.   
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time. The nuclear power project was managed by the government ministry on a 
temporary basis. In 1982, the central government initially decided to use the French 
reactor code and British turbines to construct Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station. From 
10 November to 3 December 1982 the China Nuclear Power Deputies Group visited 
France, the UK and Finland. The State Council at last approved the Guangdong 
nuclear power project on 13 December 1982 (Li李鹏 2004). 
 
Four important events took place in 1983.  
Firstly, the Nuclear Leading Group was founded inside the State Council.  
Secondly, Li led the deputy’s team in a visit to Hong Kong. They discussed the joint-
venture project of the Guangdong Nuclear Power Station, electricity selling and 
equipment, and commercial loan issues with Hong Kong-related companies and 
institutions.  
Thirdly, the ‘China-UK Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation’ and 
‘China-France Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation’ were signed.  
Fourthly, China joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IEAE) on 11 
October 1983. 
 
From the decision-making process of the Daya Bay project, readers can sense that 
the central government always puts economic and strategic considerations at the 
forefront of decision-making. According to materials that I have obtained, the risk of 
nuclear technology and safety issues have not been highlighted or properly discussed. 
Throughout the decision-making process, experts and scientists did not play any 
important part in discussions. Decision-makers put a lot of effort into demonstrating 
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how to use foreign investments to build nuclear power stations in China, and how to 
sell electricity to Hong Kong to generate income. They discussed how the country 
would have a nuclear power station with low input and high profits, rather than 
considering how the station might bring about potential risks to nature and the 
environment. However, there could have been policy-makers against the idea of 
technology imports and cooperation with foreign countries. There could have been 
negotiations between policy-makers which outsiders can never know. At that time, 
policy-makers in central government felt the same way about the importance of 
economic and technological development. It was easy for them to come to an 
agreement on technology development issues, such as civil nuclear power 
development. But if we consider the project from another angle, the country in fact 
buys foreign technology, puts the risk inside the country and sees most of its 
outgoings 22   only at the end of the process. Whether or not someone has raised 
concerns about this has never been recorded. The entire decision-making process 
involves no form of public engagement or participation. The people of Hong Kong 
engaged in resistance activities after the decisions were made in 1986. Details 
concerning activities in Daya Bay will be discussed in the next section about the 
governance of China’s civil nuclear power. 
 
4.5 The governance of nuclear power 
China’s civil nuclear power governance model is decided by the country’s political 
system and by development requirements of the industry. The governance model is 
transforming alongside the development of the industry. Since the 1980s, there have 
                                                 
2270% of electricity is sold to Hong Kong which was still a British colony at that time.  
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been several rounds of institutional transformation occurring both inside and outside 
the government. China learns from Western models of nuclear industry through the 
process of technology importation. There are also some institutions which have been 
set up for connecting with international nuclear governance. China’s nuclear industry 
is transforming from military to civil usage, from management by government 
agencies and ministries to management by corporations. However, the development 
of the nuclear industry is not trying to copy the style of the Western countries in the 
same way that China used to mimic the Russian style. Rather, it is developing 
towards a localised governing style with the influence of Western advanced 
technology and management experience. In this process, the central and provincial 
governments still play the most important part. Just like Pierre and Peter’s claim: 
“Finally, governing is still discussed primarily in terms of national governments 
which exercise authority throughout the territories within their national boundaries 
and which can exert substantial control over international influences on their 
domestic policies and institutions (for example, national markets)” (Pierre & Peters 
2000:4).  
 
To understand the governance of China’s civil nuclear industry we should look first 
at China’s real situation. Tait and Lyall (2005) summarise two levels of 
transformation occurring from government to governance. Firstly, on the 
governmental and institutional level, cooperation is replacing hierarchy. Secondly, 
on the public level, non-governmental actors are beginning to engage more in the 
decision-making process. Another issue raised is the importance of experts playing a 
more critical role in decision-making on nuclear power; this is clear to see in the 
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UK’s civil nuclear industry. The knowledge of experts gives governments the power 
to make decisions (Welsh 2000). China’s case matches these three points in some 
ways, but not in all. In the very beginning (from the 1960s to the beginning of the 
1980s), the civil nuclear power industry was closely related to the military 
programme (Cappellano-Sarver 2007). Decisions were made by a small amount of 
people who held high positions in central government. However, during the 
developmental process of China’s civil nuclear power, I see the dynamics of 
governance in both institutions and on a public level through the institutional 
transformation, the modern corporation system, and public participation activities.  I 
will discuss this issue by reviewing the institutional transformation of the nuclear 
power industry from the 1960s until now, the modern corporation system from the 
1980s until the present, and stakeholder engagements in civil nuclear power projects 
in Hong Kong and mainland China.   
4.5.1 The institutional transformation  
Institutional transformation is the initial stage of China’s civil nuclear power shift 
from government to governance. From the policy-making process of the Daya Bay 
project (as discussed in the preceding section), we know that it was a committee – 
founded by several key policy-makers in the central government – that first initiated 
the country’s nuclear power project. This was a top-down, power-over process. This 
kind of model was certainly not enough to fulfil tactical management requirements 
during the development process of the civil nuclear industry. The government and 
nuclear industry started to implement institutional transformations in the 1980s. 
Since then, the nuclear power project has become more open and systematic than 
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ever before. In this section, I intend to discuss three forms of institutional 
transformation.  
 
 1. The Second Ministry of Machine Building (SMMB 1958)  1982 The Ministry of 
Nuclear Industry (MNI 1982)   1988  China’s National Nuclear Corporation 
(CNNC 中国核电集团公司).  
This institutional transformation represents two levels of change: from military to 
civil industry, and from government institution to cooperation. The shift from 
SMMB to MNI is a process by which China’s military nuclear power institution 
transformed and merged into the civil nuclear power industry. The SMMB was 
formed in 1958.  
“It was tasked with the development of nuclear weapons, the nuclear 
submarine propulsion plant, and all associated industries. The Second 
Ministry controlled the nuclear industry from prospecting, mining, and 
processing uranium; processing fuel; constructing nuclear facilities; to 
developing and producing all instruments and control (I&C) equipment.” 
(Cappellano-Sarver 2007 p116:)  
From 1982 SMMB changed its name to the Ministry of Nuclear Industry (MNI). 
MNI was the organiser and owner of China’s first domestically designed nuclear 
power station – Qinshan Nuclear Power Station Phase I. MNI was a transitional 
institution in the 1980s. The state’s nuclear power industry is gradually transferring 
from military projects to big commercial civil nuclear power projects; the state’s 
nuclear power plan is “Retain Military, Transfer to Civilian (Bao Jun Zhuan Min 保
军转民).” MNI would not receive the same amount of resources and economic 
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support as the military had. At that time the central government offered the best man-
power and also funding for their research and development of new technology (Li 李
鹏  2004). MNI tried to apply for ownership of the Daya Bay project in 1984 from the 
State Council, but its bid was unsuccessful (Li 李鹏 2004). The Daya Bay project 
was owned by the Ministry of Water and Electricity (MWE) in the very beginning 
and the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (CGNPG) later on (I will discuss 
CGNPG and the Daya Bay project in the next part). The necessary technology and 
equipment (reactors, turbines, etc) were imported from France and the UK. MNI had 
no chance to participate in the design and manufacture of this big project, making the 
1980s the most difficult decade for MNI. It lost its leading position in the nuclear 
industry, a position only achieved during the SMMB period. After the Qinshan Phase 
1 Nuclear Power Project, the central government decided that the reactor style of 
Qinshan 1 was out of date and that the country would no longer build that kind of 
reactor. The technology for building Qinshan 1 (which was on hold by MNI) lost 
most of its value. In 1988, MNI was reorganised into China's National Nuclear 
Corporation (CNNC): “Like the Second Ministry, the CNNC consists of over one 
hundred subsidiary companies and institutions and still controls the vast majority of 
the civilian and military nuclear programs” (Cappellano-Sarver 2007:116). 
According to the cooperation introduction that I found on the CNNC website, the 
corporation is described as “a transformation result from military to civil-military 
cooperation, from simply military to various industrial systems, a transformation 
from planning operation system to market operation system.” At present, the CNNC 
is in charge of military and civil nuclear technological development, building and 
running nuclear power stations, economic cooperation with foreign countries and the 
- 102 - 
 
import-export business. The CNNC is the biggest owner of all nuclear power stations 
– and is largely responsible for operating and constructing most nuclear power 
stations. The CNNC is a monopoly corporation of the country’s nuclear industry.  
From its function and the monopoly-style operation system, it seems that the CNNC 
does not represent the shift to governance. However, the corporation style of 
management is closer to governance than that of government agencies and the 
Ministry. The CNNC still has a lot of room to keep transferring to a more market-
style corporation. 
  
2, The founding of the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA 1983) and the 
National Nuclear Safety Authority (NNSA 1985)  
The CAEA was founded for the purpose of connecting with the IAEA as an 
internationally recognised institution. On 11 October 11 1983, the International 
Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) decided to admit China as a member in its 27th 
conference. The CAEA was founded immediately afterwards. Although the CAEA is 
a member institution of the IAEA, it still retains its Chinese style – which means it 
also works for the military. For the military setting, the CAEA has another name, 
which is the National Security Technology and Industry Commission (NSTIC). 
These two institutions share the same staff and together work on both civil and 
military nuclear power issues (interview with general secretary of Chinese Nuclear 
Academy). According to the description on the website, the CAEA is in charge of 
creating decision-making policies and regulating the peaceful use of nuclear power. 
It also cooperates with government bodies and international organisations. 
Regulations such as the ‘Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export 
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Control of Missiles’ and ‘Missile-related Items and Technologies, Emergency 
Nuclear Accident Matters’ are provided by the CAEA. It also participates in and 
organises international nuclear conferences, publishing White Papers on China's non-
proliferation policy and measures.  
 
The National Nuclear Safety Authority (NNSA) is in charge of the safety of the 
country’s nuclear power development, and is under the supervision of the State 
Council. It performs independent reviews and surveys nuclear safety for civilian 
nuclear installations. The NNSA was founded in 1985 and was a subordinate 
department of Science & Technology until 1998, when it merged with the Station 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) and became one of its primary 
departments. In 2002-2003, the National Radiation Sources Management Division 
(NRSMD) detached from the Ministry of Health and joined the SEPA. The NRSMD 
and NNSA were integrated into one department, but their names were kept for 
internal and external use. NNSA is the externally used name for licensing and low 
issuing. NRSMD is used internally as a division of SEPA (Interview with BL and 
BC, president and secretary of SEPA). 
  
 
3. Research and design institutions of China’s nuclear power industry. 
One of the main characteristics of China’s civil nuclear power industry is that China 
does not have a complete nuclear industry technology support team – this 
distinguishes it from the civil nuclear power industry in Western countries. In other 
words, China does not hold the key technology of design and did not produce civil 
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nuclear reactors when the country was making its civil nuclear power plans in the 
very beginning. This point can best be seen in my analysis (in the second section) of 
the technological condition of the country’s civil nuclear power industry. China’s 
civil nuclear power development plan is built mostly upon policy-makers’ ideology 
rather than upon real technological development.    
 
The Shanghai Nuclear Engineering, Research and Design Institute (SNERDI) was set 
up in 1970 for the purpose of designing civil nuclear power reactors. From May 2007 
SNERDI was merged into the China Nuclear Power Technology Corporation 
(CNPTC) (http://www.snerdi.com.cn/01company/1backgd.asp). Several other 
institutions during the 1970s, primarily in various universities and in the China 
Science Academy (CSA), were also involved in the designing of civil nuclear plants. 
Tsinghua University Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology (INET) is the most 
important of these. However, these institutions in universities and in the CAS work 
primarily on military nuclear reactors and nuclear-powered submarines designed 
before the 1970s. The period 1978 to 1989 marks the transformation period of 
Tsinghua INET. Since the 1990s, the institution has been working on the research 
and design of civil nuclear reactors. In addition, it has also been researching 
renewable energy and environmental resources.  
The institutional transformation of safety and research organisations in the civil 
nuclear industry shows how the civil nuclear industry became detached from the 
military nuclear industry. This was an important step in helping the country’s civil 
nuclear power to found its own running and ruling system – and it was also the 
foundational step for potential governance in the future.  
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4.5.2 The modern corporation system  
Although China’s civil nuclear power industry had been undergoing some 
institutional transformation in the 1980s, the military settings, government 
institutions and corporations were not clearly separated even into the early 1990s. 
The State Institutional Reform in 1998 broke the cooperation of government and 
enterprises (State Council Development Research Centre 1999). The modern 
corporation system should be seen as the most important transformations of the 
state’s civil nuclear power industry from government to further governance. The 
Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation — which set up and was in charge of the 
Daya Bay Nuclear Power Project – is the starting point for the nuclear corporation 
system in the nuclear industry. Since Guangdong, the whole civil nuclear power 
operating and management system has been transferring to the corporation system, 
which means that civil nuclear power projects are no longer organised by the central 
government. The central government is only in charge of planning and decision-
making, while nuclear power companies run and manage nuclear power stations. 
Nuclear power companies also become the legal owner to apply for the licence for 
nuclear power projects through the administration process. The nuclear power project 
is no longer centrally run by a central government plan. Instead, the State Council 
decides on the project, whilst other government agencies, institutions, and lower 
levels of governments then cooperate to facilitate the State Council’s nuclear power 
development decision (Li 李鹏 2004). Nuclear power corporations like the CNNC 
and CGNPG were gradually transformed from government ministries.  
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In the previous section I briefly introduced the transformation of the CNNC. In this 
part I would like to discuss the Guangdong Nuclear Power Corporation (GNPC 广东
核电合营公司) and its modern enterprise system. The GNPC is a part of the 
CGNPG and is also the owner of Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station. Because of the 
historical context behind the construction of the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station, 
the GNPC is not a state-owned corporation. It is a joint-stock corporation operated 
by Guangdong Nuclear Power Investment Company and Hong Kong Nuclear Power 
Investment Company (owned by Hong Kong ‘China Power’ 香港中华电力). As a 
joint-stock corporation with the Hong Kong Company, the GNPC was not a 
government ‘sub-agent’ (Rong, Lai et al. 1999). As a modern corporation it was no 
longer just handling top-down decisions, but worked on benefits for all shareholders. 
In comparison to government sub-agencies and state-owned companies, this joint-
stock style corporation is independent in France and has to take responsibility if 
people have any concerns about the nuclear power station handled by their company. 
It becomes the body for negotiating with local people, with NGOs, with the media 
and so on. For example, when journalists in Hong Kong want to gather information 
about the operating situation at Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station, they will contact 
the GNPC for access to that information, rather than contacting government agencies 
or ministries. In April 1995, the Hong Kong legislative Council Panel on 
Environmental Affairs requested that an independent nuclear expert team (organised 
by the Hong Kong Government) be put in place to monitor the operations of Daya 
Bay Nuclear Power Station (Zhu 朱汉强  1995c). 
- 107 - 
 
4.5.3 Stakeholder engagement 
In this section, I discuss two stakeholder engagement activities. I discuss two unusual 
anti-nuclear power cases that happened in China. One happened in Hong Kong (1986) 
when it was still a British colony, and the other happened in the Silver Beach (2006), 
Shandong province, mainland China. There are two reasons for discussing these two 
cases. One is because they are the only two cases that I can find about public 
participation in nuclear power issues in China, apart from the Han River case which 
Iwill be discussed in depth later on. The other is because these two cases are 
representative and they reveal different styles of participation over nuclear power 
issues. They offer insights in explaining the concept of ‘the public’ which have also 
been used in public participation of environmental issues. Who are ‘the public’? Are 
they stakeholders with a special interest in the local environment, or they are just 
ordinary people who live locally? The anti-nuclear activities in Hong Kong were led 
by environmental protection NGOs, and the media also played an active role in the 
issue. The participants were ordinary Hong Kong citizens who lived locally and had 
concerns about risk from the Daya Bay project. The Silver Beach protest was led by 
property owners who were not residents of the Silver Beach but who purchased flats 
there; their main tool for resisting the nuclear power project was the Internet. Their 
different styles of participation are related to different social contexts, to the 
resources that participators holdi, and to the attitude of local governments.  
 
The Anti-nuclear Activities in Hong Kong 
The anti-Daya Bay nuclear power project activity (the Anti-Daya movement) is quite 
similar to anti-nuclear power activity in Western countries. It was organised by 
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environmental NGOs and widely publicised by the media. The purpose of the 
activity was to express the concerns of the Hong Kong people regarding the potential 
risks posed to the environment and nature by the Daya Bay project. Daya Bay 
Nuclear Power Station is located 50km (30 miles) away from Hong Kong. The 
project did not draw much attention from Hong Kong citizens when it was first 
announced in 1980 (Zhang 张圭阳 2007). However, the Chernobyl accident on 26 
April 1986 served as a catalyst sparking increased action against the Daya Bay 
Nuclear Power Station. On 6 May 1986, Hong Kong environmental protection 
organisations such as Long Green Team (长青社), Friends of the Earth（地球之
友）, and Nuclear Power Concern Group (核电关注组）first expressed concerns 
about the Daya Bay project, and asked for its suspension. On 15 May, 167 university 
lecturers and teachers published an open letter asking related departments to circulate 
safety documents to the public. From 27 April to 5 June 1986 the Hong Kong Times 
(香港时报), Ming Bao （明报）, and Wen Wei Po (文汇报) published 478 pieces 
of news about the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Project – 10% of all the news in Hong 
Kong during that period (Zhang 张圭阳 2007).  
 
After the public became involved in the anti-Daya activity, the Hong Kong 
government began paying attention to the issue. On 11 July of the same year, the 
Hong Kong Legislative Council sent two teams to Europe and the US in order to 
study the safety issues of nuclear power stations. On 13 August, the “Stop Daya Bay 
Nuclear Power Station Joint Meeting (争取停建大亚湾核电厂联席会议 )” deputies 
brought 1,004,000 citizen signatures from Hong Kong to Beijing, an unmistakeable 
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representation of Hong Kong’s concern about the Daya Bay Project. On 20 
September 1986, Hong Kong Legislative Council members such as Tan Huizhu, and 
Li Pengfei visited Beijing. The members had a meeting with Li and inquired about 
safety and operation management issues. These anti-nuclear activities in Hong Kong, 
however, did not change the central government’s decision regarding the Daya Bay 
Project. On 23 September 1986 all contracts and agreements about the Daya-Bay 
Project were signed between China, the UK and France (Li 鹏李  2004). This 
heralded the end of anti-nuclear activities in Hong Kong: from that point on, anti-
nuclear activities became comparatively smooth. The focus shifted from 
confrontational resistance to risk management and safety issues. However, a rather 
serious incident of human negligence happened in the Daya Bay Nuclear Power 
Station in October 1987 – an accident of misplaced reinforcement in the Phase 1 
reactor foundation. This issue was widely reported by the Hong Kong press, but was 
never mentioned by China’s mainland media. Li (2004) recorded this issue in his 
diary: It has been found out by project acceptance staff from Framatome that the 
construction of the Phase 1 reactor cannot meet the standard since the Chinese 
company which is in charge of the construction project mistakenly put the 
reinforcement in the roof of the reactor. This issue caused a great uproar among 
Hong Kong’s citizens. Based on this issue, in January 1988 the central government 
agreed that Hong Kong could organise a Nuclear Power Safety Inquiry Group. The 
China Nuclear Power Industry Department selected two staff members to maintain 
an ongoing connection with the group. They have two meetings annually in order to 
communicate about safety issues at the Daya Bay Nuclear Power Station.  
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Anti-nuclear activities in Hong Kong have primarily been organised (at least since 
1986) by NGOs, Hong Kong newspapers, ordinary citizens, professionals and civil 
servants. The Daya Bay Nuclear Power Project has been openly discussed in Hong 
Kong society. Activists have a channel for making their voices heard and have an 
opportunity to receive feedback from both local government and the Chinese 
government. Although they were not able to change the central government’s 
decision in the end, they have had the opportunity to supervise various safety issues 
at the power station. The anti-Daya movement in Hong Kong is a bottom-up public 
participation issue revealing the model of governance behind a nuclear power project.       
 
 The online anti-nuclear movement in the Silver Beach, Shandong Province  
The Silver Beach campaign is a stakeholder engagement activity organised by 
property owners who buy retirement or holiday homes along the Silver Beach. 
Activists described their activity as an anti-nuclear Internet movement. One of the 
organizers whose Internet ID is ‘Jingming’ claims that:  
“‘Silver Beach no nuclear power’” is a self-organised mass movement. There is no 
formal organisation style. Netizens are spread out everywhere. Most of them have 
never met each other.” 
The purpose of netizens’ anti-nuclear power activity is simple: to protect the 
surrounding environment of their flats. The Silver Beach case, the Han River case 
(which I will discuss later on) and many other environmental protection activities in 
China are quite similar. They are more concerned with living a ‘well-off’ life than in 
protecting the environment for its own sake (Jing 2003). People who are involved in 
this activity are not residents of Silver Beach. They are stakeholders who have a 
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certain social status and the network resources to organise and take part in the 
activity. Most of them are so-called ‘nouveau riche’ or ‘middle class’ people who 
can afford a second property for holidays and retirement.  
 
The Silver Beach is a Four A level23 national travel resort in Rushan City, Shandong 
Province. It was reported that the nuclear power project with four 1000MWe nuclear 
reactors was to be built only 4-5 km (3 miles) away from the Silver Beach. The 
Internet anti-nuclear movement first began in response to this in March 2006. Several 
stakeholders who had purchased retirement flats in the Silver Beach area heard about 
the nuclear power project. These people called themselves netizens (网友 wangyou) 
and began posting articles on the Shandong Property webpage Shan Fang Wang (山
房网).  
 
From March 2006, a key netizen started to circulate anti-nuclear power information 
on Xinghua Net 24  (新华网). The click-through rate of these anti-nuclear power 
articles was over 10,000. In April 2006, these netizens drafted a letter to Wen (the 
present prime minister), mobilised other netizens to sign the letter, and then sent it 
along to Beijing. From that point on these netizens, who were also future flat owners, 
worked together on the anti-nuclear Internet movement in order to resist the nuclear 
power project in the Silver Beach. Their articles and Internet activities drew attention 
                                                 
23The highest national travel resort level is Five A. It is the standard evaluatedand approved by the 
National Tourism Administration. The five elements for evaluation include transport, tour guide, 
sanitation, and number of visitors. A Four A level travel resort has achieved full marks in four of the 
five elements.    
   
24Xinhua Net is organized by Xinhua News agency. It is an official web page for the central 
government’s news agency.   
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from the local government and from newspaper journalists. On 25 May 2006, for 
example, “The No.1 Finance and Economic Daily” reported news about the public’s 
concern over the Silver Beach nuclear power project. In June 2006, however, the 
entire forum about Silver Beach in Shan Fang Wang was suddenly removed by the 
website administration. Netizens lost their network for the anti-nuclear movement 
without any notice. At that time an environmental protection NGO called Ocean 
Environmental Protection Commune (大海环保公社 Dahai Huan Bao Gong Se) 
invited those netizens to post anti-nuclear information on their online forum. 
Throughout this anti-nuclear power movement, netizen activities were not limited to 
an online forum. In addition, netizens also:  
 wrote letters to the State Environment Protection Administration (SEPA) and to 
the State Development and Reform Commission (SDRC); 
 organized two ‘on beach’ anti-nuclear propaganda activities called “Yan Tan Wu 
He (银滩无核 Silver Beach No Nuclear)”, taking place on 1 May and 27 July 2007. 
  
Source: http://www.txdyt.com/read.php?tid-29459-fpage-0-page-11.html accessed 27 
November 2009. 
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       3) passed “Silver Beach No Nuclear” promotion material to provincial and       
municipal government officials. 
The local government did not take a neutral position on this issue but actively 
welcomed the nuclear power project 25, even going so far as to organise a public 
exhibition for educating the public about nuclear technology. They hoped in this way 
to somehow win over the Silver Beach stakeholders. However, it could not succeed. 
Netizens were not convinced by the exhibition. The municipal and provincial 
governments at last realised that the netizens’ anti-nuclear movement should not be 
ignored. On 28 May 2007, the Rushan municipal government announced a public 
review of the Silver Beach nuclear power project on their official website. On 12 
June 2007, netizens collected 628 copies of these public review forms and handed 
them in to the Silver Beech nuclear power planning office. However, the netizens did 
not receive any feedback from the municipal government. In November 2007, the 
Civil Nuclear Power Mid-Long Term Development Schedule (2005-2020) (核电中
长期发展规划 2005-2020) was published. The Silver Beach project is not 
considered an ongoing project. Netizens published and discussed this news in their 
online forum. Their Internet movement successfully resisted nuclear power. As the 
Civil Nuclear Power Mid-Long Term Development Schedule (2005-2020) declares, 
there will not be any nuclear power project built on the Silver Beach before 2020.  
 
 
I have kept a close eye on the development of the Silver Beach anti-nuclear Internet 
movement since 2007. This is a stakeholder engagement, a bottom-up policy 
                                                 
25This attitude is very common for local governments in dealing with nuclear power projects. It is the 
same in the Han River case; details will be discussed all together in chapter 7.  
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decision-making process, and a social education process concerning knowledge of 
nuclear power. During the online anti-nuclear activities, rich information was 
circulated about nuclear power and its potential to harm the environment and human 
beings, accidents which have happened in the history of nuclear power development. 
Even netizens who are doing ecological research in the US posted articles about 
professional knowledge of nuclear radiation and nuclear risk on the forum. This 
activity was successful in drawing attention from the local government. The local 
government and nuclear power companies sent nuclear experts to communicate with 
netizens both online and offline, in order to bridge the division between lay 
knowledge and expertise on nuclear power. After experts communicated with 
netizens they became aware of the fact that nuclear power is a social as well as a 
technological issue. Unfortunately, the way that local government and nuclear power 
companies dealt with the public review results could not have satisfied the netizens: 
the results were never published. The Silver Beach case, however, as a self-organised, 
anti-nuclear social movement made up of netizens, highlights the negotiations and 
interactions taking place during the policy-making process of a potential nuclear 
power project. Stakeholders did find a way to make their voices heard by policy-
makers. This should be regarded as an important step in the governance of civil 
nuclear power in China.     
 
4.6 Nuclear Waste disposal         
 
Waste disposal has always been the most controversial issue of civil nuclear power 
development. Each country has different decision-making processes for determining 
waste disposal policy. The policy decision-making process in the US “included 
- 115 - 
 
several agencies in [the] federal government, Congress, the courts, state and local 
governments, industry, scientific organisations, public interest groups, and the 
general public”(Woodhouse 1981). In Western developed countries the most difficult 
part of waste disposal is deciding how to fill the gap between a scientist’s assessment 
of the risks and local perception of those risks (Kemp 1992). Blowers, Lowry and 
Solomon claim that there are three main conflicts faced in nuclear waste disposal: at 
the national level; in central, regional and local communities; and in cross-frontier 
transport (Blowers, Lowry et al. 1991). Lack of funding and investment is another 
big issue in waste disposal. Nuclear waste disposal was clearly a hot topic in the 
public agenda during the 1980s and 1990s, especially in Western countries where 
nuclear power is or has been used with a degree of success. The situation in China, 
however, is quite different. Nuclear waste disposal, like nuclear power, is not on the 
public agenda  and is a much more sensitive topic. Scientific assessments have never 
been published concerning the risks of nuclear waste. In this section, I can only 
provide general and preliminary information about the country’s nuclear waste 
disposal. Before discussing the country’s economic and technological situation in 
this regard, I want to discuss intermediate-level wastes (ILW) and low-level wastes 
(LLW) as identified in the UK.  
 
The UK has proposed two programmes for dealing with ILW and LLW disposal: the 
shallow land burial programme and the deep disposal programme (Kemp 1992). As 
Kemp (1992) introduced in his book The Politics of Radioactive Waste Disposal, the 
UK government has adopted the policy of disposal of radioactive waste rather then 
indefinite storage because of the influence of the Sixth Report of the Royal 
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Commission on Environmental Pollution (1976). The agency responsible for 
implementing this policy is UK Nirex Ltd, which is jointly owned by BNFL, Nuclear 
Electric, Scottish Nuclear and the UK Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA). In 1983, 
Nirex announced two potential sites that were to be examined for physical suitability: 
a sea-dumping mine in Billingham, for long-lived ILW and LLW, and Elstow, a 
shallow repository for short-lived ILW and LLW. The Billingham proposal was 
quickly opposed by an anti-dumping group and the sea-dumping idea has been 
banned until sufficient international studies have been conducted. The Department of 
the Environment indicated that Nirex also provided at least three alternative sites for 
both deep disposal and shallow trench disposal in 1985. In 1986 Nirex announced 
three sites apart from Elstow, each of which was swiftly opposed by the local 
authorities. In 1987, the whole plan for shallow trench disposal was similarly 
abandoned. Kemp claims this was due mostly to the fact that Nirex tried to prevent 
local involvement (Kemp 1992). Nirex learned the importance of involving people in 
the decision-making process. In the selection of a location for deep disposal, they 
made much more of an effort to find out the local response to the project. In 1991, 
Sellafield was selected as the deep disposal site. Based on this UK case, it is clear 
that the public and local communities play a very important role in the decision-
making process surrounding nuclear waste disposal. In China, however, the situation 
is not the same. Nuclear waste disposal is only decided by the industry and the 
government.  
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In China, nuclear waste disposal and management has only been in effect practised 
for 16 years - 35 years after the commencement of nuclear technology (Zhang 张欣 
2007a).  
“At the initial stage of development of nuclear power, the most important 
mission is bringing out the product, while from the end of the 1980s when 
the country started to adjust its military development, some of the early 
military nuclear power sites were going to be closed and decommissioned, 
the problem of waste disposal and management suddenly came up. From 
the Eighth Five-Year Plan, the state started the ‘Military Nuclear Sites 
Decommissioning and Radiation Waste Disposal’ special plan.” –Wang 
Yiren (Director of the Second System Engineering Division, the National 
Security Technology and Industry Commission (NSTIC)) (Zhang 张欣 
2007a:1; my translation)  
 
China’s nuclear waste disposal and management obviously began quite late (at 
around 1992) compared to Western countries. High-level Waste (HLW) disposal, for 
instance, is still in a phase of research and exploration. HLW from military sites has 
been stored in the factory in Lanzhou Province (west China), and is still waiting to be 
properly disposed (Wang 王祥科 2005). “Wastes from civil nuclear power reactors 
are mostly stored in the temporary waste disposal storage inside the nuclear power 
stations” (Liu Hua, SEPA Nuclear Safety and Radiation Environment Management 
Division Director) (Zhang 张欣 2007b:1; my translation). Moreover, the cost of 
waste disposal did not factor into the cost of nuclear power projects until quite 
recently: “The nuclear waste disposal and management will gradually follow the 
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market economic operation” (Pan Ziqiang, expert from China Academy of 
Engineering) (Yang 杨阿卓 2007a:1; my translation). 
According to Yang, the waste disposal of nuclear power has yet to follow the market 
economy. This is why the waste disposal fee has never been discussed at the same 
time as the economic conditions of a nuclear power project. In 1990, the central 
government earmarked 1.35 billion RMB (around 200 million USD) for nuclear 
waste disposal (Yang 杨阿卓 2007a). The nuclear industry embarked on the waste 
disposal project with this amount of money. Pan claims that within the first 15 years, 
the country built a solid foundation in nuclear waste disposal technology. In the next 
20 years the country should expect to see huge developments in the economic, 
technological and personal realms (Yang 杨阿卓 2007b).   
     
4.7 Summary 
 
This chapter presents background information on China’s civil nuclear power 
industry, including discussions on the context behind energy supply; the economic 
and technological situation of China’s civil nuclear power; decision-making 
throughout the history of nuclear power projects; the governance of the civil nuclear 
power industry and the issue of waste disposal. The purpose of this chapter is to offer 
a brief introduction to the field, especially for those readers who do not know the 
background information about China’s civil nuclear power industry. However, 
another more important purpose is to show the conflicts and dilemmas inherent in the 
development of a civil nuclear power industry. I expect readers to understand how 
civil nuclear technology – which is originally from Western countries – is managing 
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to find a place in China. In addition, in order to work for the later chapters on field 
findings, I would like to show how the top-down decision-making of civil nuclear 
power plans confronted public debates and participations. 
 
Chapter 5: Civil nuclear power in a preliminarily 
modern society26 
5.1 Introduction  
As the first of the field finding chapters, one of the main purposes of this chapter is 
to introduce the local context behind the Han River case. In the very beginning, it is 
worthwhile to explain the concept of a ‘preliminarily modern society’ as used in the 
title. There is simply no easy way to define a country’s modernity. There is no fixed 
standard to indicate the level of modernity that a country has reached. In Chinese 
society, ‘modernity’ or ‘modern society’ has always been an especially vague 
concept. ‘Preliminarily modern society’ is a phrase that comes up as people describe 
their living conditions in (and the social aspects that characterise) the townland. It is 
also a phrase used by the central government in official debates on China’s recent 
development stage. The country has just started to work for economic and modernity 
development since the reform and policy of opening up. After thirty more years’ 
development, Chinese society has reached a preliminarily modern level. People in 
the big cities are living comparatively well-off and modern lives. Those who live in a 
poverty-stricken townland in China are eager to seek opportunities for industrial and 
commercial development. ‘Modernity’ and the benefits of ‘well-off living’ are key 
goals for local people. In this process of working on development and modernity the 
townland is full of conflicts and risks. This social background shapes the local 
                                                 
26 With the approval of the supervisor, some research findings in chapter 5, 6 and 7 have been 
published in “China Environmental Series 10” (2008/2009) pp151-155 
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understanding of the potential inland nuclear power project. People’s different 
perceptions and formalisation of risks in response to the inland nuclear power project 
are strongly influenced by their social, economic and cultural positions (5.3 and 5.5). 
In this chapter I want to reflect upon what I saw during my field research and 
consider the different things people said concerning their lives in the townland.  
 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief 
introduction to the controversy surrounding the potential nuclear power project. The 
second section considers the geographical location of the Han River Basin, the 
geographical location of Dapu townland, and the living conditions of the local people. 
Having provided this background information, I will then discuss my field findings 
in the third section, using concepts related to risk and modernity. Different risks are 
constantly coming together and causing uncertainty in the lives of townland people: 
including risks from the environment, risks from other development projects, and 
risks from daily life. In the fourth section, I analyse the environmental awareness of 
the local people, arguing that (wealthy) local people are more interested in protecting 
the Han River from nuclear pollution for their own sake, than for the purposes of 
environmental/water resource preservation.  
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5.2 The Controversy of the Potential Inland Nuclear Power 
Station  
From June 2006, experts from the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and 
China Guangdong Nuclear Power Group (CGNPG) started using the Han River 
Basin to conduct preliminary tests for the potential inland nuclear power project. On 
9 September 2006, news about the project was published on Meizhou Daily 
(appendix 1.4). It was reported that three potential locations in Dapu and Fengshun 
Townland had passed the ‘preliminary feasibility’ research test.  
 
News about the project provoked controversy and opposition by People’s Deputies 
(PDs) and also by local people in the lower reaches of the Han River Basin, 
especially in Shantou City and Chaozhou City. PDs from the two cities asked for an 
inquiry meeting in the Provincial People’s Congress on 4 February 2007. In the 
inquiry meeting, the deputies expressed several concerns about the risks that the 
inland nuclear power project might bring to the Han River, and especially to the 
lower reaches of the Han River Basin. The inquiry meeting took the form of a Q&A 
session. The provincial government officials and experts from the CGNPG answered 
PDs’ questions directly in the inquiry meeting. According to the News report, the 
meeting was held in a ‘hot atmosphere’ (Chen陈枫  2007).27  
 
                                                 
27This inquiry meeting was a political activity rather than a public participation activity. The 
stakeholders in this inquiry meeting were all provincial People’s Deputies. This inquiry meeting was 
far more politically embedded than the anti-nuclear Internet social movement discussed in chapter 3. 
Topics related to PDs, the people’s congress system, and the public sphere will be discussed in 
chapter 7.   
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After the inquiry meeting, PDs consolidated their ideas and sent an official letter to 
the provincial leader. The Development and Reform Commission of Guangdong 
Province (DRCGP) replied to the letter on 12 April 2007. This reply (appendix 1.2) 
did not satisfy the PDs, and so they sent another letter to DRCGP. On 25 June 2007 
the official reply letter (appendix 1.3) from DRCGP declared that the potential 
nuclear power project would be postponed. The letter from DRCGP also declared 
that nuclear power projects would only be planned along the coastline until 2015.  
 
5.3 The geographical location and the local context  
The fieldwork research of this thesis was conducted in the Han River Basin, in places 
such as Dapu townland, Chaozhou city and Shantou city. Dapu townland is a site that 
represents the conflict of a preliminarily modern society in several aspects. There are 
conflicts between economic development requirements and geographical limitations; 
between low-income levels and high levels of consumption; between commercial 
and industrial development and environmental degradation. These problems and 
conflicts shape the social background of the case, and also influence local 
understandings and opinions about the nuclear power project. 
 
5.3.1 The Han River Basin 
 
The Han River Basin (Map 5.2 and 5.3) is located in the east of Guangdong Province 
(the green part of Map 5.1). Dapu townland (the area inside the white circle in Map 
5.2) is located at the east edge of Guangdong Province. Shanhe (the upper mark in 
Map 5.3) marks the starting point of the Han River and is located inside Dapu 
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townland. Dangxi village and Shanzhou village (see Map 5.4) are the two areas that 
have passed the preliminary test for the potential site. Taohua village is just opposite 
Shanzhou village (see Map 5.4). The three villages all belong to the Gaobei Zhen 
area (the white circle on the bottom left of Map 5.4) 28. Shantou and Chaozhou city 
are the two biggest cities in the lower reaches of the Han River (see Map 5.2 and 5.3). 
My fieldwork research is basically concentrated in Dapu townland, in Chaozhou city 
and in Shantou city. This is because the potential locations for the inland nuclear 
power station were selected and subsequently tested in Dapu townland, and because 
the controversies concerning this project first began in Shantou city and Chaozhou 
city.  
 
There are two main areas in the Han River Basin, in the Meizhou area (Meizhou city) 
and in the Chaoshan area (Chaozhou city, Shantou city, Jieyang city, Puning city, 
Shanwei city and so on). These two areas are very different in terms of economic 
development, geographical conditions and population. The Chaoshan area is a 
wealthy coastal area in Guangdong province with an active economic atmosphere 
that opened up after the reform. The area mainly depends on its manufacturing and 
exporting business. The Meizhou area is the poorest area in the province. This area 
has very little industry, and business investments are mainly concentrated on 
developing agriculture and forestry. Chaoshan is the biggest flat area inside the 
province. It is the breadbasket, producing mainly rice and economic crops. Meizhou 
is a mountain area where the lands are poor and where there is little advantage to be 
derived from agriculture and farming. The forest acreage is high, up to 68.6% (Jiang 
                                                 
28A place that is smaller than a town but bigger than a village is called Zhen (镇 ) in China. Its 
administration level is between town and village as well.  
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2009). Because of the good economic conditions, Chaoshan has higher education 
levels and a more highly skilled workforce than Meizhou. Shantou city boasts a high-
level comprehensive university, Shantou University, which attracts young people to 
the city. Most of the young people work and study outside Meizhou city since there 
are no higher education or work opportunities to be found in Meizhou city.         
 
Map 5.1 Guangdong Province in China 
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Map 5.2 The Han River Base in Guangdong 
Provinc
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 Map 5.3 Dapu townland, Chaozhou city and Shantou city  
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 Map 5.4 Shanzhou, Taohua and Dangxi village inside Dapu townland 
 
5.3.2 The Han River  
The Han River is the second largest river in Guangdong Province. Its length is 410 
km. It is created by the convergence of three rivers called the Ting River, the Meitan 
River and the Mei River in Shanhe (map 5.4). The Ting River and the Meitan River 
both flow from the northeast and the Mei River from the northwest. They converge 
in Shanhe, running towards the south and finally joining the South China Sea. The 
Han River is one of the main rivers inside Guangdong Province that today adequately 
supplies water for agriculture, for industry, and for the major cities in the basin—a 
rare fresh resource in much of China. The Han River received its name from a 
famous poet in the Tang Dynasty, Han Yu (韩愈), who was serving as a minister in 
the sovereign's governing body. He was sent to the Chaoshan area in his fifties. At 
that time the local people in Shantou were suffering from crocodile attacks in the 
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river. Han Yu discovered a way to keep the crocodiles away from the people, and 
saved a great many lives. Local people named the river Han River to remember him 
after he left. This story is familiar to people in the Chaoshan area, and there are 
temples built along the river in his honour. I visited one of themI: it is well built, 
managed and maintained, and is visited by people all the time. From a cultural aspect, 
the Han River is highly respected by local people in the Chaoshan area: it is a symbol 
for the local culture and people’s safe and happy lives. Apart from this cultural 
meaning, the River is also the most important drinking water resource for local 
people.     
 
People who live in areas lower than Shanhe drink water from the Han River. 
According to weekly reports on the condition of the Han River water, taken from the 
website of the Shantou Environmental Protection Bureau (SEPB), the ‘drinking 
water condition’ of the river meets the national standards for a level II rating. This 
means that the river water is very good for drinking. Regulations, rules and plans 
have been set up by the province and by cities along the Han River in order to protect 
current water conditions. Local governments and local people in Shantou city are 
very serious about the river since it is the only river that is not polluted in the city. I 
visited the automatic water condition monitoring station in Shantou city in August of 
2007. The station began operating on 18 October 2003. It runs 24 hours a day so as 
to monitor the condition of the water from the upper reaches of the Han River. The 
water monitor machine is operated and managed by staff in the SEPB.  
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5.3.3 Dapu townland 
Dapu townland is the starting point of the Han River. The townland (Map 5.4) is 
located on the east edge of Guangdong next to Fujian Province. The total area is 
2470 km². The total population is 520,000. People who live in Dapu townland are so-
called Hakka People29 (客家人 Guest People). There are two main aspects of Hakka 
culture: education and migration. Their ancestors were often said to have arrived 
from  or from central China centuries ago: “As a late comer to places 
initially occupied by locals, Hakkas usually had to struggle and survive on the less 
desirable land”
northern China
30. I was told that because of geographical limitations, the Hakkas 
only have two opportunities available to change their lives and create better living 
conditions: studying and working outside. It is very common for local people in 
Dapu townland to study and work outside the townland. Each family I visited in the 
town centre and in surrounding villages seemed to have a family member working or 
studying in other economically developed cities of the province. DXu, my host, told 
me that there are 500,000 Dapu people living in the townland, 500,000 spread out 
into the country and another 500,000 spread out all over the world. 
 
The town centre of Dapu townland is called Huliao. When I stayed in the town centre, 
I had casual chats with local people in order to understand their feelings about their 
lives in the town. From these conversations, I now want to discuss local feeling 
concerning the environment and economic development. The comparisons people 
drew between their town and big cities can be summarised in three points. Firstly, 
                                                 
29“The term Hakka, which literally means ‘guest people’ or ‘strangers,’ is the name of a Chinese 
ethnic group whose ancestors, like those of all Han Chinese, are believed to have originated in north 
central China” (Constable 1996:3). 
30Quote from http://www.asiawind.com/hakka/ 
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Dapu townland is located in the mountain area. The natural condition puts the 
townland at a disadvantage when it comes to economic development. This is a 
general point always made by local people and by local government officials.  
 
DY (local government official): “Dapu townland is one of the hundred poorest 
townlands in the country. We do not have competitive industry, plus it's in a 
mountainous location. Our economic situation is very difficult.” 
  
Secondly, local people always talk about the good natural environment in the 
townland. For example, they say that the air condition is very good in the town 
compared with other big cities in Guangdong province31. One is less likely to get 
sick in the townland because of the air is good and because the townland is covered 
by trees. Thirdly, locals indicate that life in big cities such as Guangzhou and 
Shenzhen appeals to them. They are attracted by the education and medical services 
that people can access in big cities. One of my host’s friends, who has a 13-year-old 
daughter, said: 
  
“There is only one good middle school in the townland. It is not as good as the 
famous middle school in Meizhou city, and can not compare to middle schools in 
Guangzhou city. If my girl goes to the middle school in the town centre, I don’t think 
she can go to a good university in the future. I am sending her to Dongshan Middle 
School in Meizhou city in September. Hopefully she can go to the famous university 
in Guangzhou like you.”  
                                                 
31Local people mostly have the experience of staying with offspring and other relatives who are 
working in other big cities.  
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Most people whose children work in big cities are in their 50s and 60s. It is common 
for those people to see doctors in big cities rather than in the townland. Local people 
consider that the medical facilities in the townland are not advanced enough to deal 
with serious diseases and surgeries. I saw more traditional Chinese medical hospitals 
than Western medical hospitals in the town centre. My host DXu told me that: 
 
“We went to Guangzhou to see a doctor last year. I needed a small operation on my 
nose. The hospital here is not good enough, so my son asked me to go to Guangzhou. 
It is a really big city. The traffic is so busy that I am afraid to go outside. The air is 
so polluted. But it is safer to have the surgery in a big hospital in Guangzhou.”    
   
People who receive higher education and have higher level skills are all leaving the 
townland to work in economically developed cities. For those people who stay in the 
townland, feelings towards the environment and towards economic development are 
very complicated. On the one hand, people know that modernity might have a bad 
influence on the environment. On the other, they feel there is no choice but to 
sacrifice the environment so as to achieve a certain level of development. In this 
sense some local people (especially government officials) claim that the proposed 
nuclear project offers a good opportunity for the townland’s economy and that it will 
not pollute the environment. Based on this consideration, local government officials 
describe the nuclear power project as a win-win plan. Details of how and why local 
government officials want a nuclear power project will be discussed in chapter 6.  
 
- 133 - 
 
The townland has three main industries: China clay manufacturing, hydropower 
stations and forestry. The Gaobei area in the south of the townland (see Map 5.4, the 
area inside the white circle) is where most factories are located. Most of China’s 
factories are family workshops. The factory that I visited had two floors: the ground 
floor was the main manufacturing workshop and the first floor contained an office, a 
display room and the factory owner’s home. DG, the mayor of Gaobei, told me that 
the family workshop style of kaolinite manufacturing consumes a high level of 
energy and produces a high level of pollution. Their method of digging and burning 
China clay has had a particularly bad impact on vegetation, earth and air. The 
provincial government raised a tax on the industry. Besides, family-style 
manufacturing cannot catch up with craft and design technology innovation. Dapu’s 
China products are no longer competitive in the market. A lot of factories are now 
closed, or are in the process of closing down.  
 
Hydropower is another natural resource for the townland that is set to be fully 
exploited. As DXu said, each of the three rivers (the Ting River, the Mei River and 
the Meitan River) that converge in to the townland can have six to seven hydropower 
stations assigned to them. These hydropower stations are the main income for the 
townland. Ninety percent of the hydropower resources have been or are going to be 
exploited.  
 
Fast-growing forestry offers a new source of income for the townland. The townland 
is starting to grow this kind of forest in order to sell wood in a very short period of 
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time32. On my way to villages from the town centre, I noticed that nearly all the 
mountains were full of stumps and bundles of wood by the side of the road.  
 
Besides these three industries, farming brings in an income for the townland as well. 
It is said that if divided into ten parts, the townland is seven parts mountain, two 
parts water and one part farmland. Generally speaking, however, farming creates 
limited economic growth because of geographical limitations. In order to make a 
profit these days farmers have started to grow economically viable fruits and crops 
such as golden grapefruit and tobacco.  
 
According to strategic and economic considerations, nuclear power stations are 
supposed to be built in relatively rural places that are far from cities and have 
relatively low population densities. Firstly, Dapu townland qualifies as a potential 
site because of its geographical and economic situation. Secondly, its lack of other 
potential incomes from industries and the urgent desire for economic development 
are key reasons why the local government committees are happy with the nuclear 
power project. The economic and geographical disadvantage is the reason for Dapu 
townland to be picked up as the potential site rather than other economic developed 
place inside the province. This point conflicts with Beck’s argument about the 
equally distribution of risk that I discussed in 2.2. In this case, economic developed 
places in the province are more likely to avoid the risk from nuclear power stations.  
 
                                                 
32This is a new kind of forest being grown in China. This kind of fast-growing forest is quite 
destructive to the land. Although these trees take only 2-3 years to grow (meaning they can be sold 
very quickly) they have a truly negative effect on the soil.  
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After staying in the town centre to conduct ethnographic research for two months 
(June-July 2007; February-March 2008), I became very aware of the low levels of 
income locally. The salary for a local government office director is only around 
900RMB/month (equivalent to £60/month). If the local government was better off 
financially, then there might be other welfare and bonus opportunities available. 
Because of the poor financial conditions of the town government, a basic salary is the 
only thing that can be guaranteed. According to statistics from Xinhua Daily, the 
average annual income for an urban resident in 2006 is 11,759 yuan (Goodman 
2008), which means that in the Dapu townland, a local government office director’s 
annual income (10,800 yuan) is even lower than that.  
 
Food and living costs are certainly not cheap when compared to the income level. 
Pork, for example, costs around 16RMB/kg (equal to £1/kg). This number shows that 
even a local government office director’s salary can only just meet the demand of 
regular clothing and food standards. On average people living in the town are not 
well-off. I interviewed local people about the imbalance between income levels and 
prices. They told me that nearly every family has one or more members who work 
outside the townland and send money back to support parents, wives and children. 
People rely not only on their own salary income, but also on family members outside 
the town.   
5.3.4 Villages in Dapu townland 
I visited three villages (Map 5.5) in the townland in order to analyse lay opinions 
about the nuclear power project and people's understanding of the risks of the project. 
Two of these villages have passed the preliminary feasibility research test so as to be 
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candidate sites for the project, while the other village is located just on the other side 
of the river. The three villages share some characteristics: most young and skilled 
members of the workforce leave the village and work outside; villagers do not 
receive much education; the influence of modernity increasingly impacts upon their 
traditional lives. As a researcher I was lucky to see people from these three different 
villages displaying different attitudes and opinions about the potential nuclear power 
project. Villagers’ personal reflections on the influence of modernity or modern 
technology on their lives were different due to their specific circumstances, namely 
the village’s geographical location, economic and management condition.  
 
We passed one place called ‘Migration New Village’ (移民新村). It is a new village 
built by the local government and by the electricity company for people who need to 
move because of the hydropower station and flooding. This kind of new village 
offers a way to resolve conflicts between hydropower projects and local villagers. 
The government official told me that villagers along the Han River suffer from 
flooding nearly every year. Whenever there are electricity companies hoping to 
develop hydropower projects along the Han River, villagers face the possibility of 
being relocated. The local government comes in to work for the benefit of both the 
electricity companies and the villagers. A ‘migration new village’ was considered by 
local authorities to be a win-win situation. Villagers got their new homes in a better 
location – without having to pay any money, and sometimes even receiving 
supplemental money as well. Electricity companies can then develop their projects 
more easily and efficiently without upsetting local villagers.  
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Map 5.5 Dangxi village, Shantou village and Taohua village 
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Dangxi Village  
 Dangxi village is the poorest village of the three (see picture 5.1). Over 40% of its 
population works outside the village (interview with the village leader). It is 
surrounded by mountains. Experts from nuclear power companies selected three 
locations in the surrounding mountains suitable for geological exploration. Dangxi 
village has houses in the traditional style, and is covered by trees and surrounded by 
farmlands. Local farmers believed that, due to the ancestral home of Lee Kuan Yew 
(former president of Singapore) being located in the village, the ‘Feng shui (风水)’ 
in the area was very good. The geographical location of the village is not very good 
as it is in the lowest layer and sees flooding every year. From my observations there 
are two main reasons for Dangxi's poorer economic conditions. The first is its simple 
production style. People in the Dangxi village only farm for living, receiving only a 
moderate income due to geographical limitations. The second is the poor 
management performance of the village committee. This is a vicious circle: nobody 
wants to join the village committee because of the poor economic conditions, but in 
the absence of capable leaders, the economic conditions continue to deteriorate. I 
arrived in the village at around ten in the morning, on the day when local people send 
Cai Shen (财神Buddha of wealth)33 away, after sending Cai Shen, New Year’s Day 
is over. People will normally go back to their workplaces after sending Cai Shen 
away. It was also the day of the village committee election. I went to the village with 
two officials from the town government, and we visited the local committee office 
                                                 
33Traditionally, people believe that the Cai Shen will move from the place where he lives to people’s 
homes on New Year’s Day and bring them luck and wealth. After the New Year, Cai Shen will go 
back to his place, and a ceremony is held to send him there. Different areas have different dates for 
welcoming and sending cai shen.    
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first. The local village management committee and the village cadre Wang34 (from 
Gaobei) were all present. Officials from the town introduced me to many people. 
Afterwards, we had a relaxed discussion about the nuclear power project. 
  
The village leader, DH, said that all the villagers were tired of hearing news about 
the nuclear power station. They had heard about it as early as 2006, and yet no one 
had been able to confirm the project after that. News about the project, however, had 
had a bad influence on the development of the village. Businessmen became very 
cautious about investing in the village because they knew they could lose all their 
profits if the village had to move. Local people also became doubtful over whether or 
not to spend money on house renovations. I conducted interviews in local homes 
after the conversation with the village committee. Wang asked a local farmer to 
guide me to the location where experts did their exploration tests. On our way, we 
had a conversation about the flooding in the previous June (2007). I asked whether 
her family had received any relief money or crops from the government after the 
flooding. She said they hadn’t received anything at all. 
 
There is a deep hole (around 10 metres) of around 10cm in diameter on the middle 
mountain (see picture 5.2). Experts from the China Nuclear Power Company made 
the hole in order to test the geological condition of the rock. According to the 
information I obtained from officials from Gaobai Zhen government (see table 5.1), 
within 1km² area of Dangxi village there are 513 families, and 2,493 individuals will 
                                                 
34Village cadres are a kind of supervisory cadre sent by the town government to the village. They all 
have ordinary jobs in the town government. They can be office directors or secretaries in the town 
government. They are sent to villages in order to pass along information and conduct supervision. 
Wang was supervising and observing the village management committee election on that day.  
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be relocated. A total of 342 houses within the area need to be relocated and the total 
measurements of these houses are 41,040m²35.  These statistics come from the Zhen 
government for the purpose of preparing for possible relocation, and have been 
provided to nuclear power companies for their reference.  The table in the next part 
(table 5.2) gives the same information for Shanzhou village.  
 
Picture 5.1 Dangxi village 
                                                 
35Some families share a house. They are sometimes siblings who have spouses but do not have enough 
money to build a new home, so two or three families share one house.  
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of houses  
The housing 
area (m²) 
1km 513 2493 342 41040 




According to my observation, I summarized that in Dangxi village most people 
welcome the nuclear power project to change their lives. The geological limitations 
they faced, and the poor management and economic condition of the village make 
local people lose the confidence to actively work for a better tomorrow for the 
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village. They passively wait for the nuclear power project to become an opportunity 
to offer them better lives. However, since they can not confirm whether the nuclear 
power project really going to happen, village development goes in to a dilemma 
situation which actually makes their lives worse.   
    
Shanzhou village  
Shanzhou village is a leading village of the town, and was made famous for its 
development in the 1970s. DZ, the village leader, was very proud to introduce the 
future development plans for the village. He pointed out that they would develop 
some mountain areas in order to grow golden grapefruits. Businessmen in 
Shenzhen36 also invested in raising fish. As part of a long-term plan they are now 
going to develop a tourist industry in the village. There will be plenty of hotels and 
farming areas so that people can stay and enjoy the countryside way of life. There is 
a flood control dam inside the village that was constructed in 1974. DZ said, “We 
started to build the dam in 1970. Nine hundred local farmers worked together with 
town soldiers to build it. We also develop our village independently; we never just sit 
and wait for help from the town government.”   From 1974 the village has rarely 
suffered from flooding. It has several sources of income: farming, raising fish, 
planting fruit trees and investing in other commercial projects. Scientists and experts 
also picked up three locations on surrounding mountains for geological exploration. 
DZ said that if Shanzhou village is selected for the nuclear power station, then 
everything that had previously been built would be destroyed. He said he was not 
keen to have the project in the area, but that if the state made the decision to build the 
                                                 
36Shenzhen is the Special Economic Zone in Guangdong province right next to Hong Kong. 
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station in the village then he would have to accept it. He also said that they were still 
planning village development - regardless of the state’s decision.  
 
From the housing conditions people can tell that farmers in Shanzhou village are 
much richer than those in Dangxi village. Their houses are quite ‘in fashion’. Their 
‘modern’ houses were built in the 1990s. Unfortunately, they actually ruined the 
beauty of the village.  
 
In comparison Dangxi village, people’s attitude to their village’s development is 
much more active. They believe they can depend on themselves to work for the 
village’s modernity. They do not see nuclear power project as the only opportunity to 
bring them investment and economic development, they even think that nuclear 
power project might ruin their harmony lives. According to information leaked from 
local government officials, the geological situation of Dangxi village is much more 
suitable for building the nuclear power station than that of Shanzhou village. The 
village leader is happy with this information and continues the village’s development 






of houses  
The housing 
area (m²) 
1km 513 2493 342 41040 
2km 680 3226 454 54400 
 
Table 5.2  
Taohua village 
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Taohua village is on the east side of the Han River, just opposite Shanzhou Village. 
The distance between the two villages is less than 500 metres. The village population 
is 2,900. Taohua village is well managed and is doing well economically. There is a 
hydropower station inside the village which guarantees an income for the village. 
Although Taohua village was not picked for the nuclear power station, it could still 
be situated inside the relocation area. However, people in the village do not have 
much awareness of this situation. They think the nuclear power project is going to be 
located in the other villages (Dangxi and Shanzhou village). The geographical 
location of Taohua village is elevated: people live along the mountain ridges, and 
living in such high places makes it difficult to visit commercial centres to buy daily 
necessities. Local people who earned money outside the village tend to build new 
houses for their parents who still live there.  Farming does not generate much income 
for the local people, so they use some of their farmland in the flat area, mostly by the 
side of the road, to build new houses. 
 
A big hydropower station was also located in Fengshun townland37 (the townland 
next to Dapu). Farmers there will receive some supplemental money because the 
project actually caused some of their farmlands to become submerged. Farmers often 
lost their farmland or had to be relocated because of power projects or road 
construction projects in the villages. This is very common in the countryside these 
days. For them, there is not much difference between moving to make way for 
                                                 
37The location of the hydropower project in Fengshun townland is in the upper reaches of Taohua 
village. The impounded level of the Dam is up to 25.5 metres. Taohua village is in the lower reaches 
and the lower layer. Part of its farmland will be submerged. Source:  
http://www.gaobei.cn/LT/dispbbs.asp?boardid=5&Id=1603&page=10 
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nuclear power plants or to make way for highway development. They normally have 
no opportunity to say no to the state’s development.  
In comparison to Dangxi village and Shanzhou village, people’s attitude of nuclear 
power project is in between in Shantou village. They do not really welcome or 
against the nuclear power project, they just do not aware nuclear power project might 
influence their lives. Even thought the project might be so close to them, they do not 
border to think of its effects just because they are in different villages.  
 
5.4 Modernity and risk in the townland  
Apart from those conflicts arising from poverty and the poor natural conditions of 
farming, and between low income and high expenditure, and between fast developing 
town centres and peasant villages, there are also serious ongoing conflicts between 
those supporting modern development and those emphasising environmental risk. As 
I have mentioned before, the townland’s main industries are China clay 
manufacturing, hydroelectricity and forestry. Each of these brings risks to the local 
environment. Family-style China clay manufacturing workshops constitute a highly 
polluted and high-energy consuming industry. Hydroelectricity causes ecological 
risks and flooding. Fast-growing forestry has a bad influence on the soil. Apart from 
these local industries, people also have to face other modern developmental projects, 
such as highways. According to my interviews, local people in the townland prefer to 
talk about their desire for modernity and economic development rather than about 
risks to the environment that might be caused by the modernisation process. 
Although there are local people who are aware of the risks to nature and the 
environment, their attitudes to those risks are passive. They know what will happen, 
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and accept it as a fact rather than trying to do something to change it. In this section I 
use the flooding that I experienced in 2007 as a case study for analysing local 
awareness and the local attitude towards risk.  
 
 I arrived in Dapu townland on 4 June 2007. It started to rain from the afternoon of 5 
June. The rain was much heavier than I had ever seen before, and it kept raining after 
that day. By 9 June the flooding had become very serious and TV news and 
newspapers started to report on what was happening to the townland and to Meizhou 
City: 
 
“There is TV news about the flooding tonight. Most of the road connecting with 
Dapu town had landslides. Traffic connections to Dapu town from outside were 
nearly paralysed. The flooding had also damaged the railway from the town to other 
parts of the province.” (Research fieldnotes on 9 June 2007) 
 
 
I was stuck in the town after that. Because of the flooding I could only make the trip 
to Gaobei Zhen, but could not go further into the villages in the first phrase of my 
fieldwork. According to the news on Meizhou Daily on 11 June, the Hanzai Dam 
was in danger because of heavy rains and the flood discharge in the upper reaches 
reservoir. Local government officials, soldiers and local people were trying their best 
to save the dam. Eighty percent of the Gaobei Zhen was underwater. The highest 
water level reached 5.33 metres.  People moved to the upper floors of their houses 
and went out in boats.   
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According to local descriptions, there is flooding nearly every year in the townland. 
In 2007 the main reason for the flooding was heavy rain, while in 2006 it was mainly 
caused by a hurricane. Apart from natural reasons, however, some people believe 
that hydropower stations along the Ting River, the Meitan River and the Mei River 
also caused the flooding. One significant interviewee is DEL, an engineer who works 
in the Dapu Environmental Protection Administration. DEL claimed that reservoirs 
in the upper reaches of the river needed to release flood water when there were heavy 
rains, and that these hydropower stations added more pressure to the water release of 
the Han River; during dry seasons, however, these power stations wanted to save the 
water for making power. In his opinion, this system makes the flooding more serious 
in rainy seasons; it also makes the river drier in dry seasons.   
 
In the online forum of Dapu townland, there are also netizens claiming that 
hydropower stations are the reason behind frequent flooding every year. One netizen, 
whose ID is Mei Na Zhong Ming, said that: 
“Another important reason [for the flooding] is that vegetation has been damaged. 
In recent years, unauthorised and wasteful mining of kaolinite cased serious damage 
to vegetation cover.” 
This person’s word highlighted the negative impact of kaolinite manufacture on the 
environment. Wen Chuan Dao Ren responded to this comment by asking: 
“What you said is right. What shall we do in the future?” 
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Other netizens read their comments and asked whether the government should do 
more to manage the situation. There were others who claimed that the government 
was entirely useless. The conversation ended without ever dealing with the flooding. 
It was just a casual chat.  
As a researcher, I believe there is a high risk in planning an inland nuclear power 
station in a place that experiences serious flooding every year (see pictures 5.3 and 
5.4).  This risk should be taken into account by local people, by people in the lower 
reaches, by people in the media and by PDs. However, this issue has never been 
discussed.     
 
These words represent two levels of information. Firstly, there are local people who 
are aware of the risks to nature and the environment caused by modern developments 
in the townland. Secondly, there are people who question the government’s 
management but who at the same time depend on the government to deal with 
ongoing conflicts between risks and development. When facing relocations, flooded 
fields, or other problems caused by development, local people will normally depend 
on the local government to work on their behalf, rather than searching for external 
support from environmental protection NGOs, the media or other organisations. In 
the local context, governments and government agencies work as mediators among 
industries, companies and local people. They have a dual role: they help industries 
and companies to communicate with local people, and they help local people to gain 
more supplements from industries and companies. This scenario illustrates a recent 
trend in Chinese society – a tendency for the government and for government 
agencies to actually cover a great deal of business that is supposed to be managed by 
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civil organisations. This introduces a much wider topic related to China’s public 
policy agenda and to civil society, which I am not going to address in detail in my 
thesis. However, the main point to make here is that all levels of governments have 
taken too much roles in dealing with civil nuclear power issues.  
 
Picture 5.3 Gaobei Zhen flooding (picture adopted from www.512400.cn) 
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Picture 5.4 road to Dapu town centre after flooding 
5.5 Public environmental awareness 
The controversy over the potential inland nuclear power project was always tightly 
connected to the Han River. When PDs expressed their concerns about the nuclear 
power project, they always referred both to water and to the environment. Most of 
the time the concept of ‘risk’ was actually missing in our conversations; however 
‘water pollution’ and ‘environment’ came up repeatedly in the words expressed by 
PDs. When the media reported news about the inquiry meeting, they highlighted 
PDs’ concerns over water rather than talking about nuclear risks. In chapter 8 I will 
analyse the journalist’s main argument when he drafted his news release. The 
journalist was concentrating on science and democracy – and ‘risk’ was not a topic 
he wanted to discuss. I claim that this is firstly related to how much the local people 
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know about nuclear risk; and secondly, to how much power the media, PDs and local 
people have to form their own discourse concerning nuclear risk. In Chapter 6 I 
intend to address the first question, and in Chapter 7 the second. In this section, 
however, I will discuss public environmental awareness. I claim here that the 
public’s growing awareness over the environment is one of the most important 
elements to shape PDs’ claims about the environment and water.  
 
After the inquiry meeting PDs summarised their inquiries in an internal letter to 
Zhang Dejiang, the province’s prime minister. Their points are as follows: 
First: The Han River is the mother river of Shantou, Chaozhou and Meizhou City. 
10,000,000 people who live below the Meizhou Valley are dependent on the Han 
River as a drinking water resource. If there were to be any leaking problems, it 
would not only pollute the ocean but also pollute the Han River basin. 10,000,000 
people’s lives would be put in danger, and this would be a catastrophe.  
When reference is made to other countries’ experiences with nuclear power 
operation, it becomes clear that nuclear power is not 100% safe. There have already 
been several serious nuclear accidents in western countries to date. Additionally, 
scientists and experts do not have very strong evidence to show that there are no 
risks from nuclear reactor operations. And they cannot guarantee there won’t be any 
invisible pollution of the river that could have consequences for the later generations 
of inhabitants.  
Second: It was reported that the capability of the reactor is up to 1000 MW. How 
much cooling water is needed to support nuclear reactors? How much is the current 
capacity of the Han River in a year? How much is the current capacity in the winter 
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and dry seasons? How is the nuclear power plant going to influence the water 
temperature? There might be ‘heat pollution’ affecting fishes and other aquatic 
creatures. If the temperature rises, bacteria and microbes will increase; this could 
turn the river into a ‘dead river’. 
Third: The other problem is related to transportation. The shipping of building 
materials, radiation materials and waste is another problem. Shipping those 
materials to the upper reaches of the Han River will be expensive and will also 
create a risk of water pollution. Considering this issue it is also better to build the 
nuclear power plant along the coastline. Guangdong province has a very long 
coastline. We think that there are still spaces to develop nuclear power plants along 
the coastline. If accidents happen, then the damage and costs will be lower. 
Fourth: The Han River is the best drinking water resource inside the province, and 
we produce the best fish in the estuary. We are not going to put the only ecological 
river in Guangdong province at risk of pollution. The Province People’s Congress is 
issuing the “Guangdong Drinking Water Resource Protection Regulation”. Does the 
nuclear power project meet the requirements of this regulation? 
Fifth:  In recent years economic development in east Guangdong is in a downturn 
period. The provincial government plan has policies to improve economic 
performance in east Guangdong. The nuclear power station will have a bad 
influence on the investment environment of the Shantou and Chaozhou city. 
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A news release also highlighted the potential dangers this project could bring to the 
Han River.  The headline concerning the inquiry meeting (Appendix 1.1) reads:  
  
‘A nuclear power station might be built in the upper reaches of the Han River. 
People’s Deputies asked for an inquiry meeting— 
10,000,000 People’s Drinking Water Might be Polluted?’  
 
In this news title, both ‘nuclear power station’ and ‘water’ are mentioned. It is 
obvious that ‘water pollution’ is highlighted.  
 
All questions asked by PDs in the inquiry meeting focused on the potential danger of 
water pollution as well. The questions that were laid out in the news were:  
 
“There are Daya Bay, Ling Ao and Yangjiang Nuclear power stations which have 
been built or are being built inside Guangdong province. We have a very long 
coastal line inside the province. Why is [the province] still planning to build inland 
nuclear power stations? Why pick up the Dapu and Fengshun town district in 
Meizhou City district? May I have officials from the Development and Reform 
Commission of Guangdong Province (DRCGP) explain this?” - Chen Han Chu, PD 
from Shantou City 
 
“The Han River is not the Daya Bay. It is our mother river. Over 10,000,000 people 
living in the middle and lower reaches of the Han River depend on it for drinking 
water. I asked how the question stands for these 10,000,000 people: if [they are] 
- 154 - 
 
really going to build the nuclear power station in the upper reaches, will there be 
any pollution in the water?” - Liang Yinying, PD from Chaozhou City  
 
“I studied biology before. The temperature of this cooling water is up to 310 degrees. 
This must have a bad influence on aquatic creatures in the river!” - Chen Shaohe, 
pearl-growing expert and PD from Shantou City 
(Chen 陈枫  2007; my translation) 
 
The PDs’ letter and their questions in the inquiry meeting show three levels of 
information. Firstly, PDs are a group of people who have the political power to 
participate in decision-making on the Han River project (details will be discussed in 
chapter 7). Secondly, at the same time they are also stakeholders who live locally and 
are familiar with the local conditions of the Han River Basin. They raise questions 
based on their specific knowledge and life experience of the Han River, for example 
the possibility of earthquakes, the dire season of the Han River, etc. As stakeholders 
who live locally they will be able to raise questions which may be ignored by 
scientists and experts when they conduct the applicability test. Thirdly, local people 
are becoming more environmentally aware. In this section, I discuss the growing 
public awareness of environmental issues and the influence of this awareness on PDs 
and on discourse in the media. Public knowledge and understanding is 
communicated and developed according to specific social and cultural contexts 
(Irwin, Dale et al. 1996). In China, public awareness of the environment is shaped by 
both top-down political influence and bottom-up participation activities. In the 
Communist Party of China’s Fifth Sixteen Plenum, the top party leader, Hu, 
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announced “building a resource-conserving and environmentally-friendly society” as 
a strategic goal of the country’s eleventh five-year plan. This goal has also been 
marked as a basic national policy. This slogan may not make much sense to readers 
in Western countries, but in Chinese society, this is a policy everyone must know. 
Because of this top-down political influence, the country is now working on 
environmental reform. Government officials in Dapu townland also mentioned the 
relationship between environmentally-friendly policy and the inland nuclear power 
station. DL is a government official in Dapu townland who wants the nuclear power 
project to go forward. He worries that PDs’ concerns about the project might cause 
Dapu townland to lose the investment.   
 
DL: “We are worried about PDs’ claims about water pollution in the lower reaches. 
Nowadays the central government is promoting an environmentally-friendly society. 
PDs use water pollution as a tool against the nuclear power project. There is a high 
possibility that the provincial government will ban the project because of 
environmental concerns.” 
 
From the bottom-up level, local environmental protection agencies and emerging 
environmental protection NGOs all over the country are the most important 
motivating forces behind the public’s environment awareness:  
 
“During that intervening decade, the central government put unprecedented effort 
into environmental protection, adopting more laws, imposing heavier penalties for 
violations, and applying advanced technology to control pollution. One result of this 
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effort was the establishment of the National Environmental Protection Agency in 
1979, whose network of 70,000 employees has since been extended to every county. 
More recently, a few non-governmental organisations have emerged in the larger 
Chinese cities […T]he priority of these citizens’ organisations, usually led by 
intellectuals, is to raise public awareness of environmental issues through 
exhibitions, organized tree-planting trips and tours of wildlife areas.” (Jing 2003:206)   
 
Every year in April, since 2005, citizens from the Meizhou and Chaoshan areas, as 
well as people from Hong Kong, Macau and other foreign countries, join the 
activities of ‘Save Water Resources, Protect Mother River (珍惜水资源，保护母亲
河)’. Tens of thousands of people walk 20km along the Han River in order to show 
their respect for it; they use activities like this in order to pass along environmental 
protection information. These people do not want the Han River to be polluted by 
industrial pollution like the other two rivers in the Chaoshan area. I suspect, however, 
that the nuclear project is not their main concern – primarily because this event 
happened in 2005, prior to any nuclear project planning. In their 2007 event, the 
nuclear project was not even mentioned. These water protection activities are carried 
out together with the local government and with media propaganda to shape local 
awareness of water protection along the Han River. I suggest that this is one of the 
most important reasons why PDs introduced the controversy over water pollution 
with regard to the nuclear power project.  
 
However, local understanding and knowledge of the environment cannot be 
separated from everyday life. In the Dapu townland, which marks the starting point 
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of the Han River, I saw a different understanding of and attitude towards the 
environment. People who live in Dapu townland are obviously not so interested in 
water protection issues. When I asked about the protection of water in the Han River, 
local people informed me that they do not actually drink water from the Han River. 
 
Local resident A: “We do not drink water from the Han River; in the townland 
people drink water from the mountain. People who live in areas lower than Dapu 
drink water from the Han River – as in places like Chaozhou and Shantou.” 
 
DL: “Dapu townland has been contributing to the water protection of the Han River 
for a long time. The industry in our district has lagged behind. That’s the reason why 
the Han River hasn’t been polluted. It is the only main river inside Guangdong 
province which hasn’t been polluted and that provides good quality drinking water 
to lower reaches. However, the bad economic conditions of Dapu townland shouldn’t 
be ignored. Although Shantou city in the lower reaches has already experienced a 
booming economy, we are still poor. If they don’t want us to have the project, will 
they pay us for protecting the water for them?” 
 
People in the lower reaches want to protect the Han River because it is their source 
of drinking water. People in the Dapu townland support or ignore the nuclear power 
project because they do not drink water from the Han River. Urban people and local 
people’s perceptions of the potential risk that the nuclear power project might bring 
to the Han River are strongly connected to their economic and social positions. It is 
obvious that people in the urban area, who live well-off lives, consider drinking 
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water resource protection as a comparatively serious issue. People who live in the 
Dapu townland care less about the potential risk to the Han River just because they 
do not drink its water.  This phenomenon also represents people’s self-interests, 
much like the Silver Beach case that I discussed in chapter 3.    
 
5.6 Summary  
Form the introduction through to the local context of Dapu townland, the reader can 
get a basic idea of where the potential inland power station will eventually be located. 
I use the concept of a ‘preliminarily modern society’ to represent the developmental 
conditions and conflicts within the Dapu townland. Because Dapu is a poor townland 
in the mountain area, people in the Dapu townland are aggressively seeking any 
opportunity for further development in order to fulfil their demand for better lives. 
The development process therefore causes a conflict between human needs and 
nature. The three villages - two of which might be picked up as the potential site and 
the other being located nearby - share diversity and similarity in this nuclear issue. 
They face similar challenges regarding the modernity process, and they represent 
different attitudes towards the nuclear power project. Villagers in Dangxi village see 
nuclear power as an opportunity for a better life given that their current situation is 
hopeless. Villagers in Shanzhou village do not want the nuclear power project 
because they are doing well in managing their place. Villagers in Taohua village do 
not pay much attention to the nuclear power project, even though they are just 500 
metres away from the potential site. 
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The Han River as the drinking water resource links the potential nuclear power 
project from Dapu townland to Chaozhou city and Shantou city in the lower reaches. 
Water safety is the main reason for people in the lower reaches to express concerns 
over the potential nuclear power project. People in the Dapu townland and in the 
lower reaches have different attitudes towards the potential risk to water resources 
due to their social, economic and cultural position; this also represents people’s 
different self-interests. This contextual information should offer the reader the 
appropriate social, cultural and economic background for understanding the public 
knowledge of nuclear risk; this will be examined more fully in the next field-finding 
chapter. 
Chapter 6: Risks or benefits? The social construction 
of nuclear risks 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5, I introduced the local context of Dapu townland, and also made some 
comparisons between Dapu townland and Chaozhou and Shantou cities in the lower 
reaches. In this chapter I intend to discuss local people’s risk construction. How do 
local people, from different social positions and under different circumstances, 
perceive risks posed by the nuclear power project?  Theoretically, this chapter 
employs two concepts: firstly, Wynne and Irwin’s argument about public 
understanding of risk; secondly, ‘situated risk’ introduced by Boholm. ‘Situated risk’ 
is a concept which will be discussed in this chapter in association with people’s 
perception of nuclear risk.  Based on their research on American Indians’ situated 
risks from radioactivity, Stoffle and Arnold claim that:  
 
‘Environmental pollution risks can be situated; that is, clearly bounded in space and 
time. Situated risks are narrowly tied to specific peoples, living in specific places, 
who are confronting specific pollution threats. Situated risks are subject to very 
specific cultural interpretations by the people who are impacted.’ (Stoffle and 
Arnold,  2009:231).  
 
In the Han River case I see the same phenomena as in Stoffle and Arnold’s claim. 
The ‘situated risk’ from the potential nuclear power project affects specific people 
who live in the lower reaches of the Han River who are confronting threats of water 
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pollution. At the same time, the specific cultural and social background also 
influences people’s perception of nuclear risk.    
 
Different attitudes in Dapu townland, Chaozhou and Shantou cities to the nuclear 
power project and its risks make the Han River Basin the perfect location to study 
people’s risk perception of nuclear technology and ignorance of nuclear power (for 




In the Han River case I can see similarities and also differences with Wynne’s sheep 
farmer case. In terms of similarity, in both cases local people show their trust of 
science and technology, and their ignorance and dependence upon institutions. The 
difference is that, firstly, Wynne’s case is already in existence. The case I am 
working on concerns a potential nuclear power programme. I claim that since people 
do not yet face the risks of the nuclear power station, they are less interested in 
discussions about its risks. Furthermore, because there is some possibility of being 
relocated and leaving the village, local people are more interested in their own 
risk/benefit calculations than in understanding the scientifically defined risks of 
nuclear technology, or the actual safety and security of the potential nuclear power 
project. It can obviously be seen through different attitudes shown by villagers in the 
three villages that I visited (see 5.3.4). Secondly, in the sheep farmer case, local 
farmers represent trust in science and technology, dependence on scientific research 
institutions, and also ignorance of the knowledge they have about the local soil and 
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climate. In the Han River case, people claim trust of technology on the surface. 
However, their trust and ignorance are all tightly related to their dependence on the 
government.  
 
This chapter aims to answer two prepared research questions: how do local people 
understand the risks of nuclear power, and how do they construct nuclear risk based 
on their understanding and knowledge of nuclear technology? The research targets 
are local people in Dapu townland, including local government officials, residents in 
the town centre and peasants in the villages; PDs in Shantou city and Chaozhou city. 
These are residents who will live near the nuclear power station every day, drink 
water from the Han River, or will be relocated if the building of the power station is 
confirmed. Michael (1996) discusses and analyses the ignorance of lay people 
concerning science and technology. He writes that “when talking to lay people about 
their scientific knowledge, in many cases we found that people simply do not possess 
any of the ‘relevant’ (at least for the investigator) scientific knowledge; they do not 
simply have a ‘defective’ body of quasi-scientific knowledge, they have none at 
all” 38 (Michael 1996:107-108). Irwin (1996) similarly points out the absence of 
science in local conversations about hazard issues. I saw the same phenomenon in 
my fieldwork research in Dapu townland. Science and scientific determinations of 
risk were generally absent from conversations about the potential nuclear power 
project.  
 
                                                 
38Here there is some difference between the ignorance that Michael discusses and what Wynne 
discusses in the sheep farmer case. Details will be interpreted in 6.3.  
- 163 - 
 
Drawing on these field findings I will now discuss four dimensions that contribute to 
the social construction of nuclear risks. These are: local trust in nuclear technology; 
local ignorance of nuclear risks, local risk and benefit trade-offs; and the silent 
majority. In this chapter I will primarily analyse interviewee data collected from 
local people in the Dapu townland. For comparison purposes, I will cite some PDs 
and analyse statements from people who originate from Dapu townland but who 
work outside it (Dapu migration). I will analyse the words of PDs and Dapu migrants 




Wynne claims that people are trusting because they depend on institutions and risky 
industrial plants. They have no choice but to trust. However, their trust can indeed be 
reflexive to the situation they face. Their trust is not reflexive to an expert system 
based on their understanding of institutional scientific knowledge, as Giddens has 
claimed (see 2.3.2), but to the division between their knowledge and expertise – and 
their identity and the fact that lack agency (Wynne 1996).  
Dapu townland as a place in the process of developing towards modernity is perfect 
for examining Giddens’ and Wynne’s argument about trust. Wynne believes that it is 
worth examining “what the relationships of lay public to expert system is or was 
under ‘simple modernity’ condition” (Wynne 1996). I analyse people’s claims about 
trust concerning three questions: uncontested status of expertise or trust, lack of 
agency or simple trust, and reflexivity to the actual situation they do or do not 
confront. In Dapu townland, when local people spoke about their trust their words 
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indicated that their trust functions on three different levels. Their trust in nuclear 
technology expresses their self-interest, their ideas concerning power relationships 
and social status, and their obvious dependence on the government (the country). I 
summarise these three kinds of trust as follows:  
 
1. Trust with no doubt at all 
Government officials in the Dapu townland express this kind of trust. The 
government official DL told me about this kind of confidence in nuclear technology 
when we were on our way to Gaobei Zhen; I had a discussion about the nuclear 
power project with him and with other local government officials in the vehicle. 
DL: “In the technology aspect, we absolutely trust the safety of the nuclear 
plant, and we do not worry about leaking or radiation pollution. This is 
because our country has been developing nuclear power for 10-odd years. 
Daya Bay and Ling Ao Nuclear Power Stations are both running very safely. 
We absolutely believe that nuclear power is reliable technology.”  
The reason for DL’s trust is the safe operation of other nuclear power stations inside 
Guangdong province. From his statement I assume that he understands some simple 
information about the country’s nuclear power development; he knows, for instance, 
that there are two other nuclear power stations inside the province and that they have 
been operating successfully for 10-odd years. His claims about the safe running of 
Daya Bay and Ling Ao Nuclear Power Station, however, deserve further analysis. I 
assume either that he really thinks Daya Bay and Ling Ao Nuclear Power Stations 
are running very safely, or that he knows something else but does not want to share it 
with me. His trust is shaped by two factors. Firstly, he just wants to believe in the 
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safety of the nuclear power station. He takes it for granted that Daya Bay and Ling 
Ao are running very safely and does not bother to reflect on the information he has 
received; he thus has no motivation to collect further information in order to support 
his trust. Secondly, he has no way to access information about whether or not Daya 
Bay and Ling Ao are running safely. Government officials at DL’s level cannot 
approach the institutions that manage the operating conditions of the nuclear power 
stations. Ordinary people have no way to assess scientific research data held by 
institutions.    
I collected a research report from the China Academy of Science (CAS), South 
China Sea Institute of Oceanology (SCSIO) that details changes in water temperature 
as well as the development of harmful algal blooms (HAB)39 in Daya Bay in the 
Northern South China Sea. In this report, researchers used 3188 pieces of data from 
1970-2005, along with data collected by satellite about the Sea Water Temperature 
(SWT), in order to examine the effect of chlorophyll (Chl-a) and the HAB frequency 
in Daya Bay. Their research findings show that: 
“The High temperature effluent from the power station was one of the main 
artificial impacts. Increase of water temperature and nutrient supply from 
land-sources may stimulate Harmful Algal Blooms (HABs).” (Yu, Tang et al. 
2007:26)  
The research report claims that the increase in SWT in Daya Bay strongly relates to 
the shape of the Bay, which is semi-closed. In order to know more about the research 
                                                 
39“HABs are regarded as a serious problem throughout the world and have also caused considerable 
economic loss in Daya Bay” - Yu, J., D. Tang, et al. (2007). "Changes of Water Temperature and 
Harmful Algal Bloom in the Daya Bay in the Northern South China Sea." Marine Science Bulletin 
9(2): 25-33. 
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I went to the SCSIO in CAS in July 2007 and interviewed the second author of the 
report, Professor Tang. Professor Tang pointed out that Daya Bay is not actually a 
good location for nuclear power stations because of its semi-closed shape. The warm 
water discharge from the power station can only circulate inside the bay, which 
causes the rise of SWT. If local people or PDs in the lower reaches can access this 
research report, it will reveal strong ‘scientific proof’ of the risk of nuclear power 
projects. However, this kind of research report is unavailable to lay people. Tang said 
that they only publish this kind of scientific research report in international English-
language journals.  
 As I will discuss in chapter 8, the media is not allowed to publish any negative news 
about nuclear power in mainland China. So scientific and propaganda-related barriers 
provide another reason for why DL trusts the safety of nuclear technology. 
 
Another example of this kind of ‘trust without doubt’ is found in my conversation 
with a local farmer in Dangxi village, a woman in her fifties. I did not ask her name. 
I use the abbreviation ‘DA’ to indicate her voice here: 
DA: “I don’t worry about it [the safety of nuclear technology]. People who 
work inside the nuclear power station are scientists and experts whose lives 
are worth much more than ours. If they can work inside the power station, 
there is nothing for us to worry about.”  
DA’s words reveal a comparison that she has already made between people like her – 
farmers who have not received much of an education and who do not have the skills 
and abilities to work outside the village (or who are too old, etc) – and scientists and 
experts who have received a higher education, have good jobs, and are important and 
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useful for the country. DA does not need scientific knowledge to trust in the safety of 
nuclear technology. She draws the conclusion that if those people whose lives are 
worth much more than hers can work inside the nuclear power station, then she 
should believe in its safety. DA’s words indirectly show some reflection on her 
relationship to ‘scientific knowledge and/or its institutional embodiment’(Michael 
1996:111). DA believes that scientists and experts who have scientific knowledge 
and expertise are much more valuable to society than she is. Scientific knowledge 
and expertise are key elements that add value to the identity of these scientists and 
experts.       
  
2. Trust in the technology but worry about other things  
Local garage owner DHe spoke about his opinion concerning the nuclear power 
project when I had my father’s vehicle repaired in his shop. It was my first day in the 
townland. 
DHe: “I do not worry about the technology. The country will not build  things 
that will harm people. Some people are worried about radiation and water 
pollution. I do not worry about these at all. I only worry about the war. Dapu 
is so close to Taiwan. If there is a war, then the nuclear power station is 
really dangerous.”  
DHe does not worry about nuclear technology because he trusts the country, but he 
worries about war. This means that DHe thinks that the country can handle nuclear 
risks such as radiation and water pollution, but that the war is too far outside of the 
country’s control. He worries that the country cannot handle the risks that will be 
brought in by the nuclear power station.  
- 168 - 
 
  
3. Trust with no choice  
Village cadre DXu (i) said:   
“I don't worry about the technology. The country decided to build it [and] it 
will be no problem. If the country has decided to go ahead with the project, 
then what we say makes no difference.”   
DXu (i)’s words carry two different meanings. On the one hand, he believes safety 
can be guaranteed because the country decided to build the nuclear power station. 
And on the other, he believes that the government will act no matter what the public 
thinks. DXu (i)’s words show that he is aware of his own powerlessness.  
 
To summarise local people’s claims of trust, DL, DA, DHe and DXu (i)’s words 
echo what Giddens has described as unexamined trust in expertise in simple 
modernity. However, Giddens’ theory of trust does not cover, as Wynne's does, the 
social influence on lay people which shapes their trust. If we consider people’s words 
and the social and political context they inhabit, it clearly demonstrates local 
people’s lack of agency as Wynne has claimed. In the local context, firstly, local 
people cannot access scientific findings. Secondly, they do not have social relations 
and social networks to express their opinion. Thirdly, they do not receive enough 
information from the media which shapes their awareness of concerns and questions 
about the nuclear power project. Apart from lack of agency, local people’s 
dependence on ‘the government’ is obvious. However, when I am in the field and 
have conversations with local people I feel that their perception of ‘the government’ 
is a vague concept. ‘The government’ is a concept that covers all institutions that 
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might be involved in running the nuclear power project. Local people – even local 
government officials – might not know how many agencies (or which ones) are 
actually working and running the nuclear power project. They do not even 
distinguish between institutions which deal with science and technology research and 
government agencies. In local people’s mind they all simply function together as one 
body.  When local people talk about ‘the government’, ‘the government’ represents 
Shang Ji dan Wei (上级单位 upper level institutions) that they are not able to reach. 
Their trust is not based on what they know; it is mixed with ignorance and 
dependence. However, their ignorance not only represents what they know or do not 
know about science and technology, as Wynne argues: it delivers more complicated 
meanings and choices as well. I will analyse these in the next section (6.3). Their 
dependence is just like what Wynne claims: that local people have no choice but to 
trust institutions to run the nuclear power project (Wynne 1996). By comparison with 
ordinary local people, I suggest that the ‘trust’ of local government officials 
represents a higher degree of self-interest. Fei (2005) claims that the most serious 
problem among China’s villagers is ‘selfishness’. ‘Self-interest’ is the key reason 
why people join or leave a social network. Local government officials claim that 
their trust relies upon the fact that they think the project will bring in some benefits 
to Dapu townland. Details about Fei’s theory about Chinese people’s selfishness and 
benefit-risk calculations among local government officials will be discussed in 6.4. I 
suspect they thought I was going to Beijing and had some means of passing their 
opinions along to the government. DL and DXu had this in mind when they invited 
me to dinner. They said, “You should let the government know our townland really 
needs the nuclear power project.” Their trust is objective-oriented – and their main 
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object is not hoping the government will be responsible for the safety of the nuclear 
power project. Their main object is centred on an inherent trust in the nuclear 
technology and government, and a hope that the government will choose to build the 
nuclear power station in their townland.  
 
In comparison to local people in Dapu townland (local government officials, farmers, 
residents in the town centre), PDs in Chaozhou and Shantou cities did not easily 
express their trust in nuclear technology. Deputy CH from Chaozhou city said:  
 
“It is not that we do not trust the country’s technology. However, there are leaking 
accidents happening in other countries internationally. What if there is a war or an 
earthquake happens? We are in an active earthquake area. The Han River’s drinking 
water is in a very good condition; people from Jieyang City [another city in the 
Chaoshan area] drink its water as well.”  
 
As a PD who lives in Chaozhou city, CH actually outlined his concerns about the 
nuclear power project instead of trust of nuclear technology. He raised the issues 
about leaking, earthquakes and water condition based on PDs’ consultation with 
experts from Shantou University, and communicated with PDs who have special 
knowledge about water. Their special identities as PDs also gave them the power and 
duty to collect information about the nuclear power project. From the different 
attitudes of local people in the townland and PDs in Chaozhou and Shantou cities, we 
can see that actually it is not whether people are reflexive to scientific knowledge 
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that shapes their trust. It is their power and whether they will be able to approach and 
make use of scientific knowledge that matters.  
 
6.3 Ignorance  
 
Apart from ‘trust’, ‘ignorance’ concerning nuclear power and its risks is a significant 
phenomenon in my interviews and conversations with lay people in the townland. 
According to my interview data in the Dapu townland (taken from 36 formal 
interviews and 20 informal interviews), 35 interviewees showed some ignorance 
about nuclear power. These people who claim ignorance are peasants and ordinary 
local residents who have no administrative positions, who are less educated, or who 
are female. If people claim that they do not even know what nuclear power is, then 
there is no way to determine their understanding of its risks. However, ‘ignorance’ is 
a common idea in the social research of lay scientific knowledge. In his famous 
sheep farmer case, Wynne explains lay people’s ignorance as not knowing what they 
do know about science and technology, while Michael interprets lay people’s 
ignorance with a different angle. Michael (1996) analyses the discourse of 
‘ignorance’ in his research of the public understanding of science. He claims that 
scientific knowledge is neutrally framed in society, and that people are influenced by 
institutional and political resonance (Michael 1996). He also claims that an 
understanding of a certain technology or science is not merely epistemological 
circumspection: “it is a political process whereby our participants construct a more 
or less critical relation with science and the institutions of science” (Michael 
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1996:111) After making several claims about scientific knowledge among lay people, 
Michael continues his arguments about ignorance.  
“Firstly, ignorance cannot be treated as simple deficit; it entails active 
construction. Secondly, in the process of that construction, people reflect 
upon the epistemological status of their knowledge. Thirdly, in the act of such 
reflection, social and political contexts are drawn upon in order to resource 
a relation to science. … The general point is that lay understandings of 
science and scientists are supplemented by people’s recognition of their 
‘ignorance’ of the actual working of science.” (Michael 1996:111)  
Michael distinguishes and discusses the discourse of ignorance in terms of four 
categories: unconstructed absence (not shown in the table below); ‘ignorance’ and 
mental constitution; ‘ignorance’ and the division of labour; and ‘ignorance as a 
deliberate choice’ (Michael 1996:115-121). Table 6.1 below shows Michael’s 
summary and categorisation of different kinds of ignorance – and how those ideas 
work together to construct an attitude towards science among lay people.  
    
Category Type                      Discursive from                  Implied form of Lay/ 
                                                                                                Science relation 
Mental construction              Non-scientific mind           Subservience/dependence 
Division of labour                 Not my job                         Coexistence/co-operation  
Deliberate choice                  Not interested/relevant       Moral/ political challenge  
 
Table 6.1 A typology of discourses of ignorance (adopted from Michael 1996:122) 
 
In these four categories of ‘ignorance’, the first one – unconstructed absence – means 
that people just want to represent the fact that they don’t know any thing about the 
science and technology, and that their ideas do not require any further explanation. 
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This kind of ignorance does not express any construction information. However, the 
other three categories of ignorance pass along information related to identity as 
represented in a person’s ignorance of science and technology. Michael sees the third 
kind (‘ignorance as a deliberate choice’) as delivering a totally different attitude 
towards science than the other two. He claims that those people who lack a scientific 
mind may still think that science is good, but simply have no ability to understand it. 
This means that people still admire the scientific authorities. The division of labour 
also means that people accept the collaborative relationship with science. The third 
one delivers the idea of a position choice, and indicates that these people choose not 
to believe in science and technology.  
 
After analysing Michael’s claims about scientific ignorance among lay people, it is 
now time to go back to the Han River case and observe the relationship between 
ignorance and risk.   
 
According to my interviews in the Han River case there are many people who totally 
do not understand nuclear power and who never think about its risks. For example,  
Sample1: Peasant DL (female) in Tiao Hua village 
DL: “I have heard about the project, I don’t know anything about nuclear 
power and its risk…” 
Most people in the Dapu townland have never heard about or confronted the issue of 
nuclear power. Moreover, nuclear power has never been defined as risky in China. 
As I discussed in chapter 3, China’s nuclear power has just recently transformed 
from government to governance. Public propaganda regarding nuclear power is 
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limited40. As discussed in 6.2, ordinary people in the townland have limited channels 
for knowing and hearing about nuclear power and its risks. Stakeholders such as 
People’s Deputies and local government officials in the townland will be able to 
receive information about nuclear power according to their position and social status, 
while most of the local people cannot automatically receive and pass along 
information concerning nuclear power and its risks unless it either has an influence 
on their lives, or they pay attention to research information. That is to say, 
knowledge and information networks have yet to build up in the local context.  
Apart from this simple ignorance which has no deeper meaning, there are also people 
who construct their ignorance (Michael 1996). Moreover their ignorance reveals their 
dependence on the government and their own self-interest. For example:  
A local resident, DHH (female), in the townland told me: “I heard about the 
project, but I don’t know where it is. I never discussed this with people, it is 
not my business. This is the government’s job.” 
Local doctor DS (male) in Dapu townland owns a small traditional Chinese medical 
clinic and Chinese medicine shop. His clinic is quite well-known in the town centre. 
I went there with my host Yan when she had a cold. There were already five or six 
patients ahead of us. When Yan was seeing the doctor, I asked DS whether I could 
interview him about the nuclear power project. He agreed, and I went to the clinic the 
next day. When I asked whether he knew about the nuclear power project and its 
risks, he said:         
“I [have] heard about the nuclear project. The potential location is just near 
my ancestral home. I am a doctor; I know there is radiation from nuclear 
                                                 
40Details about nuclear power propaganda will be discussed in chapter 7.  
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power reactors. You see that high voltage substation over there. It also [has] 
high radiation. People want it to be moved away. But the government built it 
here. Who can move it?”  
When I asked him to explain more about nuclear risks and whether he worries about 
the waste disposal problem, he said:  
“I don’t know, this issue is not one we can ask questions about and get 
involved in. The country plans the nuclear power project, they should take 
care of the waste.” 
Both interviewees mentioned the government (the country) in their statements. They 
think the nuclear power project and its risks are none of their business. The 
government (the country) will take care of everything. DS reiterated that he is a 
doctor. He uses his professional status to indicate his knowledge of radiation. 
However, he does not think his knowledge can be useful, since once the government 
(the country) is planning something, it makes no difference whether ordinary people 
know the potential risks or possible harm. He used the high voltage substation in the 
residential area to support his claims. As discussed in chapter 5, people in the local 
context are dependent on the government to care for their lives. This governance is 
strongly related to how much power local people can have over the discourse of the 
nuclear power project (details of the concept of power will be discussed in chapter 7). 
How can they make their voices heard? Will they be able to influence decision-
making on the project? Local people have gotten used to lives that are planned and 
organised by the government, or ‘the country’. This is based on China’s centralised 
economic system. According to local people, the government decides everything. It 
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will make no difference whatever they think about nuclear power and its risks, so 
why should they care?  
 
Apart from their dependence on the government (the country) to resolve nuclear risks, 
these statements also show a relationship between ignorance and self-interest. 
One of the interviewees, DW, who is the president of Gaobei primary school in 
Gaobei Zhen, said:  
“I never think about it. People in Chaozhou and Shantou are worrying about 
it. They drink the water from the Han River.”   
DW’s words show his awareness that the potential risks from the nuclear power 
station relate to the drinking water of the Han River. He is not bothered because he 
does not drink the water of the Han River and because the project does not relate to 
his self-interest. This attitude of ignorance concerning nuclear power and its risks is 
directly related to the next issue that I am going to address: the risk and benefit trade-
off.  
 
Compared with what locals say about the plant, the words of People’s Deputies 
reveal much more complicated meanings behind expressions of ignorance about 
nuclear technology and its risks. According to their words (details will be coded in 
7.2.1) they invited science and experts from Shantou University to demonstrate the 
potential risks of a nuclear power station on the Han River; they searched for 
information about other nuclear power stations and nuclear accidents on the Internet; 
and they organised committee meetings to discuss the issue. As I have claimed, self-
interest is essential to understanding local claims to, and attitudes towards, ignorance. 
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Moreover, social positioning and networking ability also determine each person’s 
attitude towards nuclear technology and its risks.     
 
6.4 Risk or benefits: What are they trading off? 
 
As I discussed in the previous two sections, local people in the townland show their 
trust and ignorance concerning nuclear power and its risks through statements about 
the proposed nuclear power plant. It is not fully convincing, however, to judge a 
person’s thoughts on these issues simply by analysing what he/she has said. People 
do not always say what they really think and believe. In this case, it is very important 
to conduct research by observing and analysing people’s daily lives and their social 
and cultural backgrounds. In the risk construction process, people choose their own 
positions according to their actual situations. Simply stated, their actual situations 
include an understanding of personal benefits and interests. Once there are risks, 
people start to use insurance. Insurance means that people can trade off risk with 
payment. Risk does not go away, however; it is just redistributed (Giddens 1999). 
Beck and Giddens tried to introduce a certain kind of risk that is not insurable, a so-
called ‘manufacture risk’. Although risk from the nuclear power project is not 
insurable at the state or business level, many people did actualise the trade-off in 
their minds – in a kind of risk redistribution, or a kind of risk/benefit trade-off. I 
argue that people present a more straightforward attitude towards risk from this 
trade-off perspective. Chinese anthropologist Fei Xiaotong claims that in Chinese 
society the self is the centre of one person’s network, and the society is founded upon 
relational social networks which are based on these personal networks. In traditional 
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Chinese society people need different social groups under different circumstances. 
Based on Chinese traditional social order there is no boundary between the self and 
the social groups. Specific social groups will be found when people work for the 
same benefits and interests, and abandoned when benefits and interests disappear. I 
will now organise these people into three categories: benefits more than risk; risk 
more than benefits; and those who are unsure about benefits and risk. Once risk is 
connected to benefit and interest and people are organised in different interest groups, 
their words are much easier to understand.  
 
Benefits more than risk  
The first category means that people think that the nuclear power project will bring 
in benefits and interests and that they will face small levels of risk, or no risk 
altogether. People in this category are typically local government officials in the 
townland and farmers who live in the potential location of the nuclear power stations. 
Government officials in Dapu townland are people who strongly support the nuclear 
power project. Broadly speaking, the local government officials that I interviewed 
believe that the project will benefit the townland. They believe that: 
1) Income from the nuclear power station can be used to improve the town .  
2) The size of the project will mean a lot of work opportunities for local people. 
3) The project will result in a commercial boom in the town. 
For example:  
DXu: “The town government really wants to have the project located in 
Dapu townland. It is very helpful for the economy and development of the 
town. Dapu is one of the hundred poorest town districts in the whole country. 
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We do not have much industry; farmland is very limited as well. The nuclear 
power project can bring in tax income and work opportunities…” 
DHe(i): “I personally really want the project [to be] located in Dapu 
townland. This project is a big boost to the economy, and [the] nuclear 
power station’s influence [on] the environment is very limited.” 
After hearing their opinions and linking this with the actual situation of the townland, 
I now doubt these three benefits. Some local people also noticed that the potential 
nuclear power project would not bring such direct benefits and interests to them as 
local government officials have claimed.     
1) It is correct to say that the power project will bring in a large amount of tax 
income for the townland. However, whether the townland will be much improved 
depends on how the local government is going to spend this money. Will it build 
schools, give unemployed people free training opportunities, or build new local 
government office buildings? For example, during my pilot study in February 
2007 the main road of the city, called Dapu Da Dao (Dapu city bypass 大埔大道), 
was being constructed. In June 2007, during my first phase of fieldwork, a six-
lane cement city bypass was completed and opened to traffic. In my opinion, the 
city bypass really does not match the style of the town centre. And I do not think 
it makes people’s lives any better: there are not that many cars in the town and 
people just walk on the six-lane bypass. Quite a lot of money has been used on 
this ‘surface job’ – much like it was used for the new office building of the local 
government (see picture 6.1).  
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Picture 6.1 The new office building of the Dapu town government 
2) As I have said before, most educated and skilled adults are working in big cities 
rather than in the townland. Those people who are left in the town might not 
qualify to work on the nuclear power project. Some may be able to work on the 
site as construction labours. Local people will not be suited to high technology or 
high-income jobs. Others recognise this as well:  
“I can’t see anything good [[that the nuclear power project] can bring to people in 
Dapu. Would you guys say something? Are there any specific benefits? 
Does it mean that we can have cheaper electricity? Not really. 
 Can rich electricity resources bring in companies and investments? People will feel 
scared to come. They may invest in other towns nearby. It is easy to make electricity 
transfers. Increased employment? I don’t think so. This is high technology, not 
labour-intensive industry. So the nuclear power project will bring in trouble and risk. 
- 181 - 
 
People are not positive about coming here. And it is no longer a good place for 
retiring.” (Comments on the online forum, my translation) 
This person’s online ID is Finalfantasy. From this self-introduction on the website I 
got the information that he/she is originally from Gaobei Zhen, Dapu townland, and 
is now working in Shenzhen city. This group of people uses the Internet to express 
opinions about the potential nuclear power project in their hometown. Details of 
online communities will be discussed in chapter 8. Finalfantasy points out that the 
nuclear power station is something that has people scared. It will bring risks to the 
townland rather than benefits. He/she made the distinction between nuclear power 
and other industry. Finalfantasy denied that the nuclear power project would increase 
employment in the townland, because it demands high technology. He/she thinks 
people who live in the townland can only work for labour-intensive industry. 
Finalfantasy’s opinion here proves insightful: it lays out the fact that the nuclear 
power project would not benefit the townland, unlike government officials’ ideology.    
 
DW (the head master of Gaobei Primary School) said that:  
“This project cannot bring any benefit to ordinary people. But it can benefit the local 
government, because of the tax income. Those farmers who will be relocated can 
receive some supplemental support as well. People like us will not benefit at all. If 
the town becomes famous in the future, then prices will rise. Wha tkind of benefit can 
we receive? We discuss this project sometimes. The government is too poor. They 
need this project to boost the economy.” 
DW’s statement points out that local people like him will not benefit from the 
nuclear power project, but will possibly face higher expenses in the future.  He talked 
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about the taxes that will go to the local government, and about supplemental money 
for relocated families. DW has a clear understanding of the situation that he will face. 
It is true that more people will come to work in the town because of the big project. It 
is also true that they will spend some money in town on food and living supplies. 
This is good news for those who might open stores and supermarkets. But since more 
people are spending their money in town, things are also getting more expensive.  
 
Whether the project will really benefit the town is still to be seen, though it will 
certainly benefit government officials. First, a nuclear power station signifies a major 
achievement for the local government officials. To arrange such a big project in town 
will be an important addition to their CVs. Second, a large number of investments 
and a higher income from taxes can raise the town’s GDP. And this GDP might not 
have any environmental deduction during the duration of their duty. Rapid rural 
industrial development has recently brought about serious pollution problems (Tilt 
2007). SEPA and its bureaucracies on all levels received more power from the 
central government so as to control and assess environmental problems. 
Environmental assessment results directly influence the achievement assessment of 
government officials, which means that if the local GDP grows on the heels of 
serious environmental pollution, local government officials will then have to take the 
responsibility. The normal duty duration for government officials is five years. If 
they have good economic achievements without any environmental or family 
planning deductions, then they are sure to be promoted to higher positions, mostly in 
other townlands or cities. In this case nuclear power projects are more attractive to 
local government officials since they do not produce any industrial pollution in the 
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local environment. If accidents happen in the future or if there is any other pollution 
caused by radiation, then nuclear power companies and experts should take 
responsibility instead of local government officials. Third, if the project is really 
located in the town, then the local government will get some income from taxes and 
financing conditions will become very good. Then people who work in the local 
government will get much more income than before41. Their standard of living will 
rise immediately. 
People who live in the potential location also think they face higher benefits and 
lower risk situations. Dangxi village has the worst geographical situation but is the 
most likely place to be chosen as the location for the power station. As a low-level 
area by the side of the Han River it has suffered from serious flooding every year. 
Farming on the mountain areas is hard, while flooding makes the situation even 
worse. Sometimes farmers lose all their harvest within several days. When flooding 
comes they have to move to the top floor or roof of their houses, and wait for the 
government to rescue them. In this situation, relocation due to the nuclear power 
project could be seen as a chance for them to have a better life outside the village. On 
the one hand, manufacturing risks from the power station will not affect them since 
they will have been moved out. And on the other hand, they will no longer need to 
suffer from the external risks of flooding. Besides, they can still receive 
supplemental money from the nuclear power company for the relocation. This is a 
win-win situation.  
                                                 
41The country fixes the standard salary for local government officials. However, in addition to salary 
there is another form of income called Jiang Jin (奖金, bones). This income depends on the financial 
condition of the local government. If the local government collects good taxes from industries and 
companies, then the government office will be able to provide Jiang Jin. However, if local 
governments do not have enough tax income, there will be little or no Jiang Jin for local government 
officials.  
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Risk more than benefits  
The second category includes those people who think they will suffer from risks 
caused by nuclear power and who will receive few benefits or personal interests. The 
typical people in this category are locals who live in the lower reaches of the Han 
River and are drinking its water, and those farmers who live close to the potential 
nuclear power station, but outside of the relocation district.   
 
The PDs from Shantou and Chaozhou cities who asked for the inquiry meeting on 
behalf of people in the lower reaches have serious concerns about the potential inland 
nuclear project. For them, it poses a significant risk to their drinking water resources 
without any economic benefits.  
“We are not against nuclear power; we just do not want it to be built on the 
upper reaches of the Han River. There will be no problem to build it by the 
coastal line. Why not build it at Shanwei42 (the other city next to Shantou)?” 
(Interview with CH; my translation) 
The situation is similar for those people who live in Taohua Village (for details see 
5.2.4). The village is located along the east coast of the Han River, directly opposite 
Shanzhou village. Being on the other side of the river makes people care less about 
the nuclear power project. When I talked to local people they said the news about the 
project did not influence their daily lives. Compared to those who complain that they 
cannot decide whether or not to renovate their housing in Dangxi village, I see lots of 
people in Taohua village who are happily moving into new housing in the New Year. 
                                                 
42Shanwei city is one of the poorest cities in the Chaoshan area. Every year Shantou city spends a lot 
of money to help resolve the poverty problem of Shanwei. If there is a nuclear power station in 
Shanwei, then the tax income will help the city’s economy. 
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I visited a family who had just moved into a new house during the spring festival. 
The house owner, who was doing business in Shenzhen (where the Daya Bay nuclear 
power station is located), said:  
          “I built this new house for my parents; my sister and brother-in-law also stay 
here.  
They look after the old people and do the farming. We use some of our farmlands. I 
want my parents to live here because it is more convenient. It is hard for them to buy 
fresh food on the mountain. If we have to be relocated they [the local government] 
must provide housing for the old people. If they can make us settle down in the new 
place, [then] we are happy to move. It would not be possible to let the old people 
stay in bad conditions.” 
Here is another problem. It is still unclear whether Taohua village is inside the 
relocation area. This is one of the major points influencing attitudes about the project. 
If the answer is yes, this means that their situation is similar to that in Dangxi village. 
They do not have to suffer from both external and manufactured risk; plus they will 
receive supplement money. However, if the answer is no, then the situation is 
completely the opposite. Since Shanzhou village is quite close to the potential site, 
they have to worry about the risk of radiation and nuclear power leaks, as well as the 
risks of external flooding. And because they will not move, there is no supplemental 
money available for them. In this case the project brings no benefits but only risks. 
 
Not sure about risk and benefits 
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There are also people who do not know whether the potential nuclear power project 
will bring them benefits or risks. The people who live in the town centre of Dapu 
townland are in this category. These people do not drink water from the Han River: 
their drinking water comes from the mountain. They think they live far enough away 




After observing people’s daily lives and analysing their words I tried to organise 
attitudes towards the potential nuclear power project into three categories. This 
organisational strategy reveals an interesting geographical layout of support both for 
and against the project inside Dapu townland (see figure 6.1). People who live inside 
the potential relocation areas are supportive of the project.  People who live nearby 
but outside of the potential relocation areas do not support the project. Most people 
in the town centre (apart from local government officials) have no opinion on the 
project. This layout is created according to local risks and benefits: 




Areas around Dangxi Village




Figure 6.1                                   
6.5 Discussion: The silent majority  
In this chapter I analyse and interpret local trust, ignorance and risk/benefit trade-offs. 
It has been widely accepted in social research about risk that people worry more 
about risks with which they are unfamiliar and have no experience to deal with, than 
risks they see as common occurrences in their daily lives: for example, people worry 
more about nuclear accidents than car accidents, although the latter are more likely to 
take their lives. In the Han River case, I do not feel that people consider the nuclear 
power project to be more risky than other risks they have to face in the townland. For 
most people in the townland, the nuclear power project holds no special meaning. 
They see it as one of the government’s development projects that is no different from 
other projects such as hydropower stations and highways. People weigh the risks of 
the potential nuclear power project according to the reality of their everyday lives, 
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social contexts and benefits; they consider what kinds of benefits and risks they 
might encounter in the potential project. Most local people say nothing about the 
project. Compared with local people who live in the townland, those  who are 
originally from the townland but who work outside it are more likely to express 
doubts and concerns about the risks of the nuclear power project (as in the case of 
Finalfantasy, detailed in 6.4). One of the reasons for this is that people are more 
willing to express their real concerns in online spaces (Yang 2003). This is one of the 
topics that I will address in chapter 8. PDs in Shantou and Chaozhou cities are also 
people with concerns about the risks of the nuclear power project. In chapter 5 I 
discussed their ideas concerning the risks posed by the nuclear power station to the 
Han River. I will discuss these claims together with the Local People’s Congress 
(LPC) system in chapter 7.   
 
However, the ‘silent majority’ (Feng 冯仕政  2007) is a common phenomenon 
highlighted by grassroots-level social environmental researchers in mainland China.  
“In China’s General Social Survey (GSS) 2003, conducted in [an] urban 
area, when confronted with the reported environmental hazards, only 38.29% 
of the respondents mobilised to protest, while 61.71% kept silent, taking no 
action at all.”  
(Feng 冯仕政 2007:184) 
“Most people are forced to keep silent about environmental hazards. Firstly, 
living is the most important thing. More people care more about their daily 
lives than about environmental hazards. Secondly, there is a professional 
barrier in making claims about environmental hazards. Local lay people lack 
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the scientific knowledge to defend themselves. Thirdly, lay people lack the 
power to fight companies. Fourthly, lay people normally work individually 
and the government does not want to see [the emergence of] NGOs. When 
there is any problem the government is willing to act as a ‘father’ which 
helps people work for their benefit.” 
(Chen 陈阿江 2007:238; my translation)  
Although I am not exactly in agreement with Chen’s four claims, especially his 
simple words about people’s lack of scientific knowledge, I recognise that it 
describes the phenomenon of silence among the local people. The absence of lay 
people in environmental debates has also been discussed by social researchers inside 
and outside of China (Jing 2003, Litzinger 2007). In the Han River case local 
residents who will actually be faced with risks from the nuclear power project remain 
silent, as do village cadres. Lu, a cadre in Taohua village, said that:  
“Nobody will be against this project. He who says no will become the Qian Gu Zui 
Ren (千古罪人 Sinner).”  
Some Chinese researchers in environmental sociology, such as Chen, believe that 
this silence exists because people lack scientific knowledge about environmental 
hazards. Irwin and Wynne (1996) have recognised the same misunderstanding. They 
suggest that the people are silent because of powerlessness; because their lay 
knowledge has never been considered rational and objective; and because of their 
dependence on institutions (Irwin & Wynne 1996). In the Han River case, local 
powerlessness and a dependence on institutions is obvious. The project has not yet 
begun and the people are not yet living with the risks of nuclear power. They are 
living with the risks of poverty and natural disasters. It is artificial if people talk 
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about their understandings of science and nuclear risks, rather than about their daily 
lives and the risks/benefits they are facing.  
          “Whilst, from the perspective of the scientific community, science ‘disappears’  
          within everyday life; from the perspective of local people, science has no  
          necessarily special or privileged status alongside such routine concerns as  
          unemployment, rent increases, or factory pollution’(Irwin, Dale et al. 1996:52).  
In Dapu townland, people choose to trust the ‘country’ and to remain ignorant and 
silent according to their self-interest, power, and social positioning. 
      
Chapter 7: Participation of Local People’s 
Congresses and Deputies: The growing power of risk 
definition and bottom-up politics  
7.1 Introduction  
PDs (and the Local People’s Congresses that they work for) as the most powerful 
group, or in other words the only group to initiate the official and direct inquiry of 
the Han River project, are the research targets of this chapter. As well as Local 
People’s Congresses and PDs who participate in the inland nuclear power project 
controversy, the media and online community also briefly join in the discussion and 
communication of information. Details about the participation of the media and 
online community will be analysed and discussed in chapter 8. When talking about 
the public participation of nuclear power issues, it is easy for people to think about 
environmental protection NGOs, stakeholders’ groups, local communities, the 
general public and their debates and resistance activities. Renn claims that 
“emphasising governance rather than governments or administrations is meant to 
underline the importance of having stakeholders and public groups participate in the 
risk-handling process and consequently establishing adequate public-private 
partnerships and involvement processes” (Renn 2008:273). However, in the Han 
River case, it is local PDs and the Local People’s Congress who stand out. This 
shows the Chinese characters in risk governance in nuclear issues and similar types 
of public issues. In this chapter I intend to analyse this kind of Chinese style of 
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participation in risk governance and bottom up politics. PDs should be seen as the 
deputies of the general public, local communities and stakeholders, although I will 
also discuss the disconnection local people have with PDs later on (7.3.2). However, 
in accordance with their duties they are supposed to work this way. As I have 
reviewed in chapter 2, the first category mentioned by Mol in his claim about 
China’s environmental governance system is ‘political transaction’ (Mol and Carter 
2006:155). I claim that the participation of PDs and Local People’s Congress 
represent the transition within the political system, which offers PDs more power to 
represent people and engage with issues relevant to people’s daily lives.  
  
In Chapters 5 and 6, I mentioned several phenomena that I observed, and local 
people’s discourse about the potential nuclear power project. These phenomena have 
to do with power. The power I discuss in this chapter is approached in terms of an 
institutional nexus which formally structures participation in the political and policy 
process. By employing it in the context of my case study, I discuss the institutional 
power on two levels. On the top-down level, I want to focus on an individual’s 
capacity to define the meaning of nuclear power and to have his/her definitions 
accepted by other people. I claim that an individual’s ability to define risk is 
determined by his/her social position and by the institutions that he or she works for. 
On the bottom-up level, it means the institutional power held by Local People’s 
Congresses (LPCs) and People’s Deputies (PDs). I intend to analyse how much 
power LPCs and PDs have in the country’s political system. In order to combine 
these two levels of power, I claim that in the Han River case the growing political 
power of LPCs and PDs was what enabled them to ask for an inquiry meeting and to 
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then define the potential risks of the inland nuclear power project in the inquiry 
meeting. However, LPCs and PDs operate as state organs and represent a 
complicated relationship between governments and party communities; they 
therefore face many limitations and difficulties when representing the people they 
stand for. This chapter has three main parts. In the first section I analyse the 
newspaper report of the inquiry meeting and the official reply letters to the nuclear 
power issue. The discourse in these documents reveals how inquirers and 
respondents negotiated with each other based on their capabilities and positions. In 
the second section I then analyse the Local People’s Congress system and the power 
and duties held by Public Deputies. As institutions that supervise local government 
achievements on behalf of local people, LPCs have growing powers and also 
limitations. I will end this chapter with a discussion section.  
 
7.2 The power to define nuclear risk  
 
Both Freudenburg & Paster (1992) and Clarke & Short (1992) emphasise the 
importance of power in risk construction. Clarke & Short (1992) claim that compared 
to institutions, ‘the public’ (or the ‘individual’) has less power in risk construction 
(Short 1992). Institutions such as the Local People’s Congress, the media and also 
the local government each have a certain degree of authority, networking and 
negotiating powers at various stages in the risk construction process. This offers 
them the possibility of playing a part in the risk construction arena. If the public 
plays as individuals in the local context, their power is very limited. Normally we 
can see that the public has more power when individuals work as consumers, voters 
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and protesters, especially when they have groups and organisations behind them 
(Short 1992), such as environmental protection NGOs. In the Han River case, 
however, there are no NGOs involved. PDs are the most important players in the 
issue. They asked for an inquiry meeting so as to have the industry, provincial 
government and government agencies answer the questions they raised on behalf of 
the local people. In more recent hearings and public inquiry meetings, industries 
which produced risk and government agencies which promoted science and 
technology development are playing together as organisers or managers (Hannigan 
2005). I argue that in the Han River case the CGNPG and government agencies 
dominated the inquiry meeting. They used their identity as experts, government 
officials and civil servants to make (and govern) the discourse. I claim that their 
words in both the inquiry meeting and in the reply letter express a ‘rhetoric of 
containment’ (Kamenstein 1988), which allows them to avoid further communication, 
responsibility and future questioning.     
 
7.2.1 The inquiry meeting 
The inquiry meeting was held on 4 February 2007, four months after the news about 
the nuclear power project was reported in the Meizhou Daily (appendix 1.4). PDs in 
fact did a lot of preparation before the meeting. It was part of their duty to conduct 
research and raise Yi An (motion) in the People’s Congress. Chen said that in 
Shantou city they had one meeting with PDs and experts before the provincial 
congress went into session. They also searched for information on the Internet in 
order to obtain general information about nuclear power in the world.  
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“We outsiders prepared three months for this meeting, and have nearly 
become half-experts!” Chen Han Chu smiled and said that the deputies 
searched the Internet and went to the library to search for information. “And 
we also invited ocean, biology and physics experts from Shantou University 
to the demonstration forum.” (Southern China Daily 2 May 2007:A04; my 
translation) 
PDs in Chaozhou city said that compared to what they had done, the officials from 
provincial government agencies and the expert from CGNPG seemed not to have 
done any ‘homework’. PDs CH and CW pointed out their dissatisfaction with these 
other officials:  
CW: “We raised our questions very directly in the inquiry meeting. We did 
our preparation. We had experts in relevant subjects. They [provincial 
government agencies and the expert] were not able to answer our questions. 
They cannot provide any data that proves that there are no negative 
repercussions created by nuclear power stations on the water. When we 
asked about [an] accident emergency plan, they did not give any reply. And 
[we asked] about where they are going to dump the waste. They did not 
[respond to this either].”    
CH: “Most of them are officials; they have only one expert from CGNPG. He 
is a PhD graduate from a Germay university. His attitude is really 
perfunctory.”   
CH and CW’s claims pointed out that the CGNPG and provincial government 
agencies were not able to provide any work or research that related either to the 
security or risk assessment, or to the management of the project. The questions that 
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PDs had in the inquiry meeting, and the replies that they received, illustrated the fact 
that the governing definition of nuclear power and its risks was based solely on the 
‘official’ capacity of the CGNPG expert and the provincial government 
representatives.  
According to the news report on Southern China Daily, the first question PDs wanted 
to know was:  
“Daya Bay, Ling Ao and Yangjiang Nuclear Power Stations have been built or are 
being built inside Guangdong province. We have a very long coastal line inside the 
province. Why is [the province] still planning to build inland nuclear power stations? 
Why pick up the Dapu and Fengshun town district in Meizhou City? May I have 
officials from DRCGP explain this?” - Chen Han Chu PD from Shantou City.  
 
The answers were as follows: 
Li Miao Juan, the vice director of DRCGP and director of the Provincial Energy 
Office: “Our province lacks traditional energy resources (coal and oil); it is the 
province’s policy to develop nuclear power!” (Appendix 1.1) 
 
“The capability sites of nuclear power stations are not rich in Guangdong!” Li Miao 
Juan explained that the selection of nuclear power sites have yan ge de (严格的 
strict) geological requirements, and the cooling systems have to be built by the side 
of the sea or river. The previous nuclear power stations were built in coastal areas, 
but locations that can meet the current requirements are limited, so that’s why new 
plans were set for inland areas. (Appendix 1.1) 
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“The report that the first inland nuclear power station will be located in the Meizhou 
city district is not true. The project will not be started until 2020. Recently, Hunan 
and Guangxi provinces have also joined the competition. Our province is just 
surveying sites along the Han River, the Xi River and the Bei River. Dapu and 
Fengshun just met the basic requirements. Now [that the locations] are at the survey 
level, we haven’t even li xiang (立项 set up the project43).” (Appendix 1.1) 
 
The second question was:  
 
“The Han River is not the Daya Bay. It is our mother river. Over 10,000,000 people 
living in the middle and lower reaches of the Han River depend on it for drinking 
water. I asked the question for these 10,000,000 people: if [they are] really going to 
build the nuclear power station in the upper reaches, will there be any pollution of 
the water?” - Liang Yinying PD from Chaozhou City. (Appendix 1.1) 
 
Replies by expert Ma Jie, a specialist from CGNPG:  
 
‘“After exploration and research for 20 years, the nuclear technology in our country 
is very mature. There is no pollution!” He said that there are very complicated and 
yan ge de (严格的 strict) requirements for designing and operating nuclear power 
stations. The investments are mainly spent on the disposal of solid, liquid and gas 
emissions, and on radiation protection and a relevant safety system. High radiation 
                                                 
43Li Xiang (立项set up the project) is the official word used to describe the working process for big 
projects. If GRDA has applied for a big project and agreed to set it up after research and survey, it 
means the project is already Li Xiang.  
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industry waste-water will not be released to rivers and sea. It will be stored after 
concrete curing and will then wait decades to undergo a process of natural decay.  
He said that the waste-water that would be released to the river mainly comes from 
daily washing and cleaning. And this waste-water must run through the waste-water 
treatment system before it is released. According to the Daya Bay test results, the 
waste-water release is only 1% of the country’s sewage indicator, and is very safe. 
The cooling tower only takes 4~5 m³ water from the river every second. It is the same 
as coal-fired power stations where there is no radiation. ‘No pollution.’ (Appendix 
1.1) 
The third question was:  
“Does the so-called 1% of the state’s sewage allowance indicates our country’s low 
requirement ‘zhong guo te se’ (中国特色  Chinese special) standard, or the 
international standard?” - Professor of Shantou University Wu Lan Ha (appendix 
1.1) 
 
Replies by Ma and Li:  
 
“The standard we are using in nuclear power is the old standard of foreign 
countries,” Ma Jie replied with a smile. “The old standard is stricter, because the 
research level was quite low in the past. Nowadays many standards in foreign 
countries are more and more ‘kuan song’ (宽松 casual).” (Appendix 1.1) 
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“You guys look at this, in France two thirds of nuclear power stations were built in 
inland areas!” Li Miao Juan brought out a French map.  France started to promote 
nuclear power developments after the oil crisis in the 1970s. A large number of 
nuclear power plants were built around big cities like Paris and along the Seine 
River44. French people think it is normal. (Appendix 1.1) 
Li and Ma tried to convince PDs of the necessity and safety of the nuclear power 
project from two different angles. Li’s word is official as Li is a government official. 
Li’s answer to the first question is: “Our province lacks traditional energy resources, 
it is the province’s policy to develop nuclear power!”  From this statement, we can 
see the top-down decision-making style behind the nuclear power project. When PDs 
ask why the province wants to build an inland nuclear power station, the first answer 
given by the government official is that ‘[to] develop nuclear power is the province’s 
policy’. This is a case of informing rather than negotiating. In the very beginning Li 
tried to use the province’s policy in order to stop the PDs from speaking. When the 
PDs kept asking questions, Li said that the project hadn’t been li xiang. The 
unspoken words were that people should not worry about the project right now, since 
it will not be started until 2020. Government agencies have not yet conducted any 
detailed research on the feasibility of the project. It is possible that the project can 
never be li xiang. Why should we discuss so many details about whether the station 
is going to pollute the river? Obviously, Li’s words are nothing related to scientific 
knowledge or expertise about nuclear power technology. Her power in making 
claims comes from her position as a government official who is permitted to 
announce the government’s decision and policy. Ma tried to speak about the safety of 
                                                 
44Actually there is only one inland nuclear power station in France; it is located along the Seine River 
and is called Nogent-sur-Seine. 
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the nuclear power project from a technological angle. He is a nuclear expert in 
CGNPG with a professional knowledge of the technology. He spoke about the water 
recycling system of the power station, and gave some figures to support his claims 
that the nuclear power station will not cause water pollution. For example, 
“According to Daya Bay’s test results, the waste-water release is only 1% of the 
country’s sewage indicator, very safe.” This data that Ma provides is very informal. 
Secondly, Daya Bay and the Han River are not comparable. PDs have claimed that 
the Daya Bay nuclear power station is using seawater and that water is being released 
into the sea as well. The Han River is a drinking water resource. It is not 
representative to use the data collected from seawater to prove the safety of the 
drinking water. Thirdly, Ma’s data is not easy for people who have no expertise in 
water pollution to understand. He did not provide the country’s sewage indicator, or 
any information about how this indicator works, or about what the cost will be if 
people drink water that contains too much sewage. Ma gave this data so as to create a 
barrier and keep PDs from asking further questions. Both Li and Ma used 
international examples to convince PDs. Li provided some photos about French 
inland nuclear power stations (interview with PDs). Ma claimed that foreign 
countries' old standards were used as a benchmark for running China’s nuclear power 
station, thereby making it much safer. As I have written, PDs were not satisfied by 
official replies that failed to answer their questions. The inquiry meeting did not 
provide any actual plan or management schedule that showed that the government, 
agencies and nuclear power companies would work for safe public drinking water. 
Government officials and the expert stood firm in their views in order to show PDs 
that they were worrying too much.   
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PDs summarised their questions and concerns and submitted formal written material 
to Zhang Dejiang, the province’s prime minister (details have been given in 5.5). 
DRCGP, as the government agency involved in planning the nuclear power project, 
has been appointed to provide feedback to PDs.  
7.2.2 Replies after the meeting 
After the inquiry meeting, DRCGP wrote an official reply letter to PDs (dated 12 
April 2007) in order to further explain the inland power project (appendix 1.2). PDs 
were not satisfied by this official reply.   
The reply letter addressed three questions: the location of the nuclear power project, 
the safety of the nuclear power project, and its influence on the water temperature. In 
the reply letter we can see a lot of language transformation. These grammar 
transformations reveal the attitude of provincial government. They tried to avoid 
responsibility by shifting the conflict. As Kress and Hodge claim, in the transactive 
model45 there is an actor, a verbal process, and an affected entity. Some sentences in 
the reply letter have clearly been transformed in order to hide the actor. Take this 
sentence for example:         
“The nuclear power station is going to be run by very strict operating regulations 
and by very strict environmental protection and monitoring standards. It will have 
very little influence on the surrounding environment.” 
If they wrote this sentence in a transactive model it would be: 
                                                 
45“When the action is seen as passing from the actor across to the affected, we can call this the 
transactive model.” (Hodge, R. and G. Kress Language as Ideology, Routledge 1993). 
  
- 202 - 
 
*** “[Nuclear Power Company A] is going to run the nuclear power station by very 
strict operating regulations and by very strict environmental protection standards.”  
The sentence has become passive and the writer has made the actor disappear. The 
reason for constructing the sentence in this way might be to express the following: 
*** “There is a nuclear power company that is going to run the nuclear power station, 
I don’t know which one/I know which one, I don’t want to name it, because once I 
name it, it will have to take the responsibility – the PDs might request further 
information, I might have to hide this company, then PDs will find no target to go 
further.”  
This is one ideological motivation (Hodge & Kress 1993) that the writer(s) might 
have.     
A second kind of transformation in the letter acknowledges abstract entities (such as 
the actor) on the surface.  
“The design of the third generation technology adopted a lot of prevention and 
controlling measures. These all help to reduce the risk of accidents. .” 
Take these two sentences as examples:  
“The design of the third generation technology adopted many control and prevention 
measures.” 
This is a transformation sentence that shifts from active to passive, just like the first 
case I gave in this section. The actor who should assume responsibility for ‘the third 
generation technology’ is missing. And in the next sentence:  
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“These measures will reduce the risk of large scale accidents.”  
The abstract noun ‘these’ has been used in this sentence as the actor to ‘reduce the 
risk of accidents’. These two sentences together indicate that:  
“The third generation of technology will reduce the risk of large scale accidents.”   
 
However, ‘the third generation of technology’ cannot be responsible for ‘reduc[ing] 
the risk of accidents’. When PDs read these sentences they cannot get any 
information about which institution will be responsible for reducing the risk of 
accidents in the nuclear power station. DRCGP does not want to give a clear 
explanation of the safety of nuclear power reactors. They just use ‘the third 
generation of technology’ because it is plausible – and because it will make people 
believe that the safety of nuclear power can be guaranteed by technological 
developments. They hide the actors so PDs cannot ask further questions. This style of 
official documentation or reply letters is similar to a format used in China and in the 
UK as well. The government agencies use this kind of grammar transformation in 
order to avoid direct responsibility for decision-making. It is called guang yang wen 
zhang (官样文章 official paper) in Chinese, which is actually a meaningless phrase. 
The government agency gave this kind of reply letter to PDs indicating that this was 
the way the agency worked. The power of Chinese government agencies in nuclear 
risk construction is granted according to political positioning and legitimacy.  
PDs were not satisfied with the answers in this letter. Chen wrote another letter to 
DRCGP. Three and a half months later, on 25 June 2007 (appendix 1.3), Chen 
received another official reply letter from DRCGP. This letter claimed that: 
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“Recently, we started to revise the Province’s nuclear power development 
plan. According to the research and discussion that has been conducted of 
late, and according to a synthesised consideration of the construction and 
location reservation conditions, we believe that Guangdong's nuclear power 
programmes should be planned along the coastline until the year 2015. In 
this revised version of the development plan we are not considering building 
a nuclear power station on the upper reaches of the Han River.  
It is just like you have described on your feedback suggestions that ‘the 
government should work for the people’s benefit’’. We will be very careful 
when dealing with issues related to the public benefit. The Han River is the 
drinking water resource for 10,000,000 people in Shantou, Chaozhou and 
Meizhou cities; we will be very careful with every construction project on the 
river.’  
According to the second reply letter, there will not be any inland power project on 
the upper reaches of the Han River before 2015. This Han River debate is officially 
finished after the second letter. This is a dramatic sudden ending to the nuclear issue. 
Obviously, it is not because of PDs’ inquiries that the government halted its plan. I 
tried to ask an insider about the government’s reasoning for this (I cannot provide 
their name and position). One possibility is that the potential locations are actually in 
conflict with the country’s defence routes. It will not be possible to receive a licence 
from the National Development and Reform Administration (NDRA). The provincial 
government does not want further inquiries about this abandoned project. They just 
reply to PDs in such a way as to indicate that the provincial government has 
considered their advice and that the nuclear power project is no longer being planned.    
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7.3 Local People’s Congress and People’s Deputies 
 
In this section I discuss the People’s Congress system (focusing on the Local 
People’s Congress) and the People’s Deputies in the local context. My intention is to 
see how much power PDs have to negotiate with the provincial government, with the 
government agencies and with the nuclear power companies. I will analyse both the 
duties and limitations of LPCs and PDs. PDs traditionally held a lower political 
status in comparison to the local government and the Party. They acted as ‘rubber 
stamps46’ in the past. However, since the Party’s political regulation and law reform, 
LPCs have been permitted to delegate matters (Manion 2008). After the concept of a 
‘harmonious society’ was announced in 2006, more attention has been given to 
people’s lives and people’s voices. LPCs, as institutions that supervise government 
jobs on behalf of the people, are gaining a more important position and status in the 
country’s political system. In this section I discuss all the issues related to LPCs and 
PDs associated with the Han River case.  
7.3.1 The People’s Congress System 
“The people's congress system is the fundamental political system by which the 
Chinese people act as masters of the state. The Chinese people exercise state power 
through the National People's Congress (NPC) and the local people's congresses at 
various levels. China has adopted a unicameral parliamentary system based on its 
national conditions, rather than a bicameral system as instituted in Western 
countries.” (http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/145935.htm) 
                                                 
46Always saying yes to governments and the Party. 
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While comparing books and articles about China’s People’s Congress system, I 
found this paragraph in China.org.cn that provides a general introduction to the 
system. Simply stated: The People’s Congress is a democratic system in which 
people exercise state power. The duties of the PC include law-making (at the 
provincial level and above), oversight, and personnel appointment and removal. 
However, the PC system is distinguished from the parliamentary system in three 
main ways.  
Firstly, only deputies at the county level are directly elected by votes. Lower level 
deputies elect any Deputies who hold positions at a higher level.  
“Deputies are chosen in direct, popular elections up to the county level, and  
indirectly by lower-level congresses after that. Under current law, all 
elections are contested; with 20-50 per cent more candidates than positions 
for indirect elections and 50-100 per cent more for direct elections. Some 
deputies serve in single member districts; most serve in multi-member 
districts. Districts are usually established to coincide with work units, but 
sometimes residential status is used…” (O'Brien 1994:363-364) 
Details about deputy elections will be discussed in 7.3.2.  
Secondly, PCs on all levels are financially dependent on all levels of government.   
This financial dependence is one of the most important reasons for a limitation of the 
PC’s duties. Although PCs have the right to review government draft budgets and 
oversee implementation, PCs also depend on the governments to pay off all of their 
expenditure (Cho 2002). The government can therefore influence and manage 
through fiscal bureaux (Cho 2002).  
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Thirdly, the Party Committee at all levels decides the appointment and removal of 
the People's Congress Standing Committee and deputies.  
“Party-dominated election committees closely control nominations and local 
organization departments conduct political examination of candidates…Short 
biographies of candidates are provided to voters and election committees 
increasingly sponsor assembly hall question-and-answer sessions or arrange 
for voters to meet candidates personally. In most units at most times, however, 
open campaigning has been forbidden.” (O'Brien 1994:364-365) 
Details about the relationship between PCs and the Party Committee will be 
discussed in 7.3.2 and 7.4. The situation of party-dominated elections has changed 
since the 1990s (for details see 7.3.2).  
 
The PC system can be divided into administrative levels: the National People’s 
Congress (NPC), the Provincial People’s Congress (PPC), the Municipal People’s 
Congress (MPC), the County People’s Congress, and the Town and Village People’s 
Congress (TVPC). There are also other relevant minority area PCs which are not 
related to my research, and in order to make it simple and clear, I separate the system 
here into the National People’s Congress and the Local People’s Congress. PCs 
lower than the national level all belong to LPCs – which is where my research is 
targeted. The NPC and LPC at all levels allow citizens to supervise government work. 
When there are no NGOs, civil society and victims of pollution can turn to deputies 
in the People’s Congress at national, provincial, municipal, and country levels; they 
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can put forward motions and proposals that will suspend pollution and compensate 
victims (Shi & Zhang 2006). However, it is not enough to just read from official or 
legislative documentation if we want to know the real political power and status of 
LPCs. Moreover, it is one-sided to isolate LPCs from governments and the Party and 
to discuss their function only. LPCs, local governments and the Party are inextricably 
connected. In his research paper Cho (2002) discusses how LPCs have a lower 
political status than the local governments and the Party. Because the party hierarchy 
of government leaders is higher than leaders in LPCs, local governments are not 
always willing to listen to the requests of LPCs. The important government policy is 
decided by the Party, LPCs can supervise government jobs, but they still have to 
listen to the Party (Cho 2002). So actually, LPCs will normally cooperate with the 
Party in order to achieve their supervision goal. In some local issues, LPCs will gain 
approval from local governments and the Party in order to work. Because of the 
existence of the Party and also some limitations of the LPC system, LPCs do not 
exactly have legislative power. However, this is changing due to the Party’s 
reflection and China’s political reform and innovation. The Han River case is a good 
example of the PC’s power of supervision.  
 
In the Han River case, provincial PDs used their power to ask for an inquiry meeting 
when the Provincial People’s Congress (PPC) was in session. The issue about the 
inland nuclear power station was first raised in Shantou City. A teacher who worked 
in a vocational-technical school first read the news in Meizhou Daily. She thought 
that it was a very serious issue, and wrote a letter to the Shantou Municipal People’s 
Congress office to inquire about it. Meanwhile, a provincial people’s deputy, Chen 
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Hanchu in Shantou City, also read the news. Chen also thought this was a very 
serious issue for Shantou City. Chen is the president and associate research fellow of 
Shantou Social Science Association, the PD of the Tenth PPC, and also the organiser 
of the inquiry meeting.  
Chen: “After receiving the letter from the teacher and reading the news about 
the project, myself and other Provincial and Municipal PDs in the Municipal 
People's Congress had a discussion about this issue. We were all worried 
that this project might cause pollution to the Han River. So we contacted the 
professor in the ocean biology department in Shantou University, and 
another professor in the physics department. We had a discussion meeting. 
We wanted to discuss and inquire about the risks with professionals.” 
In Chaozhou City, information was passed from the Chaozhou Municipal 
government to MPC. Officials in the municipal government office read the news in 
the Meizhou Daily. After discussion and inquiry, they thought that it was better for 
PDs to raise this question when the PPC was in session (interview with Huang and 
Wang).  
Huang: “We were about to ask about this issue in the PPC, and then we 
heard that PDs in Shantou City were going to do it as well. We thought it 
would be much better for us to cooperate and raise the issue in the PPC 
together. The power is much stronger.”   
Along with a duty to supervise, PCs at the provincial level and above also have a 
duty to make laws and issue regulations. I asked PDs what they would do if the 
provincial government wanted to build the inland power station in the upper reaches 
of the Han River in the future. Provincial PDs such as Chen in Shantou city and 
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Huang, Wang and Liang in Chaozhou city claim that they will try to draft a law in 
order to protect the Han River and forbid pollution and risky industries along the 
river. They claim that once the law is set up, they will no longer need to worry about 
nuclear power projects. The PCs’ powers are still limited, however, because of their 
financial dependence on political positions lower than Party committees and 
governments. If the Guangdong Provincial government and Party committee want 
the nuclear power station to be built in the upper reaches of the Han River, it will be 
very hard for the PPC to set up the law. There will be negotiations and ongoing 
difficulties between the Party, the government and the PPC.      
7.3.2 People’s Deputies in Local People’s Congress 
 
After a discussion of the LPC system, this section focuses on important actors in 
LPCs: People’s Deputies. PDs are the primary link between the public and the 
institution. They have various duties and limitations imposed on them as well. This 
section will discuss how they worked in the Han River case and what kind of 
limitations they faced along the way. 
 
According to the People’s Deputies Working Handbook, PDs have a duty to raise Yi 
An (议案 motion) when the People’s Congress is in session. And they have the right 
to raise Jian Yi (建议 suggestion) at any time. According to the law, Yi An is the 
legislative proposal required to be issued in a PC and its standing committee to 
congress agenda in order to make decisions, and is raised by statutory agencies and 
statutory proposal people. Jian Yi is a casual way for People’s Deputies to 
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communicate suggestions, critiques and opinions to their own level of government 
and to lower levels of governments. In order to rise Yi An, PDs have to conduct 
research before the congress is in session. During this time they listen to the opinions 
of ordinary people concerning various government achievements, big projects, and 
other relevant issues that people think might be addressed in the coming year.  
 
O’ Brien explains their duties as follows: 
“On the one hand, people's congress deputies are still expected to explain 
government policy to their constituents - to act as a link (niudai 纽带 ) from 
the leadership to the citizenry. Serving as regime agents, they represent state 
authority, explain the pattern of state extraction and justify allocations... 
On the other hand, deputies are also expected to be advocates: they are 
charged with reflecting mass opinion and bringing regional and group 
demands to the attention of decision-makers. They receive constituent letters 
and visitors, write proposals, and attend meetings with local and national 
leaders that highlight injustices and mistakes and convey requests to improve 
government performance.” (O' Brien 1994:359) 
PDs have changing roles at the local level. They used to act as a link between 
government and citizens, rather than as a supervisor on behalf of citizens (O' Brien & 
Li 1993). The Party used to have strong control over the election of PDs, because the 
PD candidates had to be nominated by the Party committee. O’Brien and Li (1993) 
claim that the People’s Congress was constructed rather than elected. In the 90s, 
however, this situation began changing with the development of the PC system – 
especially in the local context. In 1995, a reform of Party regulations and the law 
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meant that more than 17,000 Communist Party candidates lost in the first set of PD 
elections after 1995 (Manion 2008). Local PC and PDs are playing a more and more 
important role in law-making (Cho 2006), the development of democracy (Ho 2007), 
environmental issues (Lo & Leung 2000), and so on.     
Duties  
Three questions will be discussed in this section: Who are my deputies? What is the 
PDs’ hierarchical system? And who do PDs stand for?  
 
In the Han River case, the PDs I spoke with operated at two different levels – one 
made up of Provincial PDs (PPDs) and the other made up of Municipal PDs (MPDs). 
PPDs’ duties are to supervise provincial government and MPDs’ duties are to 
supervise municipal government. PPDs attend the Provincial People’s Congress 
meeting, while MPDs attend the Municipal People’s Congress. Neither PPDs nor 
MPDs are directly elected by local people. They are elected by PDs at lower levels: 
PPDs, for example, are elected by MPDs. Local people directly elect only those PDs 
who work below the township (county) level. This means that local people in the city 
can only elect PDs in their residential areas or work units. If Shantou city residents 
want to report their concerns about the nuclear power project, they can first contact 
PDs in their residential areas or work units, as they may have elected them directly. 
Afterwards, the PDs to whom they reported can contact PDs at higher levels and 
keep reporting the issue until it reaches the provincial level. Or, if local people know 
PDs in the upper levels, they can contact them directly to express their concerns. 
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Secondly, local people can either visit or write to the Shantou MPC office to report 
their concerns about the nuclear power project. MPDs will help to pass the 
information to upper levels of PDs.  
 
Thirdly, local people can write to or visit the Shantou municipal government office 
or the environmental protection division in Shanzhou city to discuss the nuclear 
power project and their concerns. The municipal government office or environmental 
protection division would then approach the upper level of government or division to 
express a local citizen’s concerns about the project.      
   
The teacher who wrote to the Shantou MPC office was doing her duty as a citizen in 
reporting the issues about which she was concerned. As the project was under review 
by the Development and Reform Commission of Guangdong Province (DRCGP), the 
inquiry about the project needed to be made at Provincial level. In this case MPDs 
needed to contact PPDs in order to make inquiries about the project in the PPC 
meeting. Chen told me that if the project was under review by the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) they would have contacted the 
National PDs in Shantou City.  
 
Limitations 
In the Han River case, PPDs in both Shantou and Chaozhou City stood for their 
citizens and the local government to ask in the PPC meeting for an inquiry meeting. 
Their duties included working for the benefit of local people and standing up for the 
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local people who elected them. However, I can see some limitations in the PD 
system that might hinder them as they try to fulfil their duties. 
First, PDs work part-time. They still have a full-time job to do for a living. To be a 
deputy of the people is just a part-time, unpaid job. It is not possible to apply for 
funding to do Yi An researching and information collecting. PDs have to have a 
certain degree of security, economically and socially, in order to work for the people.  
Xiang: I heard that you did a lot of research and data collection before the 
congress. Can you apply for any money from the provincial congress or the 
provincial government to cover the research fee? 
Chen: No, there is not any money for research; we all pay by ourselves.   
Xiang: That means PDs spend their own money to work for people.  
Chen: Yes, we don’t have any funds. We all work part-time. Deputies in 
foreign countries all have money. My situation is better, people like me have 
Dan Wei (单位，work unit). We still have some resources that can be used. It 
is more difficult for those labourers’ and farmers’ deputies.  
Xiang: Does that mean that PDs are supposed to have certain social and 
economic foundations?  
Chen: This is the reality. Some PDs with certain social and economic 
foundations cannot completely represent the opinions from Xia Ceng (下层 
the grassroots level), while people who know clearly about what happens in 
Xia Ceng have no power to present lay people’s opinions. There are people 
who have been PDs in the PPC for five years without saying a word. This PC 
system is a good system, but it needs to be refined. Some people from Ji Ceng 
( 基 层 bottom) had limited knowledge. They did not recognise that 
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environmental problems are an issue. They sometimes might ignore it; think 
it is all about nature. Or, it is possible that they really had no way to express 
their ideas.                
    
Chen’s words do not only point out the first limitation of the PC system. It also 
reveals a second problem, which is the gap between PDs and the grassroots level. 
How much do PDs really know about voices from the bottom? During the interview 
with PPD Liang (The Agricultural Bureau of Chaozhou City), I asked how they 
researched farmers’ opinions about the nuclear power issues. Liang did not give a 
direct response, but merely said that they collected information from farmers through 
everyday work and according to their experiences. PDs do not normally hear much 
from local people. A lot of Chinese authors have written about the deputies’ 
representativeness (Yang and Yang 1999; Qin 2003; Bian 2005). Bian argues that 
PDs should reflect on and have a clear understanding of their real role. In the past, 
PDs would take the title of PD as an award for having a good reputation in their 
everyday jobs. They would take on the PD role as an honour instead of as a real job 
representing and serving the people who elected them. Qin claims that there is not 
enough publicity to let people know who their deputies are and who they should refer 
to when they have problems (Qin 2003). The communication channels between 
people and their deputies haven’t been well built. I argue that the gap between PDs 
and the grassroots level is the most important limitation for people’s duties. This PD 
system is not operating as it is supposed to if their PDs have never been identified 
and if the PDs have never reported to the people who voted for them.  
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Thirdly, how much power do PDs really have in the policy decision-making process? 
This is a question that I have been curious about since the first time that I read the 
news about the inland nuclear power project on a website. As far as I know, PDs 
have always agreed with the government and the party. Although PDs are supposed 
to supervise how the government works, they have rarely had a chance to do it in the 
past. There is a case used by Peter Ho in his 2001 article about Huang Shunxing, a 
member of the Standing Committee of the NPC and an expert on hydroelectricity. 
This man tried to voice his criticism of the Three Gorges Project at the Fifth Session 
of the Seventh NPC in April 1992. When it was his turn to speak, the microphone 
was unplugged and he could not make the speech at all. He resigned from the NPC in 
response to this incident (Ho 2001). As I discussed in 7.3.1, Party groups are formed 
in LPC standing committees, and it is the LPC standing committees that nominate 
the PDs. When LPCs conduct their supervision duties they have to wait for 
instructions from the Party. For example, if the LPC wants to dismiss leading 
officials, it has to wait for authorisation from the Party. Leading officials in the 
government normally have a much higher position in the party hierarchy than LPDs. 
The power of PDs is much reduced because of these complicated party hierarchies 
and because of the mixed positioning among government officials and party leaders. 
 
7.4 Discussion:  Local People’s Congress – a growing power 
for bottom-up politics 
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Public Deputies and the LPC system play essential parts in the inland nuclear power 
issue. Literature that discusses the growing power of LPCs concentrates on two 
things: law-making ability and supervision. The Local People’s Congress (LPC) is 
changing from a Congress of ‘Rubber Stamps’ to ‘Iron Stamps’ as supervisory 
powerhouses in the politics of law-making (Cho 2002; 2006); “LPCs at provincial 
level have also grown in importance as local law-makers, or as ‘information brokers’ 
between the central and local levels thanks to their complex networks”( Cho 
2002:724). Legislation and supervision are two of the most important duties for PCs, 
while the NPC concentrates on law making and LPCs at various levels concentrate 
on supervising (Cho 2002). The inquiry meeting in the Han River case represents 
LPCs’ growing supervisory power at a certain level. 
 
Nowadays we can see that members of the NPC and Local People’s Congress are 
quite active in environmental issues (Lo & Leung 2000), just as PDs have been in 
Shantou and Chaozhou cities. Compared to the NPC, most of the time LPCs are 
more active and effective in their supervision of government work (Cho 2002). 
Those PDs I interviewed mentioned that PDs are gaining power on issues related to 
Min Sheng (民生 people’s daily lives) – and drinking water is one of the most 
important issues related to Min Sheng, which is a key reason why PDs were 
successful in asking for the inquiry meeting.  
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Another reason for PDs’ success is that the MPC, the municipal government and the 
Municipal Political Consultative Conference (MPCC)47 all had the same view of the 
situation.  
 
Although the PDs that I interviewed did not clearly mention that the three leading 
bodies all had the same view of the issue, it is easy to see this in the words of a PD 
who has done political research (as a Chinese person) for three years.  
Huang: “The municipal government officials read this in the Meizhou Daily. 
After discussion and making inquiries to relevant agencies they thought it is 
much better for PDs to raise this issue in the PPC…” 
I can also see this though the PDs’ original work agencies. Chen, the leader of these 
PDs, is the president of the Social and Science Institute which is an agency under the 
Shantou MPCC. This means that Chen is a PD who currently works for the sub-
agency under Shantou MPCC. According to what I have discussed about the duties 
of a PD, Chen is actually representing voters in his work unit (Shantou MPCC).  It is 
the same for PD Huang from Chaozhou city. He works as the vice-president of 
Chaozhou MPCC, which means he represents the preferences of Chaozhou MPCC as 
well. From the original work units of these PDs, it is obvious that the aforementioned 
three bodies (MPC, municipal government and MPCC) have the same view of the 
project – and this may indicate important support of PDs’ Yi An. This is a very 
important strategy when it comes to PDs working in the local context. The current 
goal of LPDs is to cooperate with local governments, MPCC and the Party in order 
to influence the decision-making of upper levels of governments.  
                                                 
47People’s Congress, People’s Government, People’s Political Consultative Conference and also 
People’s Communist Party and the Party Central Committee Commission for Discipline Inspection 
comprise the so-called Wu Tao Ban Zi (五套班子, five sets of bodies) of governing.   
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The power of LPCs (as institutions and state organs) is beginning to grow and to play 
a more and more important part in law-making and supervision. In my case, however, 
I see the gap between PDs and the people they are supposed to represent. In other 
words, the institutional power of LPDs is growing, but the participation of the people 
is still limited. PDs still have a lot of space to work out their primary duty as a link 
between institutions and ordinary people. The LPC system should offer enough 
resources for PDs to fulfil their duties and should build up the supervisory system so 
as to evaluate PD achievement.
  
Chapter 8: Space and Awareness – the Media and 
Online Communities  
8.1 Introduction  
In this chapter I discuss people’s environment and risk awareness, and the spaces in 
which they communicate with each other and receive information. Here ‘space’ 
refers to communication forums. These communication forums take multiple forms: 
face to face, traditional media (newspaper, TV and radio news) and virtual forms 
(online forums and chat rooms). These different forms of communication forums are 
not separated from one another. Exclusion from one does not influence people to 
receive information through other forms: for example, even if one has no access to 
the internet, he or she can still get information through talking to relatives/family and 
through newspaper and TV news. The space for communication of environmental 
and risk information is multi-layered. The research targets of this chapter are mainly 
the traditional media and online communities. Within China’s social and political 
context, the traditional media’s (TV, newspaper and radio) news propaganda is 
influenced and controlled by the Party and the government, and commentaries about 
nuclear risks are forbidden, in contrast to the situation in Western countries. In the 
UK and the US, news and comments about the risk of nuclear power can comprise a 
hot topic and valuable news resource for the media. However, some recent issues 
indicate that Chinese media are gaining more freedom in news broadcasting, 
especially of environmental issues which are relevant to people’s daily lives (Wen 
1998; Yang 2005; Martens 2006; Mol & Carter 2006). People’s growing awareness 
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of and interest in environmental issues has encouraged media broadcasts of 
environmental news (Parlour & Schatzow 1978; Wen 1998). Under these 
circumstances, issues concerning nuclear risks can be reported using the angle of 
environmental issues.   
The Internet is a more open and free space for communication and discussion. The 
Party and the government have far less influence and control over it compared to 
traditional media. Recently, the Internet has become another way for policy-makers 
to know people’s opinions about public issues. In online environments it is much 
easier for individuals to gain access and have their voices heard, and also find 
support. The main argument of this chapter is that people’s growing environmental 
awareness and their interest in environmental issues offer the media a basis for 
reporting debates about the nuclear power project, using a less politically sensitive 
angle. At the same time, media and Internet propaganda on environmental issues 
shape people’s environmental awareness and risk perception.  
 
8.2 The media  
 
In China the media are under control and remain in an awkward position, having to 
please and serve both the Party and government as well as the market (Yang 
2005:56). On the one hand, the media, especially TV and newspapers, have always 
been seen as the ‘throat and tongue’ of the government, which means they put out the 
propaganda that the government wants them to. On the other hand, along with the 
country’s reform, economic development and decentralisation of the political system 
and market competition, the media have to work for the people as well (Mol & 
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Carter 2006). To broadcast news which relates to people’s daily lives, a story on 
pollution in drinking water resources, for example, will meet citizens’ needs. “The 
mass media, particularly television, newspapers, and the Internet, pay increasing 
attention to environmental problems, and with economic development the general 
public now has substantially improved access to these media” (Shi & Zhang 
2006:289). It is true that the media are more open and they are encouraged to report 
environmental problems. This phenomenon is similar to the Soviet Union at a certain 
level. When Soviet communism went through a collapse, the social and political 
impact of environmental issues became a motivating factor of the transition of the 
society (Tickle and Welsh 1998). In China the media have the freedom to report on 
environmental issues within the boundaries of political requirements. Under this 
special context, the ‘angle’ of the news reporting becomes particularly important. 
The ‘angle’ in this case means how to frame environmental stories. Before I analyse 
the news framing of the Han River case, I want to distinguish it from Hannigan’s 
claim about news manufacturing in the constructionism approach. In the Chinese 
context, to find the ‘angle’ of reporting environmental hazards or debates is to avoid 
touching on politically sensitive topics in order to make the news publishable to the 
public. It is distinguished from Hannigan’s argument on finding a new angle to 
publish news to meet the public’s interests or how to make news (Hannigan 2005). 
To publish a nuclear debate is not easy in the Chinese context. I argue that the news 
can be reported in accordance with three factors: the government’s approval, 
people’s growing environmental awareness, and the media’s active role in 
broadcasting environmental issues. Public environmental awareness is raised by the 
media broadcasting environmental issues (Wen 1998); while at the same time, 
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people’s growing interest in environmental issues encourages the news broadcasting. 
However, the government and the Party will control the news broadcasting at a 
certain level. In this section I will first discuss the growing power of the media in 
broadcasting environmental issues. In the second part I analyse the three main 
practical reasons for the successful publication of the inquiry meeting and 
controversy about the potential nuclear power project.   
 
8.2.1 The power of the media in environmental issues 
“Newspapers and television have correspondingly become powerful networks and 
the largest means of disseminating information on environmental protection.” (Wen 
1998:39)  
 
The media have been considered to have more power in broadcasting environmental 
problems for both top-down and bottom-up reasons. It is similar to what I have 
discussed in 5.5 about people’s environmental awareness. The environmental 
degradation caused by economic development has been one of the most serious 
problems for the government. To build an ‘environmentally friendly’ society is the 
main achievement for the country’s eleventh five-year plan: it is one of the national 
policies. At the same time, China’s environmental problems have attracted 
international attention. At the top-down level, the government wants to promote 
environmental protection and public environmental awareness. The government has 
to depend on media propaganda to achieve these goals (Wen 1998).  
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At the bottom-up level, the emergence and growth of environmental protection 
NGOs and GONGOs encourage citizens to join in environmental protection activities, 
especially in economically developed urban areas where people pay more attention to 
the influence of environmental degradation on their living conditions. Public interest 
in and attention to environmental issues encourage the media’s broadcasting and its 
power. Parlour and Schatzow (1978) discussed similar findings about public 
concerns and media broadcasting of environmental issues. They summarise the 
model in Figure 8.1.  
                                                            information 
 
          Problem               Public               concerns                     Mass 
                                                                                                 Media 
 
 
                                Figure 8.1 The Public Mass-Media Interaction Model 
Source: The Mass Media and Public Concern for Environmental Problems in Canada, 
1960-1972 (Parlour & Schatzow 1978:14) 
 
Both top-down and bottom-up requirements offer the media a relatively free and 
open space for broadcasting environmental issues. However, the state remains 
dominant in the mass media since they are mostly state-owned and under constant 
state censorship (Martens 2006). Also, the media are very careful not to take serious 
political risks, and the reporting of public debates is heavily influenced by the 
official state policies (Martens 2006, Lee 2003). The political influence and control 
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of media broadcasting has its historic and political reasons. It is straightforward, but 
changing at different times due to the requirements of market economy and 
democracy.  
“News media in post-Mao China, in short, are in the paradoxical situation of at once 
being changed and remaining the same. Economic reforms and an open-door policy 
introduced market logic into Party-controlled news media system and led to a 
fledgling journalism reform movement and the emergence of discourse on media in 
the mid-1980s, which threatened to challenge the Party’s monopolistic control. 
While the crackdown on the democracy movement in 1989 suppressed democratic 
discourses and reimposed tight political control, market forces gained momentum 
after the Party’s unreserved embrace of the market economy in 1992. These 
developments produced the current mix of Party logic and market logic - the defining 
feature of the news media system. It is a scene full of constructions, tensions, and 
ambiguities.” (Zhao 1998:2) 
The ownership decided which body of the government or Party committee that a 
newspaper works for: for example, the Southern Daily subordinates to the 
Guangdong Province Party Committee; the Guangzhou Daily subordinates to 
Guangdong Provincial Government. This is known by insiders of the government 
and newspaper companies. When interviewing people who work in the mass media 
field, I always heard them mention ‘Dang De Chuan Bo Ji lv’ (党的传播纪律; the 
party’s broadcasting rule). This is something journalists or people who work in the 
mass media should always remember. It is important that the media do not touch on 
politically sensitive topics when broadcasting environmental issues: for example, 
nuclear power issues are not free for discussion. This is not only applicable in China 
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- even in Western countries some of the sensitive nuclear power issues are not open 
for free discussion, for example, in the UK the Windscale fire of 1957 (Allan, Adam 
et al. 2000).  In the next section I discuss how the news about the inquiry meeting of 
the potential nuclear power project was reported by Southern China Daily.  
 
8.2.2 How is the news published? 
The ‘angle’ of news reports on the inquiry meeting influenced whether they got 
published. In this section, I first analyse the angle chosen by the journalist to frame 
the news, and how it matters. Secondly, I analyse the timing and people’s 
environmental awareness, which positively influence the publication of the news. 
Thirdly, I look at the special position of the newspaper in the province. 
 
Framing the news 
 
“I did not frame the Han River inquiry meeting as a debate on nuclear power issues. 
I try to report this news in the theme of ‘Science or Democracy (科学还是民主)’.”  
Chen Feng, the journalist who reported the news about the Han River inquiry 
meeting in Southern China Daily, told me the above when I interviewed him in July 
2007 in his office.     
“About nuclear power issues, the government normally don’t like [the media] to 
propagandise and report. In general there might be some positive and official 
introduction or some technological information. For example, where a nuclear 
power station is going to be built; what kind of reactor; how big is the capacity. We 
[journalists] are not allowed to visit or report news about nuclear power issues 
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unless we are invited by nuclear power companies or they arrange the press release. 
We normally publish press releases that the media departments of nuclear power 
companies send us.”   
In China nuclear power is a sensitive topic which the media are not allowed to 
discuss freely. In 2005 my master’s dissertation focused on a comparative study of 
four newspapers in the UK, Hong Kong and mainland China with regard to their 
news reports about nuclear power. There is no news relating to debates on nuclear 
power in Guangzhou Daily (广州日报) from May to August 2005.  
Wen Bo, an author who wrote about China’s media in China Environment Series, 
wrote that: 
“There is virtually no reporting of nuclear power issues in China and, consequently, 
there is a complete lack of awareness among the Chinese public about the 
environmental impacts of nuclear testing and nuclear power production, the 
generation of radioactive waste, and the potential for devastating nuclear accidents. 
Though many Chinese have heard about the Chernobyl disaster, few believe that 
such an event could happen in their own country. In this regard, the Chinese media 
has failed to inform citizens about nuclear safety issues and the hazards associated 
with potential problems at nuclear sites.” (Wen 1998:43-44)    
 
In order to collect information about the news broadcasting of nuclear power issues 
from the authorities, I visited GZH, the director of the Publicity Management Office, 
Province Broadcast and Television Bureau.   
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GZH: “This is a sensitive topic, the management is very strict. We have meetings 
every year to discuss the broadcasting of this kind of issue. Actually the government 
doesn’t want to propagandise [this issue]. Because Lao Bai Xing (老百姓 1. 
ordinary people 2. the ‘ person in the street’) is afraid of this, so normally we do not 
propagandise or make it less.”        
 
The angle that Chen used to frame the news was ‘science or democracy’ instead of 
debates on nuclear power projects. The issue is mainly concentrated in the 
environmental concerns and protection of people’s drinking water. He claims that 
this is one of the most important reasons that the news release can be published. The 
main argument Chen made in the news report is “from this inquiry meeting, we see 
that science meets democracy in the potential inland nuclear power project” (Chen
陈枫 2007). Chen said that the news passed the examination process without any 
problem48. However he talked about how he worked on telling the story according to 
his profession.   
 
Chen: “As journalists we are very careful in writing news releases. We should stay 
neutral when reporting news. A lot of work has been done on balancing different 
positions. The scene of the inquiry meeting was very tense. I seldom saw this kind of 
                                                 
48Chen: “I can tell you the process of news publishing. We are daily news. So normally the deadline of 
acceptance of drafts is 10pm. And then the news will be finalised and ready to print at around 12.30 
am. Journalists finish news releases, and then hand in to the department releases section. The duty 
director will go over important news. If there are any problems, the director will discuss with 
journalists and then make some changes. After that, the news releases will be passed to the night 
editor. The night editor will go over them again. And then the news releases will be sent to the duty 
vice deputy general manager. After the vice deputy general manager goes over them, news stories can 
be published. That night I finished the news release at about 10.30. Then I handed it in to the duty 
director in my department. He did not make any comments.” 
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situation before. I tried to present the real  process of the inquiry meeting on my 
news release. And they just let it be published.”    
 
Timing and People’s Environmental Awareness  
  
The timing of the inquiry meeting has always been highlighted by Chen.  
Chen: “The timing of the inquiry meeting was very important, since this inquiry 
meeting was held during the 10th National People’s Congress (NPC) and Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). During this period the 
government wanted the media to report more about people’s opinions. For example: 
what do people think about their lives? Are they satisfied with the government’s 
activities? How do they feel about some big projects that were being conducted? Etc. 
So this was the time the media had more freedom on reporting news related to people 
and their opinions. That’s one of the most important reasons that I could get the 
news published.” 
 
When People’s Congresses are in session, it is the time that People’s Deputies (PDs) 
express people’s opinions about the government’s achievements and about their lives. 
This is the time of year when PDs make people’s voices heard on their behalf. For 
ordinary people, it is a time when they will pay attention to media broadcasting 
(newspapers, TV news, radio, Internet) to see whether PDs have expressed their 
opinions and their voices to political leaders and decision-makers. It is the period of 
the year that the government wants the media to report more about people’s opinions.  
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The identity of the province’s main newspaper and journalist’s personal profession  
 
This point illustrates the ‘Chinese character’ of China’s media. In Western countries 
newspapers are mainly privately owned, while in China newspapers are all ‘state-
owned’. The most significant newspapers are owned by different levels of 
governments and government agencies.  As I have explained in 8.2.1, the Southern 
Daily belongs to the Guangdong Provincial Party Committee, and the Guangzhou 
Daily belongs to Guangdong Provincial Government. There is another main 
newspaper called Yangcheng Evening, which belongs to Guangzhou Municipal 
Government. All three of these newspapers received an announcement about the 
inquiry meeting beforehand, while other, smaller newspapers are not allowed to 
access and report the news (interview with Chen).    
 
Chen: “I got an announcement on that morning (4 February 2007), which said that 
there was going to be an inquiry meeting in the Province People’s Congress (PPC). 
It was about a new nuclear power project on the upper reaches of the Han River. 
People’s Deputies (PDs) from Shantou and Chaozhou city were coming for the 
inquiry meeting. At that time, with the professional sensitivity of a journalist I sensed 
that it was something big (大料 daliao). And an inquiry meeting is unusual in the 
PPC. Especially when PDs from two cities asked for the inquiry meeting, which was 
something that had never happened before. There are two types of meeting which 
can be held in the People’s Congress when PDs have serious things to inquire of the 
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government. One is called ‘询问 xunwen (inquiring)’; the other is called ‘质询
zhixun (questioning)’. The former one is gentle while the latter is quite stringent.”  
It is because Chen works for Southern China Daily that he was informed and able to 
publish the news.  
 
 
From Chen’s word, and literature about China’s media, we know that news 
broadcasting of nuclear risks is forbidden. However, news broadcasting of 
environmental issues has been promoted. The potential risk of the inland nuclear 
power project to water resources and the environment, along with the angle of 
‘science or democracy’ which matches the theme of the People’s Congress, allowed 
the news about the inland nuclear power project to be published. The broadcasting of 
this news release also shows that the media has more power and freedom in 
broadcasting news about people’s daily lives and environmental issues. Compared 
with newspaper and other traditional forms of media in which it is even harder to run 
stories on nuclear debates, the Internet is a much freer and broader space in which to 
share news, and moreover, for people to participate in communicating and discussing 
nuclear power issues.  In the next section, online communities will be discussed as 
the most popular sphere for people to talk about nuclear power.   
  
8.3 Online Communities  
In contrast to interviews and conversations with local people, people’s online 
discussions about the nuclear power project are more active and wide-ranging. Yang, 
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who conducts research about the relationship between the Internet and China’s civil 
society, claims that: 
‘The Internet facilitates civil society activisms offering new possibilities for citizens’ 
participation. Civil society facilitates the development of the Internet by providing 
the necessary social basis - citizens and citizen groups - for communication and 
interaction.’   
 (Yang 2003:405) 
In Western countries there is also a large amount of research on this cyberactivism. 
Tim Jordan, as a representative author, claims that activism and hacktivism in the 
cyber world constitute a new form of political action which informs changes to our 
society (Jordan 2002). Recently, the Internet has become a very important tool for 
Chinese citizens and citizen groups to communicate about knowledge, social life and 
political ideas (Yang 2003). At the same time, people’s willingness to voice their 
opinions on social and political issues encourages the development of online 
communities. Yang’s claims show that technology and society shape one another, 
and it is wrong to only emphasise the influence of the former on the latter.  I am not 
going to address the controversial and complicated topic of the development of 
China’s civil society in my thesis. My claim is that the Internet, as a space for people 
to communicate environmental knowledge and opinions, shapes people’s 
environmental awareness – and vice-versa. The online anti-nuclear movement which 
I discussed in chapter 3 is a good example. In the Silver Beach case, citizens used the 
Internet as a platform to express their opinions about the nuclear power project, 
communicate scientific and technological information and knowledge, and organise 
events. There are authors who discuss the government’s control (Michael & James 
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2002, Harwit & Duncan 2001) and impact (Taubam 1998) on online society. In 
comparison to traditional media, the Party and the government’s influence on online 
communities is far less significant. However, online communities are also a platform 
for governments to know people’s opinions and to communicate with people. Quite a 
lot of Internet communities are organised by all levels of governments and 
government agencies, for example the Gaobei forum and Dapu forum, which I will 
discuss in this section. The Dapu town government organised this online forum in 
order to give citizens a space to express their opinions about all kinds of issues. In 
the Han River case I claim that the online forum is an effective platform for people to 
express their opinions about the inland nuclear power project. However, people only 
use this forum to communicate information and knowledge and express their 
opinions about the project. People did not organise any events or try to use any 
methods to influence decision-making on the potential inland nuclear power project.  
8.3.1 Online communities in the field  
 
Before I visited the field I read Yang’s article about civil society and the Internet. 
Although I was aware of the boom in online communities in China, I was surprised 
that even a small Zhen like Gaobei has a complete and functional online community 
with 1,300 members49. When I arrived at the Gaobei Zhen government office and 
asked about local officials’ opinions on the inland nuclear power project, they 
suggested I simply visit the online forum (www.gaobei.cn/LT) and read people’s 
                                                 
49One of the seven Zhens in Dapu townland. 
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opinions there. The computer operator DZC met me in the computer room50. She 
helped me open the page and view people’s opinions on the nuclear power project; 
around 20 people had posted opinions. But the post in the forum has subsequently 
vanished. I suspect that they blocked the posts after I went to the town as they knew 
some people had started to pay attention to the project from outside.  
The online forum at Dapu Net (www.514200.cn) is the community which I intend to 
study in depth. Dapu Net has 16,955 members (accessed 9 August 2008). The forum 
was set up by local government on 13 June 2003, and is a place for people from 
Dapu, living both inside and outside the town, to discuss its issues. Topics include 
Dapu’s economic, social and cultural development; people’s daily lives; government 
achievements and local policies; and some tourist information. The forum has a very 
strong local atmosphere. As discussed in Chapter 5, people from Dapu with higher 
education and skills work outside Dapu townland and do not physically live in it. 
From the netizens’ IP addresses, self-descriptions and posts I noticed that quite a lot 
of netizens who actively join in discussions about the inland nuclear power project fit 
into this category, just like Finalfantasy who I mentioned in 6.4: for example, an 
active netizen whose username is Dong Guan You Zi (东莞游子  Traveller in 
Dongguan) 51. As well as these migrants from Dapu, Dapu Net is also a popular 
online community visited by local people, and was recommended to me by several 
interviewees. On my third day in the town centre, I went to a local gold shop. The 
shopkeeper was a young man of around 25. When I discussed the inland nuclear 
power project with him, he said, “I don't know the project. You should go to the 
                                                 
50There were four computers, two printers and one phone/photocopier in the computer room at the 
government office. Officials (other than the manager) who want to use computers or other equipment 
have to use this room, as they do not have computers for everyone.  
51Dongguan city is an industrial and commercial city in Guangdong province next to Hong Kong and 
Shenzhen.    
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Internet. People talked about the project in the online forum. The address of the 
webpage is www.514200.cn. It is easy to remember. 514200 is the postcode of 
Dapu.”  
I followed his instructions and found the following threads about the inland nuclear 
power project in the online forum: 
1. Dapu became a candidate site for a nuclear power station; please vote with your 
opinions. (07/09/2006)  
2. Information on the Dapu nuclear power project, location and demonstration. 
(07/09/2006) 
3. Re-discussion about the Dapu nuclear power project. (07/11/2006) 
4. The nuclear power project is not our business, is it worth discussing anymore? 
(27/11/2006) 
There were a total of 113 posts about this issue. In the online forum, discussions are 
quite heated and open. A total of 193 people voted on the issue. They had a choice of 
three options and the results were: 
1. Building the nuclear power station will benefit the people of Dapu. 96 (49.74%) 
2. There is no benefit to the ordinary people of Dapu and there will be potential 
risks. 88 (45.60%) 
3. Don’t care. 9 (4.66%) 
People’s posts on the matter were mainly about how the inland nuclear power project 
might influence Dapu’s economy, people’s daily lives and the environment, and 
whether it is good or bad for the town. There were also posts about the Chernobyl 
disaster and some brief introductions to civil nuclear power.  
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The style of the posts was more like a conversation about the inland nuclear power 
project. People supported or disagreed with each other’s opinions on it. Some posted 
several times on the topic; sometimes they also criticised each other’s words.  
For example: 
A Wen: “The sun is reacting all the time. If there is no radiation from the sun, human 
beings will die. Hydropower is the same, people die in reservoirs every year. Does 
this mean that we should not develop hydropower? Nuclear power is not a nuclear 
bomb, don’t worry too much.” 
 
Dong Guan You Zi (in response to the above):  
 
“The radiation from the sun is safe, because of the filters in the atmosphere. People 
died in the reservoirs because of carelessness. Actually, nuclear bombs are safer 
than nuclear reactors, because the bomb is still but the reactor is reacting all the 
time. The danger of nuclear power comes from daily waste disposal. The most 
dangerous thing for people living nearby is waste disposal, and outsiders never know 
what is happening. So the daily management of nuclear power is very important. 
Who can guarantee staff will not make any mistakes in operating the reactors?” 
    
A Wen: “There is scientific proof that nuclear power is an environmentally friendly, 
safe and economic energy source.” 
 
Mzliaohuei: “A Wen, are you a government official?” 
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These are four posts in one thread, illustrating the argument. A Wen supported the 
project and gave his reasons. Dong Guan You Zi quoted his words and made some 
comments. He also showed his concern about the safety of the project. A Wen 
replied straight away by saying that nuclear power is safe. Mzliaohuei expressed a 
suspicion that A Wen must be a government official if he takes that view. 
 
Apart from discussions, netizens share information that they collected about the 
Chernobyl accident as well. Shuixi, one of the netizens, posted a copied article of 
over 10,000 Chinese characters with general information on the accident and local 
people’s descriptions of its influence on their lives. Laowantong posted an image 
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Picture 8.1  
 
 
8.3.2 Netizens’ reflections on nuclear risks and their ability to play 
a part in decision-making 
As discussed in chapter 6, from my interviews with local people I do not feel that 
they see the nuclear power project as different from other development projects such 
as highways or hydropower stations. However, in online communities, people talk a 
lot more about the risks from nuclear power stations, such as the accident in 
Chernobyl, radiation pollution, bombing, earthquakes and war. These risks stand out 
in the way they talk about nuclear power. 
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Finalfantasy: “The hydropower project will benefit Dapu townland. It can be used to 
develop tourism as well. I do not support the nuclear power project. I support the 
hydropower project.” (Finalfantasy’s comments about the risks of the nuclear power 
project have been coded in 6.4.) 
In the online community netizens not only reflect on nuclear risk; they discuss their 
potential to influence decision-making on the nuclear power project. In the post ‘The 
nuclear power project is not our business, is it worth discussing it anymore?’ dated 
27/11/2006, 肖秀娜, who started the post, claims that:  
”Firstly, we do not have spoken rights at all, because the government do not need to 
ask for our agreement. Experts make the decision whether to build the nuclear power 
station. Once they finish the research and testing and then decide that Dapu is a 
suitable site to build the nuclear power station, we have to accept. Why waste energy 
[to talk about this issue] here?”  
1111’s reply to 肖秀娜’s words:  
”We should think of it in this way. It is true that we cannot intervene on whether to 
build the nuclear power station or not. However, discussing this issue can help us 
know about the reality of the project.”  
This conversation is essentially the crux of my argument. Netizens understood their 
lack of power to influence decision-making about the nuclear power station. 
However, even if they cannot change anything, there should be a space for those who 
are interested in the issue to communicate opinions and share information. I believe 
that in China online communities meet this requirement. They function as a relatively 
free space which presents few barriers; people can communicate freely and search 
for information that interests them. They do not need to have any expertise or 
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scientific knowledge; they do not need to hold positions of power or high social 
status; they do not even need to say who they are; they can just say what they want to 
say. They will easily find support and disagreement on the Internet, just like the 
conversation I quote in 8.3.1 between A Wen, Dong Guan You Zi and Mzliaohuei. 
The online community met people’s need for personal expression and public 
participation, filling the gap which traditional media could not (Yang 2003). 
Especially in my case, it offers me rich material to understand those young and 
educated people’s views about the potential nuclear power project. Since most of 
them are physically located outside the town, I cannot approach them for information 
face- to-face. However, access to online communities helps to resolve this problem.     
8.4 Summary  
In this chapter I make one key argument: that the media and online communities, as a 
space for people to communicate and receive information about environmental issues, 
shape people’s environmental awareness, and people’s growing environmental 
awareness encourages media news broadcasting and people’s communication around 
environmental issues in online communities. Although China’s media are still 
serving both the Party and the market, many authors who write about China’s 
environment and civil society (Wen 1998; Yang 2005; Martens 2006; Mol & Carter 
2006; Wang 2008) claim that they have growing power and more freedom in 
broadcasting environmental issues. According to my field findings in the Han River 
case, journalists can find an angle related to people’s daily lives and environment in 
order to construct debates about nuclear power and have them published. It seems 
that debates about nuclear power are no longer forbidden in news broadcasting if the 
theme of the news is not just about nuclear risks but people’s daily lives, 
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environment and democracy. The Internet, as a new form of technology, offers 
people a relatively free and wide space to communicate and share information. With 
regard to sensitive topics like nuclear power, people are more willing in online 
communities to say what they really think and understand about nuclear risks. The 
online community on a certain level erodes the barriers of power, scientific 
knowledge and institutions in nuclear issues. In Chinese society, in comparison to the 
media, online communities, having been subject to less control and influence by the 
Party and government, have become a key space for people to communicate, share 
information and give their opinions on nuclear power and its risks. 
 
 
Chapter 9 Conclusion  
 
My research aims to see how Chinese people construct risk with regard to nuclear 
technology, according to differences in social identity, economic and cultural 
background, in the process of science and technology development. The case I chose 
to study for my research was the civil nuclear industry, specifically an inland nuclear 
controversy in Guangdong province. In this chapter I will conclude the thesis by 
summarising four of my key field findings, and connecting them with the three 
academic objectives set out in the introduction. I will then give some 
recommendations for policy decision-making regarding the development of civil 
nuclear power.  
 
9.1 Local people’s perception of nuclear risk  
 
The first of my principal field findings indicates that local people in the case-study 
area deal with a significant degree of risk through the way they manage their trust 
and ignorance of nuclear technology. As I have discussed in chapter 6, one particular 
villager claimed that she did not worry about risks from the nuclear power project. 
She thought that people like her knew nothing about nuclear technology, while those 
scientists and experts working inside the nuclear power site knew much more than 
her. If these specialists in nuclear power could work on the site, she reasoned that 
there was nothing for her to worry about. Other villagers and people living in the 
town centre claimed that it did not matter whether they agreed with the nuclear 
power project or not, as the government would make the decisions on it. Regardless 
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of what they thought about its risks or benefits, the government would build the 
nuclear power site once the decision was made.  Local ordinary people have no 
choice but to trust the government to manage the risk of nuclear power. Beck claims 
that people have no choice but to trust science and technology, and cannot perceive 
risks because they lack scientific knowledge which should be used as the tool with 
which to reflect on science, technology, and resultant risks. However, in giving 
deeper consideration to the local context and what people said in Dapu townland, I 
argue that Beck’s theory is problematic and that Wynne and Irwin’s argument about 
lay knowledge is more convincing. In China, when faced with modern technology 
such as nuclear power, people do not understand risk through scientific knowledge, 
but through the actual situation that they face. In my case, in Dapu townland the real 
situation is their ignorance of nuclear power and its risks, their dependence on the 
government to make decisions and take responsibility to guarantee the safety of the 
nuclear power project, and the fact that people expect the development of modernity 
will improve their lives.  
 
My case study of the Han River nuclear power project challenges Beck’s theory 
about scientific knowledge and lay people’s perception of risk in two ways. Firstly, 
from my case study I suggest that scientific knowledge has been overemphasised as 
the essential tool to understand risk for local lay people. Secondly, people know that 
they lack the agency to define risk. In my case, I found that lay people do not 
actually invest their trust in competing experts. It is not necessary for scientific 
knowledge to have a place in their conversation when they talk about risk of nuclear 
power (Irwin, Dale and Smith 1996). It is just as Michael claimed and as I found for 
- 244 - 
 
myself in the fieldwork research: firstly, local people reflect upon the 
epistemological status of their knowledge of nuclear power. Secondly, they reflect 
upon the social and political context in which they live. In the Han River case, local 
people are aware of the government’s domination of nuclear power issues. They 
know that they do not have the opportunity to participate in decision-making on the 
nuclear power project. Based on these two reflections their understanding of nuclear 
technology and its risks are supplemented by their recognition that they do not know 
what the government and experts will do with nuclear power. They choose to trust 
that it is safe rather than worry about its risk.  
 
9.2 The community  
 
In my research I observed that generally, people’s individual characteristics – for 
example, their gender, education level and income level – do influence their attitudes 
about the nuclear power project. However, the different local communities in which 
they live are significantly more influential than their individual, demographic 
characteristics. Although I conducted interviews and observation instead of survey 
research, this point was still made very clear in my research.  
As I discussed in chapter 5, people living nearby each other in three different villages 
have noticeably distinctive attitudes to the nuclear power project. People in Dangxi 
village think that their village’s economic and management conditions are poor, and 
that they might never live a modern life if left to their own devices. So they welcome 
the nuclear power project as an opportunity for better lives. People in Shanzhou 
village do not really want the nuclear power project because they are good at 
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managing themselves and they are happy with their lives nowadays; they do not want 
to change. People in Taohua village, although located close to Shanzhou village, 
seem not to care about the project. They think that it is not their business. These 
findings indicate that in the local context people’s attitudes towards modernity or 
modern technology are significantly impacted by their geographical locations. 
Different geographical locations represent the different social-economic contexts of 
people’s lives, to which perceptions of risk are heavily tied. This sociological finding 
provides useful insight in researching people’s perceptions of risk in the Chinese 
context. The real situation that we see in China is that big projects such as civil 
nuclear power stations, hydro-power stations and highways have mostly been built 
up or planned in the less economically developed countryside, at a certain distance 
from cities. Local communities always have very different attitudes about these big 
projects, related to the economic and social conditions which they are facing. This 
local situation offers rich material for sociological research about different people’s 
perceptions of risk in the local context.        
9.3 Benefits and interest groups  
 
In the Han River case, as discussed in chapter 6, people’s self-interest and 
consideration of benefits are essential in deciding their stance on nuclear risk and 
whether to participate in decision-making. The ‘selfishness’ which Fei has discussed 
with regard to Chinese people is obviously represented in nuclear power issues. 
Although Fei’s research was conducted 70-80 years ago based on fieldwork in the 
Chinese countryside, it continues to provide insight into people’s behaviour in 
society nowadays. In both the Silver Beach anti-nuclear campaign which I discussed 
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in chapter 3 and the Han River case in chapters 5, 6 and 7, I sense a strong 
selfishness (calculation about one’s interests and benefits) on the part of property 
owners (Silver Beach case), local people and local government officials and PDs. As 
I have discussed in chapter 6, people always talk about what kinds of benefits and 
interests that the nuclear power project will bring them, while not caring whether 
these benefits will incur risk to other people. Local people in Dapu townland claim 
that they do not consider risks posed by the nuclear power project to the drinking 
water resource of the Han River, because they drink water from the mountain rather 
than from the river. Government official DL claims that they want development. He 
asks whether Dapu townland, if it does not build the nuclear power station in order to 
preserve drinking water quality for people in the lower reaches, will  be paid by cities 
in the lower reaches for doing so. Local people demonstrate these selfish opinions 
about the natural environment. It is not merely a case of ‘the nuclear power project is 
not in my backyard, so I do not care’. It is a case of ‘the nuclear power project is in 
someone else’s backyard but I reap the benefits. If you do not want the project and it 
incurs a loss for me, you have to pay me’. This is the way that people think. People 
joined the interest group in order to participate in decision-making on the nuclear 
power project, for example, in the organisation of property owners in the Silver 
Beach case and PDs’ cooperation in the Han River case. However, the group can 
include everyone who works for the same interests. It will also disappear once the 
project is cancelled or if the property owners sell their properties. There is no stable 
organisation participating on the issue which works for environmental protection of 
the Silver Beach. In the Han River case, PDs also get together because they share the 
same interests. They are free to connect and disconnect according to interests other 
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than environmental protection. The research findings of interest groups in Chinese 
society at a certain level point out the realities of researching China’s environmental 
issues. Mostly environmental controversy comes up when people think certain 
projects influence their benefits. This is a kind of passive reaction to protect their 
interests rather than to actively protect the environment for its own sake.   
 
9.4 Power and social status determine participation  
 
In the final point of field finding, I raise the important issue of power and social 
status, and also their direct and indirect influence on local people’s participation in 
nuclear power issues. Besides those points discussed in 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3, we see that 
in the Han River case, power and social status determine who can express their 
opinions about the nuclear power project to policy-makers. Directly, PDs have the 
legitimate power to participate in the nuclear power issue by asking for an inquiry 
meeting. Indirectly, PDs have a network through which they can approach other PDs, 
scientists and experts to find cooperation and support. As I have discussed in chapter 
6, PD Chen Hanchu was able to contact the professor, who is also a PD, from 
Shantou University to inquire about professional opinions on the influence of nuclear 
power stations on water. Their power and social status support and strengthen each 
other, which made their participation possible. However, ordinary local people show 
their powerlessness on the issue. The media has power to publicise the issue. 
However, they have to work inside the boundaries and avoid making any political 
mistakes: hence why Chen Feng claimed that he framed the issue on the theme of 
‘science or democracy’ rather than a debate on nuclear power. I posit that the PDs’ 
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participation in the nuclear power issue within the political system represents the 
transition of civil nuclear technology from government to governance. It shows that 
different powers negotiate within the political system to make decisions on the 
nuclear power project. However, participation within the political system has its 
limitations, as discussed in chapter 7: the quality of official replies does not always 
satisfy inquirers. Besides, even PDs’ duty is to supervise government actions on 
behalf of the people; they do not have enough communication and connection with 
the people for whom they stand. Chen Hanchu also claims that PDs do not in fact 
have much connection with the grassroots. People who know what happens in the 
grassroots find it hard to convey their opinions to the government.  
 
Outside the political system, the most active way that people participate is to use the 
Internet as a platform for communication and circulation of information about 
nuclear risk. In the Silver Beach case discussed in chapter 3, netizens wrote and 
signed letters and passed them on to ESPA and policy-makers. They organised 
events on the beach in order to attract more attention to the nuclear issue. Their 
methods of participation were just like Wang’s outside access model and popular-
pressure model. However, this kind of participation outside the political system also 
has limitations. Firstly, there is no way to confirm whether people’s opinions really 
reach policy-makers (Wang 2008), since the government and its agencies do not need 
to reply to individuals and inform them of their decisions on how to manage risk. 
The public have to wait until specific policies have been made and the results 
announced; for example, netizens waited until NDRC published the “Civil Nuclear 
Power Mid-Long Term Development Schedule (2005-2020)”, at which point they 
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knew that the Silver Beach project was postponed. However, there is still no way to 
know whether this was due to their resistance activities. Secondly, the organiser and 
participations in risk issues are not ordinary local people. They hold a certain social 
status; they are educated middle class people who have Internet access and a special 
interest in risk issues. According to my fieldwork research, the ordinary local people 
constitute a silent majority in risk issues. I claim that people’s power and the space 
for them to participate in risk and environmental issues is getting bigger, but is still 
relatively limited thus far.  
9.5 Suggestions for policy-making 
 
As I have discussed in chapter 3 the limitations of doing a single case study, it is not 
fully convincing to give policy suggestions based on the research of just one case. 
Following the fieldwork research on the Han River case, and my general reading on 
the background to the country’s civil nuclear power development, I would like to 
make three suggestions for policy-making on civil nuclear power in China.  
 
Firstly, the development of independent institutions should be promoted to monitor 
the safety and environmental impact of nuclear power sites. Besides nuclear power 
sites and environmental protection bureaux there should be independent research 
institutions just like SCSIO in CSA which monitors Daya Bay Nuclear Power 
Station's impact on sea water. Particularly when inland nuclear power sites are going 
to be built, the impact on drinking water should be monitored by independent 
institutions and findings should be made available to the public. It is obvious that in 
the inquiry meeting government officials and the expert from CGNPG did not give 
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PDs satisfactory answers about the nuclear power issue. Following the inquiry 
meeting, the reply letters from GDRA were also vague. If the civil nuclear industry 
were to have more transparency, and research data not controlled and accessed by 
only government officials and experts, PDs would not receive answers like these. I 
acknowledge that the promotion of independent research institutions to provide 
quantitative data on the environmental impact might cause endless arguments about 
the reliability of the data and so on. We would then return to the argument about 
whether the risk of nuclear power can be objectively assessed or not. For the 
purposes of my recommendations here I wish to put aside the theoretical arguments 
and focus on what to do to balance the domination of the government and its 
agencies on all issues of civil nuclear power. Or, in other words, provide the public 
with other sources to collect information about the safety and environmental impact 
of civil nuclear power sites. Should the public want to participate in policy decision-
making, they would make use of these open data produced by research institutions to 
support their claims. I suggest that at this stage, when the country is promoting the 
development of civil nuclear power and also inland nuclear power projects, it is both 
important and necessary to promote independent research institutions to work on the 
transparency of risk monitoring and supervise the safety and environmental impact of 
nuclear power sites in China.  
 
Secondly, different powers inside and outside the political system should be 
encouraged to participate in negotiations before finalising nuclear policies. Both PDs 
and netizens’ participation inside and outside the political system are very helpful in 
highlighting risks which might not have been considered by policy-makers and 
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experts. Although in China NGOs do not yet participate in nuclear issues, PDs can 
use their special identity to supervise all levels of government and express their 
concerns on people’s behalf. It is very important to encourage PDs to forge a 
stronger connection with the people for whom they stand and encourage people to 
express their opinions through the media, online communities and their deputies. At 
the same time, more space should be made available for both international NGOs and 
GONGOs to engage in nuclear power issues. Nowadays, it is not possible to hide 
nuclear power projects from the public. People’s growing environmental awareness 
and growing power of participation in environmental risk governance require more 
space and power to influence policy decision-making.  
The development of civil nuclear power in China nowadays faces a great deal of 
challenges and conflicts. It is a dilemma for the government to make decisions, and 
for the public to accept nuclear power projects, especially inland ones. I suggest that 
opening discussions and negotiations on nuclear power projects inside the political 
system and between the government and the public is far better than to keep them 
closed and depend on policy-makers’ ideology.   
There is one further consideration which I believe is important in framing decisions 
about nuclear energy, even though it has featured little in the case studies I have 
reviewed: the price of electricity. The viability of nuclear power stations clearly 
depends (as we saw in chapter 3) on the price that is set for electricity and on 
expectations about the likely future price. At present, according to state policy, 
nuclear electricity has not joined the market competition. NPG will buy all electricity 
produced by nuclear power stations. Once nuclear electricity has to compete with 
other energy resources, provinces will not compete for nuclear power projects unless 
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there are real profits to be seen. Prices will decide which technology to use. It can at 
the same time benefit the development of China’s domestic technology. The cost of 
waste disposal and decommissioning will also be considered openly with regard to 
nuclear power projects. Recently, the government has already begun promoting 
electricity market reform. Traditional energy resources (coal, oil, hydro) have all 
joined the market competition. Power stations with no profits are facing closure or 
have already been closed down. Market competition should be helpful for the nuclear 
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Appendix 1 Documents analysed in the Han River 
case  
1.1 The news in the Southern China Daily (南方日报 nan fang 
ri bao) about the process of the inquiry meeting on 4 
February 2007 
52A4 Southern China daily 2 May 2007 Guangdong ‘two congress ’ special report 
(hot topic) 
“A nuclear power station might be built in the upper reaches of the Han River. 
People’s Deputies asked for an inquiry meeting— 
10,000,000 People’s Drinking Water Might be 
Polluted?  
A nuclear power station to be built on the upper reaches of the Han River, 
10,000,000 people’s drinking water in the middle and lower reaches might be 
polluted? Yesterday, the Shantou and Chaozhou PDs standing group queried 
the Development and Reform Commission of Guangdong (DRCGD), 
Guangdong Environmental Protection Administration (GEPA), Guangdong 
Water (GW) about the ‘first inland nuclear power station is possible to locate in 
Meizhou’. The field atmosphere is huo bao (火爆 hot).” 
 
First question: The coastline is very long. Why choose the upper 
reaches of the Han River? 
                                                 
52The Provincial People’s Congress and the national committee of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Congress 
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“There are Daya Bay, Ling Ao and Yangjiang nuclear power stations which have 
been built or are being built inside Guangdong province. We have a very long coastal 
line inside the province. Why is [the province] still planning to build inland nuclear 
power stations? Why pick up the Dapu and Fengshun town district in Meizhou City 
district? May I have officials from DRCGP explain this?” Chen Han Chu PD from 
Shantou City asked the first tough question. 
“Our province lacks traditional energy resources, it is the province’s policy to 
develop nuclear power!” Li Miao Juan, the vice director of DRCGP and director of 
the Province Energy Office, explained the recent situation: all coal mills are now 
closed. Oil in the sea is limited. The country requires Guangdong to reduce 16% of 
its unit energy consumption in the ‘eleventh five-year’ plan duration. We are facing 
big pressure! The current trend is to actively promote clear energy resources like 
nuclear power. Of late, nuclear power constitutes 17% of energy power in 
development countries. The goal of our country is for usage of nuclear power to 
reach 4% by 2020.   
“The capability sites of nuclear power stations are not rich in Guangdong!” Li Miao 
Juan explained that the selection of nuclear power sites have yan ge de (严格的 strict) 
geological requirements, and the cooling systems have to be built by the side of the 
sea or river. The previous nuclear power stations were built in coastal areas, but 
locations that can meet the current requirements are limited, so that’s why new plans 
were set for inland areas.  
 
“The report that the first inland nuclear power station will be located in the Meizhou 
city district is not true. The project will not be started until 2020. Recently, Hunan 
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and Guangxi provinces have also joined the competition. Our province is just 
surveying sites along the Han River, the Xi River and the Bei River. Dapu and 
Fengshun just met the basic requirements. Now [that the locations] are at the survey 
level, we even haven’t li xiang (立项 set up the project53).”  
“Hao zai (好在 luckily) it hasn’t li xiang! If it has already been decided there is no 
point in this inquiry meeting!” Xu Shi De, deputy from Chaozhou, reacted with xin 
zhi kou kuai (心直口快 think it and say it immediately). It attracted laughter.      
               
Second question: Will water resources be polluted if a nuclear power 
station is built in the upper reaches of the river?  
“The Han River is not the Daya Bay. It is our mother river. Over 10,000,000 people 
living in the middle and lower reaches of the Han River depend on it for drinking 
water. I asked the question for these 10,000,000 people: if [they are] really going to 
build the nuclear power station in the upper reaches, will there be any pollution of 
the water? ” Liang Yinying PD from Chaozhou City caught up and asked loudly.   
“After exploration and research for 20 years, the nuclear technology in our country is 
very mature. There is no pollution!” Ma Jie, a specialist from CGNPG, replied. He 
said that there are very complicated and yan ge de (严格的 strict) requirements for 
designing and operating nuclear power stations. The investments are mainly spent on 
the disposal of solid, liquid and gas emissions, and on radiation protection and a 
relevant safety system. High radiation industry waste- water will not be released to 
                                                 
53 Li Xiang (立项，set up the project) is the official word used to describe the working process for big 
projects. If a big project have been applied from GRDA and agreed to set it up after research and 
survey, it means the project is already Li Xiang.  
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rivers and sea. It will be stored after concrete curing, and will then wait decades to 
undergo a process of natural decay.  
He said that the waste-water that would released to the river mainly comes from 
daily washing and cleaning. And this waste-water must run through the waste- water 
treatment system before it is released. According to Daya Bay’s test results, the 
waste-water release is only 1% of the country’s sewage indicator, and is very safe. 
The cooling tower only takes 4~5 m³ water from the river every second. It is the 
same as coal-fire power stations where there is no radiation. ‘No pollution’. 
“I studied biology before. The temperature of this cooling water is up to 310 degrees. 
This must have a bad influence on aquatic creatures in the river!” Chen Shaohe, 
pearl-growing expert and PD from Shantou City, said that he believed the safety 
technology is very strong. But the waste from the nuclear power station is cumulative; 
will there be any potential radiation pollution to surrounding environment and later 
generations?  
 
The vice-inspector of the GEPA, Ma Ming Hai, explained in response to these 
questions that once [the project] li xiang there would be yan ge de environmental 
protection standards. And afterwards, when applying for the permit from the CEPA, 
there would be a whole set of yan ge de scientific standards, so people should please 
not worry about that.  
Third question: The Chaoshan area has a dense population. What if 
there is leaking? 
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“Is the so-called only 1% of the state’s allowed sewage indicators our country’s low 
requirement ‘zhong guo te se’ (中国特色 China special) standard or the international 
standard?” Professor of Shantou University Wu Lan Ha Si persisted in questioning 
the pollution standard. 
“The standard we are using in nuclear power is the old standard of foreign 
countries.” Ma Jie replied with a smile. “The old standard is more strict, because the 
research level was quite low in the past. Nowadays many standards in foreign 
countries are more and more kuan song (宽松 casual).”  
“You guys look at this, in France two thirds of nuclear power stations were built in 
inland areas!” Li Miao Juan brought out a French map and said, “France started to 
promote nuclear power development after the oil crisis in 1970s. A large number of 
nuclear power plants were built around big cities like Paris and along the Seine River. 
French people think it is normal.” 
“We knew that the French people are okay with that, but we also knew that Germany 
and Belgium pledged not to build nuclear power stations anymore! Moreover, is the 
population density in France comparable to ours? The population density in Shantou 
is 3000 people/m². If there are any accidents, losses will be difficult to restore.” Wu 
Lan Ha Si and Chen Han Chu said the Provincial People’s Congress is drafting the 
‘Guangdong Drinking Water Resource Protection Regulation’; it was suggested that 
there should not be a nuclear power station in the upper reaches of the Han River.  
“Bu pa yi wan, jiu pa wan yi (不怕一万就怕万一, not afraid of the usual situation, 
afraid of the accident) what if there are wars or leaking like the Chernobyl accident? 
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How can we deal with an emergency situation?” Chaozhou PD Chen You Biao asked 
urgently. 
“The reactor type in Chernobyl has been disused for a long time. We are using the 
most advanced third generation technology. There are three layers of protection, 
which can guarantee no accidents like Chernobyl.”  
Answer: Respect scientific and public opinion; a high degree of 
caution will be exercised in the construction of nuclear power 
stations.            
 
“Thanks for PDs’ attention and understanding!” Li Miao Juan and Rong Ming Hai 
said sincerely. “Safety is the lifeline for nuclear power stations. The project is still in 
the preliminary survey stage. It needs to be yan ge de checked and issued by the 
CEPA. It would not begin earlier than the period of the twelfth five-year plan. The 
relevant department in the provincial council will definitely respect scientific and 
public opinion, and will exercise a high degree of caution in the construction of the 
nuclear power station.  
 
After more than one hour of ‘chun qiang she zhan (唇枪舌战 fighting with mouth 
and tongue), were PDs satisfied with the result? “Today we have enough 
communication, we are quite satisfied with the result,” said Chen Han Chu and Wang 
Hong Fu. “We understood and support the province’s policy on promoting nuclear 
power stations. We hoped the province would consider the selection of location 
further, listen to people’s opinions and think about the economic and social benefits. 
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And we hope the energy problem can be resolved properly. PDs will keep following 
this issue.”                    
 The first reply letter from DRCGP  
 “Mr Chen Han Chu and other deputies: 
Your suggestions that ‘it is inappropriate to locate the first inland nuclear power 
station in Meizhou — the upper reaches of the Han River (Provincial People’s 
Congress BIZI No. 6003, the fifth conference of the Provincial People’s Congress 
People’s Deputies suggestion No. 1304)’ have been accepted. The major leaders of 
the province instructed our commission to do the research. During the period of the 
fifth conference of the tenth Provincial People’s Congress the Shantou and Chaozhou 
People’s Deputies also inquired about this issue with our commission, Province 
Environmental Protection Administration, the China Guangdong Nuclear Power 
Group, and so forth. Your suggestion is very important. It fully reflected the 
responsibility of People’s Deputies. We would like to thank you for working for the 
people.  
Our administration handled the research together with the GEPA and CGNPG to 
give you the following reply: 
1) The location of the nuclear power project on the upper reaches of the Han River. 
In order to guarantee the stability of energy supply and reduce the environmental 
pollution caused by energy consumption, the state has raised the strategic policy of 
‘activity promoting the construction of civil nuclear power’.  Guangdong province is 
highly lacking in energy resources. The development of civil nuclear power is one 
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very useful path for energy supply. It has been projected that up until 2010 the 
capability of the province’s nuclear power will reach 6000MW and by 2020 it will 
reach 24,000MW, with 10,000 under construction. Referring to the location problem 
of nuclear power projects, as you have suggested, our priority was to consider the 
coastline locations. Until recently all the operating nuclear power stations and 
nuclear power projects planned by the state have been located along the coastline. 
Although the coastline in Guangdong province is long, the siting requirements of 
nuclear power stations are very strict. The locations which can meet the requirements 
have nearly all been picked up already. So the coastline is not enough to satisfy 
nuclear power developments in Guangdong province. The construction and operation 
experiences of inland nuclear power stations are very well-established worldwide. In 
accordance with improvements in nuclear power technology levels, the state has 
begun to select qualifying locations for inland nuclear power stations. And the state 
will start to build them very soon. That’s why the Guangdong province has begun to 
consider selecting potential locations for inland nuclear power stations on the three 
main rivers (the North River, the West River and the Han River). Now it is just at the 
location selection stage; whether the project can be set up or not must go through shi 
fen yang ge de (十分严格的 very strict) scientific research and testing.  
The initial preparation job for a nuclear power plant takes a very long time. For 
example, the nuclear power location selected in 1988 in Taishan City is still 
competing for being li xiang on the country’s eleventh five-year plan. In order to 
fulfil our province’s nuclear power development plan, we must prepare for the 
location selection and protection jobs beforehand. So the province focuses the 
location selection on the coastline and at the same time starts to select the potential 
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locations of nuclear power stations on the three main rivers. After the experts from 
the State General Electricity Design Institution estimate the locations on the three 
main rivers, they will primarily select one qualifying location for more in-depth 
research. At the next stage, the province will organise related institutions and experts 
to conduct further research on the candidate sites. They conduct very serious research 
and testing on every construction condition yang ge de (严格的 strict) according to 
the nuclear power project management regulations. It was not like some media had 
reported that ‘the first inland nuclear power station will be located on the upper 
reaches of the Han River’.  
2) Safety problems of the nuclear power project. 
Safety is the most important point in nuclear power construction. From the very 
beginning of the nuclear power development plan in Guangdong province, the 
provincial party committee and council always emphasise the safety problem of 
nuclear power. Safety comes first. To strengthen the management of nuclear power 
operations and guarantee the healthy development of nuclear power, the province 
always puts safety at the top level of nuclear power development. 
There are well-established construction and operation experiences of coastal and 
inland nuclear power stations all over the world. Because of the general acceptance 
of the safety of nuclear power together with rapidly rising oil prices, nuclear power is 
developing very fast all over the world. The capability of nuclear ower came just 
after coal and was equal to hydropower in 2005. For example, France is a major 
consumer of nuclear power (about 80%). They have nuclear power stations all over 
the country (including big cities like Paris). The public is satisfied by the safety of 
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nuclear power. Recently, our country has been successfully importing the most 
advanced third generation of technology. And the main distinguishing characteristic 
of the third generation of technology is its safety. The design of the third generation 
technology adopted a lot of prevention and controlling measures. These all help to 
reduce the risk of accidents. The main incoming projects in Guangdong are supposed 
to use the third generation technology. So the safety of nuclear power plants is 
guaranteed. Besides, the nuclear power station will have a shi fen yan ge de (very 
strict) waste management system, in order to reduce the impact on the surrounding 
environment of maximum limits. The state will monitor the waste disposal of the 
nuclear power station shi fen yan ge de (very strictly). The solid waste and high 
radiation liquid waste will not be disposed in the environment at all. Low radiation 
sanitational waste will pass very strict processing and will only be released when it is 
checked and has qualified. The actual release amount is much lower than the national 
standard. The nuclear power station is running under shi fen yan ge de (very strict) 
operation regulations and shi fen yan ge de (very strict) environmental protection and 
monitoring standards. It has very little impact on the surrounding environment. It 
seldom has any influence on people’s lives and farming production nearby. The Daya 
Bay nuclear power station in Shenzhen city is a good example. According to the 
long-term data of 15 environmental monitoring stations in Guangdong province, 
Shenzhen city and Hong Kong, there are no differences between the environmental 
radiation level at present and before the power station was built. And there are no 
changes taking place in the regional ocean ecology categories and figures. The level 
of the marine environment in Daya Bay is equal to that of a seashore.  
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3) The influence of the nuclear power station on the water temperature of the Han 
River. 
The inland nuclear power station planned by our province will be executed on yan ge 
de (strict) environmental protection measures. The cooling system of the nuclear 
power station will use the double recycling format, which means the water will be 
recycled internally. The recycled water will be cooled by air inside the cooling tower. 
There will not be any warm water discharging to the river. The cooling water will be 
reused after cooling by air. This will reduce the amount of water consumption and 
stop warm water discharging to the river. Because of the internal water recycling 
system, the amount of water consumption is just to supply the evaporation. There 
will not be any impact on the residents consuming water in the lower reaches of the 
Han River. All amounts of water discharged will be far lower than the state ‘nuclear 
power station environmental radiation protection regulation’ control level.  
The Han River is the drinking water resource of 10,000,000 people in Shantou, 
Chaozhou and Meizhou city. To build a nuclear power station on such an important 
river, we will refer to your recommendations to be very careful.   
Thank you very much for your valuable recommendations.  
 
                                                                                                      12   April 2007  
(Contact people and telephone: Jing Chu Hong, Liu Zai Zheng 83133078 
83133183)” 
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(My translation)   
 The second reply letter from DRCGP 
“Mr Chen Han Chu and other Deputies:  
Your feedback to the ‘the reply of the Provincial People’s Congress BIZI No. 6003, 
the fifth conference on the Provincial People’s Congress People’s Deputies 
suggestion No. 1304’ has been received. Your suggestions are very important. They 
fully reflect the responsibility of People’s Deputies. They fully represent your 
concern and support for the Guangdong nuclear power development. We appreciate 
that. We would like to reply to your suggestions after very careful checking.   
The news reported on 28 April 2007 that Meizhou has been selected to build the 
nuclear power station. It was not in accordance with the facts. It could cause 
confusion and misunderstanding for readers. Actually the fourth meeting of the 
Guangdong nuclear power construction leader conference did not discuss the subject 
of location. We did not make any decision on the location of the nuclear power 
project.  
To commence the general selection of the nuclear power location is a long- term 
strategy of the province’s nuclear power development. The purpose is to increase the 
reserve resources for the province’s nuclear power station locations. In fact the 
nuclear power programmes on the three main rivers have not yet been set up or 
reached the practical stage. The start date of the inland nuclear power project 
depends on the state’s nuclear power development policy. There will be very strict 
and full testing and research, and recommendations collected from the upper and 
lower reach areas before a specific project can be set up. Only projects in very good 
- 280 - 
 
construction conditions can be set up for preliminary preparation. Because 
Guangdong has a very long coastline, and the reserve locations for the nuclear power 
station are considerably rich, we still planned to build a nuclear power station along 
the coastline in recent years.  
Recently, we started to revise the Province’s nuclear power development plan. 
According to the research and discussion has been conducted of late, and according 
to a synthesised consideration of the construction and location reservation conditions, 
we believe that Guangdong’s nuclear power programmes should be planned along 
the coastline until the year 2015. In this revised version of the development plan we 
are not considering building a nuclear power station on the upper reaches of the Han 
River.  
It is just like you have described on your feedback suggestions that ‘the government 
should work for the people’s benefit’. We will be very careful when dealing with 
issues related to the public benefit. The Han River is the drinking water resource for 
10,000,000 people in Shantou, Chaozhou and Meizhou cities; we will be very careful 
with every construction project on the river.  
Thank you very much for your concern and support of the development of 
Guangdong nuclear power programme. We hope your concern and support for 
Guangdong’s nuclear power development will continue, and together we will 
promote social and economic development in Guangdong province.  
 
                                                                                                             25 June 2007        
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(Contact people and telephone: Jing Chu Hong, Liu Zai Zheng 83133078 
83133183)” 
(My translation)  
1.4 The news in the Meizhou Daily: 
Title: The first inland nuclear power project in Guangdong province is going to be 
located in Meizhou City.  
Meizhou daily  
（Reporter: Luo Juanjuan）A four-day conference on the  preliminary feasibility 
research report of the indeterminate power project in the Han River Basin ended 
yesterday. Three locations named Dangxi, Wailou in Dapu town, and Shensha in 
Fengshun town, Meizhou city, have passed the preliminary feasibility research test. 
The first inland nuclear power project is going to be located in Meizhou city. The 
municipal party committee assistant deputy secretary and routine deputy mayor Li 
Jia attended the summing-up meeting yesterday morning.  
Nuclear power experts and engineers first went to Dangxi, Wailou and Shensha to 
conduct an investigation of the sites. After that they were divided into six groups 
(power system; location; geological and seismic; hydraulic and hydrometeorological; 
environment and safety; and technical and economic) to discuss. After that they 
provided a comprehensive analysis and feasibility study of the location, transport, 
geology and seismology, hydrometeorology, drainage conditions, environmental and 
safety conditions, project investment and economic evaluation. Experts believed that 
these three locations basically satisfy the demand of different types of nuclear 
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reactors. The transport conditions of road and railway also satisfy the requirements. 
At the same time, considering the population distribution, the possibility of external 
and artificial events and radiation effects in normal and accident situations, there are 
no subversive factors in the three locations. So the conditions of the three locations 
basically meet the requirements for constructing a nuclear power station. 
Experts hope Meizhou city can extend protection to the three potential locations and 
generate support. This would help to create a good environment for promoting the 
nuclear power project on the Han River.  
Li Jia showed his appreciation for the experts and the distinguished jobs they have 
done for Meizhou city. He said that having the nuclear power project when Meizhou 
city is in need of development is good news for local people. He also said that 
constructing a nuclear power station is an historic and strategic project. All levels of 
departments of the city council will do their best to protect the three potential 
locations and help with other relevant jobs. And he hoped that the inland nuclear 
power project on the Han River can be agreed and that construction will begin soon, 
along with bringing benefits to people living around the mountains 54 .    
 
54Meizhou city is surrounded by mountains.  
Appendix 2 List of Fieldwork Events 
Visiting studentship: July – August 2007, Registration as visiting student in China 
Science Academy, Beijing  
 
Conferences and meetings:  
4) 30 June 2007 – 02 July 2007, Beijing International Conference on 
Environmental Sociology, Renmin University of China   
5) 15 July 2007, Opening Conference of 2007 Summer School of 
Nuclear Science and Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing  
6) 8 January 2008 – 12 January 2008, Fourth Annual Graduate Seminar 
on China (GSOC), The Hong Kong Chinese University, Hong Kong  
7) 15 March 2008, First Citizen Forum in Guangzhou  
 
Visiting: 
4. 6 August 2007, visited the automatic water condition monitoring 
station, Shantou city 
5. 7 August 2007, visited the wind farm on Nan’ao Island, near Shantou 
city 
6. 24 February 2008, visited selected location of nuclear sites in Dangxi 
village and Shanzhou village, Dapu townland  
 
Selection of important Interviews  
BL, secretary-general of the China Nuclear Academy 
BC, president secretary of State Environmental Protection Administration  
Professor Tang Danning, China Science Academy, South China Sea Institute of 
Oceanology  
Chen Feng, journalist from Southern China Daily  
Chen Hanchu, Provincial PD from Shantou city 
CH, Provincial PD from Chaozhou city  
- 284 - 
 
- 285 - 
 
CW, Provincial PD from Chaozhou city 
DL, local government official, Dapu town  
DXu, local government official, Dapu town 
DHe (i), local government official, Dapu town 
DEL, engineer in the Dapu Environmental Protection Administration 
DHe, local garage owner, Dapu town 
DS, local Chinese doctor  
DH, leader of Dangxi village 
DZ, leader of Shanzhou village  
GZH, director of the Publicity Management Office, Provincial Broadcast and 
Television Bureau 
Zhu Hanqiang, jounalist report news about Daya Bay nuclear power station in Hong 
Kong fro, 1994-1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
